Triggell v Pheeney [1951] HCA 23

Triggell v Pheeney [1951] HCA 23

The jury was entitled to consider the defendant's conduct throughout, including at trial, in assessing aggravated damages, but only to the extent that such conduct was improper or lacking bona fides. The trial judge's directions properly reflected this principle, and the damages were not so excessive as to require a new trial so the jury's verdict should be restored.

Parties
Appellant; Plaintiff: Daniel Triggell (deceased, represented by executors John Alwin Triggell and Walter James Triggell); Respondent; Defendant: Arthur James Pheeney
Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
10 May 1951
Procedural Posture
Appeal / Appeal From the Supreme Court of New South Wales (full Court) to the High Court of Australia
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Libel, Damages, Qualified Privilege, Malice, Assessment of Damages
Defamation Tort Law Libel Damages Qualified Privilege Malice Assessment of Damages

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

More case intelligence is available

Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.

Full judgment text Downloadable case file Legal principles 4 Authorities cited 24 Party arguments 2 Amounts and remedies 2
Sign in to unlock

Parties

Daniel Triggell (deceased, represented by executors John Alwin Triggell and Walter James Triggell)

Appellant; Plaintiff

Arthur James Pheeney

Respondent; Defendant

Procedural Posture

Appeal / Appeal From the Supreme Court of New South Wales (full Court) to the High Court of Australia

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the jury may consider the conduct of the defendant at trial (including statements of belief) in aggravation of damages in a defamation action
  2. 2 Whether the damages awarded (£1,955) were so excessive as to require a new trial
  3. 3 Whether directions to the jury regarding defendant’s conduct at trial amounted to a misdirection

Ratio Decidendi

The jury was entitled to consider the defendant's conduct throughout, including at trial, in assessing aggravated damages, but only to the extent that such conduct was improper or lacking bona fides. The trial judge's directions properly reflected this principle, and the damages were not so excessive as to require a new trial so the jury's verdict should be restored.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • Order of the Supreme Court of New South Wales discharged
  • Verdict of the jury for the plaintiff (appellant) restored