R. v. AJL [2000] NSWCCA 104

R. v. AJL [2000] NSWCCA 104

The unreasonable verdict ground failed because, notwithstanding the matters relied on by the Appellant, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. However, the complaint evidence was wrongly admitted under s.66 of the Evidence Act 1995; its admission under s.108(3)(b) was not inevitable, and the jury had been directed that Ms B's evidence was evidence of the truth of what she was told. The Court could not conclude that the Appellant did not lose a significant chance of acquittal, so the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
12 April 2000
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal Against Convictions and Sentences / Appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal From the District Court
Outcome
Appeal allowed; convictions and sentences quashed; new trial ordered.
Legal Topics
['appeal Against Conviction' 'unreasonable Verdict' 'complaint Evidence' 'fresh in the Memory' 'prior Consistent Statements' 'unfair Prejudice' 'new Trial']

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

More case intelligence is available

Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.

Full judgment text Downloadable case file Legal principles 1 Authorities cited 2 Party arguments 2 Amounts and remedies 1
Sign in to unlock

Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal Against Convictions and Sentences / Appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal From the District Court

  1. 1 ['Whether the convictions were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence.' "Whether Backhouse DCJ erred in admitting evidence of the complainant's complaint to Ms B under s. 66 of the Evidence Act 1995." 'Whether, despite inadmissibility under s. 66, no miscarriage of justice occurred because the complaint evidence could have been admitted under s.108(3)(b) of the Evidence Act 1995.']

Ratio Decidendi

The unreasonable verdict ground failed because, notwithstanding the matters relied on by the Appellant, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. However, the complaint evidence was wrongly admitted under s.66 of the Evidence Act 1995; its admission under s.108(3)(b) was not inevitable, and the jury had been directed that Ms B's evidence was evidence of the truth of what she was told. The Court could not conclude that the Appellant did not lose a significant chance of acquittal, so the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; convictions and sentences quashed; new trial ordered.

Orders

  • ['ORDER that the appeal be allowed.' 'ORDER that the convictions and sentences be quashed.' 'ORDER that there be a new trial.']