R v Paton (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1617

R v Paton (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1617

Applying the Davidson test, the Crown case contained sufficient other circumstantial evidence to go to the jury on the accused's complicity in the shooting even without the firearm, ammunition and threat to kill evidence from Ms Cameron. Those matters therefore were not indispensable intermediate facts and the jury need not be directed that they must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before reasoning towards guilt.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
31 October 2013
Procedural Posture
Criminal Law Murder / Procedural Ruling on Defendant's Application for a Shepherd Direction in a Jury Trial
Outcome
Application refused; the firearm, ammunition and threat to kill matters were held not to be indispensable intermediate facts.
Legal Topics
['shepherd Direction' 'circumstantial Case' 'indispensable Intermediate Facts' 'murray Direction' 'joint Criminal Enterprise' 'intentional Assistance or Encouragement']

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Procedural Posture

Criminal Law Murder / Procedural Ruling on Defendant's Application for a Shepherd Direction in a Jury Trial

  1. 1 ["Whether evidence that a firearm was in Mr Kearnes' living room in the general presence of the accused, ammunition was in the same location with the accused aware of it, and Mr Kearnes made a threat to kill in the accused's presence were indispensable intermediate facts in the Crown's circumstantial case." "Whether, absent those asserted facts, there would nonetheless be a case to go to the jury on the accused's complicity in murder." "Whether a Murray direction should be given in light of the importance of Ms Cameron's evidence."]

Ratio Decidendi

Applying the Davidson test, the Crown case contained sufficient other circumstantial evidence to go to the jury on the accused's complicity in the shooting even without the firearm, ammunition and threat to kill evidence from Ms Cameron. Those matters therefore were not indispensable intermediate facts and the jury need not be directed that they must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before reasoning towards guilt.

Court Disposition

Application refused; the firearm, ammunition and threat to kill matters were held not to be indispensable intermediate facts.

Orders

  • ['The matters of the firearm, the ammunition and the threat to kill are not indispensable intermediate facts.' 'The judge did not propose to direct the jury that those matters must be established beyond reasonable doubt before the jury could reason towards satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of...