Jovanovic v Tay, President of the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2000] FCA 1789

Jovanovic v Tay, President of the Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission [2000] FCA 1789

The President erred in law by dismissing the complaints under s 101(1)(b) simply because she considered that the applicants were unable to carry out the inherent requirements of their pre-accident employment under s 15(4)(a). Section 15(4)(a) could not be considered in isolation from s 15(4)(b), and the issue of services or facilities and unjustifiable hardship could not properly be resolved on a summary dismissal without inquiry.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
08 December 2000
Procedural Posture
Application for Review Under the Administrative Decisions (judicial Review) Act 1977 of Decisions Dismissing Disability Discrimination Complaints / Final Judgment
Outcome
The applications were allowed; the President's decisions were set aside and the complaints were referred back to the Disability Discrimination Commissioner for the inquiry to be resumed.
Legal Topics
['judicial Review' 'summary Dismissal of Complaints' 'inherent Requirements of Employment' 'services or Facilities and Unjustifiable Hardship' 'disability Discrimination Commissioner Inquiries']
['administrative Law' 'disability Discrimination' 'employment Discrimination'] ['judicial Review' 'summary Dismissal of Complaints' 'inherent Requirements of Employment' 'services or Facilities and Unjustifiable Hardship' 'disability Discrimination Commissioner Inquiries']

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Procedural Posture

Application for Review Under the Administrative Decisions (judicial Review) Act 1977 of Decisions Dismissing Disability Discrimination Complaints / Final Judgment

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ['Whether the President made an error of law by dismissing the complaints under s 101(1)(b) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 on the basis of s 15(4)(a) without considering s 15(4)(b).' 'Whether the complaints should have been summarily dismissed as relating to acts not unlawful under Part 2 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992.']

Ratio Decidendi

The President erred in law by dismissing the complaints under s 101(1)(b) simply because she considered that the applicants were unable to carry out the inherent requirements of their pre-accident employment under s 15(4)(a). Section 15(4)(a) could not be considered in isolation from s 15(4)(b), and the issue of services or facilities and unjustifiable hardship could not properly be resolved on a summary dismissal without inquiry.

Court Disposition

The applications were allowed; the President's decisions were set aside and the complaints were referred back to the Disability Discrimination Commissioner for the inquiry to be resumed.

Orders

  • ["The decision of the first respondent in relation to each applicant's complaint in proceeding V 641 of 1999 be set aside." "Each applicant's complaint in proceeding V 641 of 1999 be referred back to the Disability Discrimination Commissioner in order that the inquiry into it be resumed." 'The decision of the first...