R v Paton (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1616

R v Paton (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1616

Manslaughter was not viable on the evidence. Ms Cameron's evidence was evidence of her belief, not evidence that the accused agreed to frighten the deceased. Even if the accused agreed to "sort out" the deceased by confrontation or assault, that act was not remotely connected to the death, which was caused by repeated shooting; there was no evidence of a confrontation or beating leading to or developing into the firearm discharge.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
30 October 2013
Procedural Posture
Criminal Law Murder Trial / Procedural Ruling During Trial Before Crown Final Address on Whether Manslaughter Should Be Left to the Jury
Outcome
Manslaughter is not to be left to the jury.
Legal Topics
['murder' 'manslaughter as Alternative Verdict' 'joint Criminal Enterprise' 'accessorial Liability' 'unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter' 'criminal Causation']
['criminal Law' 'criminal Procedure'] ['murder' 'manslaughter as Alternative Verdict' 'joint Criminal Enterprise' 'accessorial Liability' 'unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter' 'criminal Causation']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Criminal Law Murder Trial / Procedural Ruling During Trial Before Crown Final Address on Whether Manslaughter Should Be Left to the Jury

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ['Whether manslaughter was viable on the evidence and should be left to the jury as an alternative verdict in a murder trial based on joint criminal enterprise or accessorial liability.' 'Whether evidence that the accused and Peter Kearnes went to "sort out" or frighten the deceased could support complicity in an unlawful and dangerous act causing death.']

Ratio Decidendi

Manslaughter was not viable on the evidence. Ms Cameron's evidence was evidence of her belief, not evidence that the accused agreed to frighten the deceased. Even if the accused agreed to "sort out" the deceased by confrontation or assault, that act was not remotely connected to the death, which was caused by repeated shooting; there was no evidence of a confrontation or beating leading to or developing into the firearm discharge.

Court Disposition

Manslaughter is not to be left to the jury.

Orders

  • ['Manslaughter is not to be left to the jury.']