Shepperd v Ryde Corporation [1952] HCA 9

Shepperd v Ryde Corporation [1952] HCA 9

The High Court found the appellant had made out a prima-facie case that a collateral promise or implied term existed that the areas in question would be used as parks and not otherwise, arising from the scheme and representations made prior to contract. This was sufficient to justify an interlocutory injunction restraining the council from altering the use of the park areas pending final determination.

Parties
Appellant / Plaintiff: Cecil Leslie Maurice Shepperd; Respondent / Defendant: Council of the Municipality of Ryde
Jurisdiction
Australia
Procedural Posture
Appeal From Interlocutory Decision in Equity (injunction Application) / High Court of Australia Appeal From Supreme Court of New South Wales
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Collateral Contract, Incorporation of Plans in Contracts, Representation and Estoppel, Implied Terms, Interlocutory Injunction, Amenities in Subdivisions, Powers and Obligations of Municipal Councils

Case Brief

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Parties

Cecil Leslie Maurice Shepperd

Appellant / Plaintiff

Council of the Municipality of Ryde

Respondent / Defendant

Procedural Posture

Appeal From Interlocutory Decision in Equity (injunction Application) / High Court of Australia Appeal From Supreme Court of New South Wales

  1. 1 Whether the plan and brochure supplied by the Council formed part of the contract or gave rise to a collateral contract or promise not to use the park areas for other purposes
  2. 2 Whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Council from using the park areas otherwise than as parks
  3. 3 Whether a representation concerning the future use of land as a park could form a basis for estoppel or equitable relief

Ratio Decidendi

The High Court found the appellant had made out a prima-facie case that a collateral promise or implied term existed that the areas in question would be used as parks and not otherwise, arising from the scheme and representations made prior to contract. This was sufficient to justify an interlocutory injunction restraining the council from altering the use of the park areas pending final determination.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • Order of the Supreme Court of 24 September 1951 discharged.
  • The respondent Council, by its servants and agents, is restrained until the hearing of the suit or further order from using or permitting use of the area bounded by Perkins Street and Driver Street, shown on the plan as 'Park', for any purpose other than a park.