Pham v Comcare [2003] FCAFC 166

Pham v Comcare [2003] FCAFC 166

Leave to appeal was refused because the applicant's proposed notice of appeal suffered from the same deficiency as the notices before the primary judge, in that it identified no arguable question of law or appellable error. Ryan J's discretionary decision refusing an extension of time was clearly correct, was not attended by sufficient doubt, and refusal of leave would not cause substantial injustice.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
05 August 2003
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal / Full Court Application for Leave to Appeal From a Single Judge Refusing an Extension of Time to Appeal From an Administrative Appeals Tribunal Decision
Outcome
Leave to appeal refused with costs.
Legal Topics
['leave to Appeal' 'extension of Time' 'appeal From Administrative Appeals Tribunal on a Question of Law' 'safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Claim' 'interlocutory Decision' 'discretionary Decision']
['administrative Law' 'workers Compensation' 'federal Court Appellate Procedure'] ['leave to Appeal' 'extension of Time' 'appeal From Administrative Appeals Tribunal on a Question of Law' 'safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Claim' 'interlocutory Decision' 'discretionary Decision']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Application for Leave to Appeal / Full Court Application for Leave to Appeal From a Single Judge Refusing an Extension of Time to Appeal From an Administrative Appeals Tribunal Decision

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ["Whether leave to appeal should be granted from the single judge's refusal to extend time under s 44(2A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1976 (Cth)." "Whether the applicant identified an arguable question of law or appellable error in the Tribunal's decision or the primary judge's discretionary decision." 'Whether the decision was attended by sufficient doubt and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused.']

Ratio Decidendi

Leave to appeal was refused because the applicant's proposed notice of appeal suffered from the same deficiency as the notices before the primary judge, in that it identified no arguable question of law or appellable error. Ryan J's discretionary decision refusing an extension of time was clearly correct, was not attended by sufficient doubt, and refusal of leave would not cause substantial injustice.

Court Disposition

Leave to appeal refused with costs.

Orders

  • ['Leave to appeal be refused.' "The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal."]