Easterday, Clark Ervin v Australian Securities Commission & Anor [1996] FCA 643

Easterday, Clark Ervin v Australian Securities Commission & Anor [1996] FCA 643

The mareva injunction affected only the practical recoverability of costs and did not constitute a special circumstance justifying departure from the ordinary rule that costs follow the event. The appeal was not an error of law beset with difficulty, and the applicant sought an indulgence on wholly inadequate grounds. Separate representation was reasonable because the respondents had separate spheres of interests, so the applicant should pay the costs of both respondents, with further submissions to be received about fixing the second respondent's costs and the applicant's response to fixed costs.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
26 July 1996
Procedural Posture
Appeal From the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Concerning Freedom of Information / Costs Following Dismissal of the Appeal
Outcome
Costs awarded to the first and second respondents; further submissions ordered on whether the second respondent's costs should be fixed in a sum and on the applicant's response to fixed costs.
Legal Topics
['costs Follow the Event' 'special Circumstances in Costs' 'mareva Injunction' 'separate Representation' 'fixed Costs Orders']
['costs' 'administrative Law' 'freedom of Information'] ['costs Follow the Event' 'special Circumstances in Costs' 'mareva Injunction' 'separate Representation' 'fixed Costs Orders']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Appeal From the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Concerning Freedom of Information / Costs Following Dismissal of the Appeal

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ["Whether costs should follow the event after dismissal of the applicant's appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal." "Whether a mareva injunction over the applicant's assets was a special circumstance barring or affecting costs orders." 'Whether separate representation costs should be allowed for the two respondents.' 'Whether costs orders should be fixed in a sum.']

Ratio Decidendi

The mareva injunction affected only the practical recoverability of costs and did not constitute a special circumstance justifying departure from the ordinary rule that costs follow the event. The appeal was not an error of law beset with difficulty, and the applicant sought an indulgence on wholly inadequate grounds. Separate representation was reasonable because the respondents had separate spheres of interests, so the applicant should pay the costs of both respondents, with further submissions to be received about fixing the second respondent's costs and the applicant's response to fixed costs.

Court Disposition

Costs awarded to the first and second respondents; further submissions ordered on whether the second respondent's costs should be fixed in a sum and on the applicant's response to fixed costs.

Orders

  • ['The second respondent do within 5 days file and serve a submission on whether its costs should be fixed in a sum.' 'The applicant have a further 5 days to file and serve any submission in reply.']