Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45

Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45

There is neither a statutory nor common law norm, whether as a percentage or otherwise, for the time a federal offender must serve before release on a recognizance release order. Sentencing must be of severity appropriate to all the circumstances. The sentences at first instance were manifestly inadequate given the seriousness, duration, and scale of the offending, compared to comparable sentences for similar conduct. The Court of Criminal Appeal was correct to find manifest inadequacy, and its reasons, though not fully stating all relevant principles, sufficiently revealed the bases for that conclusion.

Parties
Applicant: Anthony Joseph Luis Hili; Applicant: Glyn Morgan Jones; Respondent: The Queen
Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
08 December 2010
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / High Court Special Leave to Appeal From Supreme Court of New South Wales, After Court of Criminal Appeal Judgment on Prosecution Appeal Against Sentence
Outcome
Special leave to appeal granted on grounds one to six for both applicants (ground seven refused for Mr Jones). Appeals dismissed.
Legal Topics
Sentencing, Federal Offences, Manifest Inadequacy of Sentence, Consistency in Sentencing, Recognizance Release Orders
Criminal Law Sentencing Federal Offences Manifest Inadequacy of Sentence Consistency in Sentencing Recognizance Release Orders

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Parties

Anthony Joseph Luis Hili

Applicant

Glyn Morgan Jones

Applicant

The Queen

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal / High Court Special Leave to Appeal From Supreme Court of New South Wales, After Court of Criminal Appeal Judgment on Prosecution Appeal Against Sentence

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Is there a judicially determined 'norm' or starting point for the period of imprisonment a federal offender must serve before release on recognizance?
  2. 2 Were the sentences imposed at first instance manifestly inadequate?
  3. 3 Did the Court of Criminal Appeal give adequate reasons for its finding of manifest inadequacy?

Ratio Decidendi

There is neither a statutory nor common law norm, whether as a percentage or otherwise, for the time a federal offender must serve before release on a recognizance release order. Sentencing must be of severity appropriate to all the circumstances. The sentences at first instance were manifestly inadequate given the seriousness, duration, and scale of the offending, compared to comparable sentences for similar conduct. The Court of Criminal Appeal was correct to find manifest inadequacy, and its reasons, though not fully stating all relevant principles, sufficiently revealed the bases for that conclusion.

Court Disposition

Special leave to appeal granted on grounds one to six for both applicants (ground seven refused for Mr Jones). Appeals dismissed.

Orders

  • In S142/2010: Special leave to appeal granted on grounds one to six inclusive. Appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter, and dismissed.
  • In S143/2010: Special leave to appeal granted on grounds one to six inclusive, refused on ground seven. Appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter, and dismissed.