Jones v Spackman [2014] NSWDC 139

Jones v Spackman [2014] NSWDC 139

Having weighed the delay, facts, and concrete prejudice, the Court held there was no material prejudice to the defendant arising from the delayed commencement of proceedings. Relevant evidence (notably the statement of Mr Robinson) was available, and any dimming of memory was reasonable given the circumstances of a significant event. Most delays were due to requirements under the workers compensation legislation, solicitor delays (not attributable to the plaintiff), and procedural steps. No evidence was lost, the claim was not suddenly sprung on the defendant, and a fair trial was possible. It was fair and just to grant leave.

Parties
Applicant: Danielle Jones; Respondent: Graeme Spackman
Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
22 July 2014
Procedural Posture
Interlocutory Application / Application for Extension of Limitation Period Under S 151 D(2) Workers Compensation Act 1987
Outcome
Application allowed
Legal Topics
Extension of Limitation Period, Work Injury Damages, Procedural Fairness, Negligence (workplace Accident)
Personal Injury Workers Compensation Limitation of Actions Extension of Limitation Period Work Injury Damages Procedural Fairness Negligence (workplace Accident)

Case Brief

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Parties

Danielle Jones

Applicant

Graeme Spackman

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Interlocutory Application / Application for Extension of Limitation Period Under S 151 D(2) Workers Compensation Act 1987

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether leave should be granted under s 151D(2) Workers Compensation Act 1987 to commence proceedings out of time
  2. 2 Whether the defendant has suffered material prejudice due to the delay
  3. 3 If the plaintiff's delay is attributable to her or her solicitors, and impact of such delay

Ratio Decidendi

Having weighed the delay, facts, and concrete prejudice, the Court held there was no material prejudice to the defendant arising from the delayed commencement of proceedings. Relevant evidence (notably the statement of Mr Robinson) was available, and any dimming of memory was reasonable given the circumstances of a significant event. Most delays were due to requirements under the workers compensation legislation, solicitor delays (not attributable to the plaintiff), and procedural steps. No evidence was lost, the claim was not suddenly sprung on the defendant, and a fair trial was possible. It was fair and just to grant leave.

Court Disposition

Application allowed

Orders

  • Leave granted to the plaintiff, pursuant to s 151D(2) of the Workers Compensation Act 1987, to commence proceedings for the cause of action alleged on 14 January 2004 on 2 August 2013.
  • Plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of this application.