Marshall v Fleming [2014] NSWCA 64
The orders of the primary judge were set aside because the Memorandum of Understanding was not engaged on a referral under UCPR r 20.14, the order did not appoint a particular referee, and did not identify the questions of foreign law to be referred, as required by the rules.
- Parties
- First Applicant: Margaret Lesley Marshall; Second Applicant: Kim Neil Marshall; First Respondent: Francis G Fleming; Second Respondent: Marc S Moller; Third Respondent: Steven R Pounian; Fourth Respondent: James P Kreindler; Fifth Respondent: David C Cook; Sixth Respondent: David Beekman; Seventh Respondent: Bianca I Rodriguez; Eighth Respondent: Noah H Kushlefsky; Ninth Respondent: Robert J Spragg; Tenth Respondent: Brian J Alexander; Eleventh Respondent: Justin T Green
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Judgment Date
- 20 March 2014
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal and Appeal From Interlocutory Order
- Outcome
- Appeal allowed in part; orders for leave to appeal, setting aside of primary orders, and directions for further steps.
- Legal Topics
- Interlocutory Order, Referral of Questions of Law, Foreign Law, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Margaret Lesley Marshall
First Applicant
Kim Neil Marshall
Second Applicant
Francis G Fleming
First Respondent
Marc S Moller
Second Respondent
Steven R Pounian
Third Respondent
James P Kreindler
Fourth Respondent
David C Cook
Fifth Respondent
David Beekman
Sixth Respondent
Bianca I Rodriguez
Seventh Respondent
Noah H Kushlefsky
Eighth Respondent
Robert J Spragg
Ninth Respondent
Brian J Alexander
Tenth Respondent
Justin T Green
Eleventh Respondent
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal and Appeal From Interlocutory Order
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the primary judge erred in making an order under UCPR r 20.14 referring questions of foreign law to a New York Panel of Referees without appointing a referee and identifying the questions to be referred;
- 2 Whether the Memorandum of Understanding between the Chief Justice of New South Wales and Chief Judge of the State of New York is engaged in circumstance of the reference under UCPR r 20.14;
- 3 Whether an order for referral under UCPR r 20.14 requires identification of the referee and question(s) to be answered
Ratio Decidendi
The orders of the primary judge were set aside because the Memorandum of Understanding was not engaged on a referral under UCPR r 20.14, the order did not appoint a particular referee, and did not identify the questions of foreign law to be referred, as required by the rules.
Court Disposition
Appeal allowed in part; orders for leave to appeal, setting aside of primary orders, and directions for further steps.
Orders
- Grant the applicants leave to appeal limited to the three matters referred to in par [14] of this judgment.
- Direct the applicants to file a Notice of Appeal limited to those matters within 7 days.
Full Case Text
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