Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd (ACN 051 373 570) v Dyer, Arthur James [1996] FCA 1001
The motions were dismissed because Jenkinson J's orders of 24 July 1996 finally determined the applications to set aside the statutory demands and were not interlocutory; the Federal Court Rules could not be used to alter the substantive operation of ss 459F and 459G; and, after the extended compliance period expired, s.459F left no power to make a further extension, while s.1322(4)(d) could not override the specific statutory demand time limits.
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Judgment Date
- 19 November 1996
- Procedural Posture
- Applications Under Ss 459 G and 459 H of the Corporations Law Concerning Statutory Demands; Motions for Further Extension of Time / Reasons and Orders on Motions on Notice Dated 23 August 1996 Seeking to Set Aside or Vary the Orders of Jenkinson J, or Extend Time for Compliance With Statutory Demands
- Outcome
- Motions on notice dated 23 August 1996 dismissed.
- Legal Topics
- ['statutory Demands' 'extension of Time for Compliance' 'setting Aside or Varying Orders' 'winding Up in Insolvency' 'federal Court Rules']
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Procedural Posture
Applications Under Ss 459 G and 459 H of the Corporations Law Concerning Statutory Demands; Motions for Further Extension of Time / Reasons and Orders on Motions on Notice Dated 23 August 1996 Seeking to Set Aside or Vary the Orders of Jenkinson J, or Extend Time for Compliance With Statutory Demands
Legal Issues
- 1 ['Whether the Court had power under Order 35 rule 7(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules to set aside or vary the orders made by Jenkinson J on 24 July 1996.' 'Whether the Court had power under Order 3 rule 3 of the Federal Court Rules to extend further the time for compliance with the statutory demands.' 'Whether s. 459F(2) of the Corporations Law permitted a further extension of time after the existing compliance period had expired.' 'Whether s. 1322(4)(d) of the Corporations Law could be used to override the time limits operating under s.459F.' 'Whether the orders of Jenkinson J finally determined the applications to set aside the statutory demands.']
Ratio Decidendi
The motions were dismissed because Jenkinson J's orders of 24 July 1996 finally determined the applications to set aside the statutory demands and were not interlocutory; the Federal Court Rules could not be used to alter the substantive operation of ss 459F and 459G; and, after the extended compliance period expired, s.459F left no power to make a further extension, while s.1322(4)(d) could not override the specific statutory demand time limits.
Court Disposition
Motions on notice dated 23 August 1996 dismissed.
Orders
- ['That the motion on notice dated 23 August 1996 be dismissed.' "That, in the event that the applicant is wound up in an application relying on the present demand as varied by the order of Jenkinson J, the respondent's costs of this application form part of its costs in that winding up application, but that...
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