NAB v Garry & anor [2003] NSWSC 22

NAB v Garry & anor [2003] NSWSC 22

Mr Simpson's long and extensive banking experience gave him specialised knowledge in banking practice, procedure, securities and enforcement, and his opinions on the Bank's conduct were based on that knowledge and on material identified in his affidavit. The evidence therefore qualified for admission as expert testimony under the common law and s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any s 135 danger.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
03 February 2003
Procedural Posture
Evidence Expert Opinion Evidence Admissibility / Judgment on Admission of Affidavit of Peter Middleton Simpson Sworn 20/09/2001
Outcome
Witness determined to be an expert able to express opinions on the subject matters objected to.
Legal Topics
['expert Evidence' 'opinion Evidence' 'ambit of Expertise' 'admissibility Under Common Law and Evidence Act 1995' 'section 79 Specialised Knowledge Exception' 'section 135 Discretion to Exclude Evidence' 'banking Practice, Procedure and Propriety']
['evidence' 'banking'] ['expert Evidence' 'opinion Evidence' 'ambit of Expertise' 'admissibility Under Common Law and Evidence Act 1995' 'section 79 Specialised Knowledge Exception' 'section 135 Discretion to Exclude Evidence' 'banking Practice, Procedure and Propriety']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Evidence Expert Opinion Evidence Admissibility / Judgment on Admission of Affidavit of Peter Middleton Simpson Sworn 20/09/2001

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ['Whether Mr Simpson demonstrated expertise in a relevant field sufficient to give opinion evidence on banking practice, procedure and propriety.' "Whether Mr Simpson's opinions were based on specialised knowledge within s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995." 'Whether the evidence should be rejected under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, risk of being misleading or confusing, or undue waste of time.']

Ratio Decidendi

Mr Simpson's long and extensive banking experience gave him specialised knowledge in banking practice, procedure, securities and enforcement, and his opinions on the Bank's conduct were based on that knowledge and on material identified in his affidavit. The evidence therefore qualified for admission as expert testimony under the common law and s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any s 135 danger.

Court Disposition

Witness determined to be an expert able to express opinions on the subject matters objected to.

Orders

  • ['Mr Simpson is an expert able to express opinions in relation to the matters set out in paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 of the statement annexed to his affidavit of 20 September 2001.' 'The evidence is not rejected pursuant to s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995.']