Attorney-General (Q) (Ex rel Duncan) v Andrews [1979] HCA 24

Attorney-General (Q) (Ex rel Duncan) v Andrews [1979] HCA 24

The appeal was dismissed because the majority held that cl. 46(h) did not require every part of a road forming a frontage to the land to satisfy the prescribed width. Since vehicular access to the proposed accommodation-unit development was to be restricted to the portion of frontage adjacent to lot 38, and the adjacent road section was capable of being treated as the principal road frontage whatever its name, the Council acted within the lawful scope of cl. 46(h).

Jurisdiction
Australia
Procedural Posture
Relator Action Concerning Preliminary Building Approval Under a Town Planning Scheme / Appeal to the High Court of Australia From the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland
Outcome
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Topics
['construction of Town Planning Scheme' 'principal Road Frontage' 'vehicular Access for Accommodation Units' 'appeal as of Right Under Judiciary Act' 'substitution of Relators']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Relator Action Concerning Preliminary Building Approval Under a Town Planning Scheme / Appeal to the High Court of Australia From the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland

  1. 1 ['Whether the Gold Coast City Council had power under cl. 46(h) of the Town-Planning Scheme for the City of Gold Coast to determine that Fern Street formed the principal road frontage to the subject land.' 'Whether any part of the subject land could be determined to have a frontage to Fern Street upon the proper construction of cl. 46(h).' 'Whether the appeal was competent as of right under s. 35(3)(b) of the Judiciary Act.' 'Whether the executors of the deceased original relator could be substituted as relators.']

Ratio Decidendi

The appeal was dismissed because the majority held that cl. 46(h) did not require every part of a road forming a frontage to the land to satisfy the prescribed width. Since vehicular access to the proposed accommodation-unit development was to be restricted to the portion of frontage adjacent to lot 38, and the adjacent road section was capable of being treated as the principal road frontage whatever its name, the Council acted within the lawful scope of cl. 46(h).

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Orders

  • ['Appeal dismissed with costs.']