Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [1990] HCA 21

The High Court held that the Attorney-General is not bound to consider the respondent's (Quin’s) application for appointment as magistrate in isolation from other applications or to apply the selection process previously used; the duty of procedural fairness established in Macrae entitled Quin only to an opportunity to respond to adverse material, not to substantive or preferential consideration. The executive may change its policy for making appointments, provided the new process is lawful and conforms to the statute, and cannot be bound by a legitimate expectation or estoppel to exercise its discretion in a particular way. The appeal was allowed, the declaration of the Court of Appeal...

Jurisdiction
Australia
Procedural Posture
Appeal / High Court of Australia Appellate Judgment
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
['procedural Fairness' 'legitimate Expectation' 'judicial Review' 'appointment of Judicial Officers' 'natural Justice']
['administrative Law' 'constitutional Law'] ['procedural Fairness' 'legitimate Expectation' 'judicial Review' 'appointment of Judicial Officers' 'natural Justice']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Appeal / High Court of Australia Appellate Judgment

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ["Whether the Attorney-General is required to consider the respondent's application for appointment as a magistrate on its own merits and not in competition with other applicants" 'Whether the duty of procedural fairness or a legitimate expectation gives rise to a right to a substantive result or only to a procedural right' 'Whether an executive policy can fetter or be fettered by representations or expectations arising from its prior conduct in the absence of statutory prescription']

Ratio Decidendi

The High Court held that the Attorney-General is not bound to consider the respondent's (Quin’s) application for appointment as magistrate in isolation from other applications or to apply the selection process previously used; the duty of procedural fairness established in Macrae entitled Quin only to an opportunity to respond to adverse material, not to substantive or preferential consideration. The executive may change its policy for making appointments, provided the new process is lawful and conforms to the statute, and cannot be bound by a legitimate expectation or estoppel to exercise its discretion in a particular way. The appeal was allowed, the declaration of the Court of Appeal...

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • ['Appeal allowed with costs.' 'Set aside the declaration of the Court of Appeal.' "Declare that the appellant is bound to consider the respondent's application for appointment as a magistrate dated 12 December 1983 in accordance with the judgment of this Court." 'Reserve the question what order should be made with...