Creevey v Barrois [2005] NSWCA 264
Although leave to appeal was granted because the primary judge arguably erred on the availability of a contribution cross-claim under s 26(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), the appeal failed because Mr Creevey did not establish that the alleged lost cross-claim against Mr Clements was viable and realistic. The evidence showed, at most, a theoretical possibility of contribution; accordingly no real and practical prejudice sufficient to make the out-of-time proceedings unfair was established.
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Judgment Date
- 15 August 2005
- Procedural Posture
- Application for Leave to Appeal From a District Court Decision Granting Leave to Commence Motor Accident Proceedings Out of Time / Court of Appeal; Leave to Appeal Granted and Appeal Dismissed
- Outcome
- Leave to appeal granted; appeal dismissed with costs.
- Legal Topics
- ['extension of Time to Commence Proceedings Under Motor Accidents Act 1988 (nsw)' 'fair Trial After Delay' 'prejudice From Delay' 'contribution Between Tortfeasors' 'lost Opportunity to Cross Claim Against a Third Party' 'limitation Period Under S 26(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1969 (nsw)']
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal From a District Court Decision Granting Leave to Commence Motor Accident Proceedings Out of Time / Court of Appeal; Leave to Appeal Granted and Appeal Dismissed
Legal Issues
- 1 ['Whether leave should have been granted to commence proceedings more than three years after the date by which the motor accident claim had to be made under s 52(4) of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW).' 'Whether, despite the delay, a fair trial of the issues between the parties could reasonably be anticipated.' 'Whether Mr Creevey suffered significant prejudice because the time to bring a contribution claim against a potential joint tortfeasor had expired under s 26(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).' 'Whether the alleged lost cross-claim against Mr Clements was viable and realistic rather than merely fanciful or theoretical.']
Ratio Decidendi
Although leave to appeal was granted because the primary judge arguably erred on the availability of a contribution cross-claim under s 26(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), the appeal failed because Mr Creevey did not establish that the alleged lost cross-claim against Mr Clements was viable and realistic. The evidence showed, at most, a theoretical possibility of contribution; accordingly no real and practical prejudice sufficient to make the out-of-time proceedings unfair was established.
Court Disposition
Leave to appeal granted; appeal dismissed with costs.
Orders
- ['Grant leave to appeal.' 'Appeal dismissed with costs.']
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
Sign in to read
Sign in to read the full judgment text
Sign in to read the full judgment text. Downloads and additional research tools may depend on your plan.
Sign in to read the full judgment