R v Droudis (No. 7) [2016] NSWSC 1274
The second representation was admissible under s.65 Evidence Act 1995 because it was made shortly after the asserted fact occurred, in circumstances making fabrication unlikely and reliability sufficiently probable, and it also satisfied s.65(2)(d). The first representation was not admissible because the evidence was uncertain as to timing and attribution to the Accused rather than Monis, and the Court could not make favourable findings as to reliability under s.65(2).
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Judgment Date
- 05 September 2016
- Procedural Posture
- Judge Alone Trial for Murder / Procedural Ruling on Voir Dire Concerning Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence Under S.65(2) Evidence Act 1995
- Outcome
- For the purpose of s.65(2) Evidence Act 1995, the hearsay rule applies to the first representation but not the second representation arising from the evidence of Sonia Conciatore.
- Legal Topics
- ['hearsay' 'first Hand Hearsay' 'unavailable Witness' 'admissibility of Representations' 'evidence Act 1995 S.65(2)']
Case Brief
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Procedural Posture
Judge Alone Trial for Murder / Procedural Ruling on Voir Dire Concerning Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence Under S.65(2) Evidence Act 1995
Legal Issues
- 1 ['Whether two representations conveyed through Sonia Conciatore about statements made by the deceased concerning communications with the Accused were admissible under s.65(2) Evidence Act 1995.' 'Whether the alleged representations were second-hand hearsay or first-hand hearsay.' 'Whether the first representation concerning the use of the word "Mummy" satisfied the reliability requirements for admission under s.65(2).' 'Whether the second representation concerning an argument about the boys living with Monis satisfied the requirements for admission under s.65(2).']
Ratio Decidendi
The second representation was admissible under s.65 Evidence Act 1995 because it was made shortly after the asserted fact occurred, in circumstances making fabrication unlikely and reliability sufficiently probable, and it also satisfied s.65(2)(d). The first representation was not admissible because the evidence was uncertain as to timing and attribution to the Accused rather than Monis, and the Court could not make favourable findings as to reliability under s.65(2).
Court Disposition
For the purpose of s.65(2) Evidence Act 1995, the hearsay rule applies to the first representation but not the second representation arising from the evidence of Sonia Conciatore.
Orders
- ['The second representation is admitted and treated as admissible under s.65 Evidence Act 1995.' 'The first representation is not admitted for the purpose of s.65.']
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