Singh v Fair Work Ombudsman [2019] FCA 664

Singh v Fair Work Ombudsman [2019] FCA 664

Leave to appeal should not be granted because any appeal against the existing procedural orders was premature: the orders were subject to any claim based on the privilege against exposure to civil penalty, did not require Mr and Mrs Singh to abandon that privilege or necessarily shut them out from later relying on evidence, defences or submissions after the close of the Fair Work Ombudsman's case in chief, and any issue about leave to rely on such material should first be determined by the primary judge at the hearing.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
13 May 2019
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal From a Procedural Order Made by a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court in Civil Penalty Proceedings / Dealt With on the Papers; Application for Leave to Appeal Dismissed
Outcome
Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Legal Topics
['application for Leave to Appeal' 'privilege Against Exposure to Civil Penalty' 'procedural Orders for Filing Evidence and Submissions' 'civil Penalty Proceedings Under the Fair Work Act 2009 (cth)']

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Procedural Posture

Application for Leave to Appeal From a Procedural Order Made by a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court in Civil Penalty Proceedings / Dealt With on the Papers; Application for Leave to Appeal Dismissed

  1. 1 ['Whether procedural orders requiring filing of affidavit material, amended defences and submissions before the hearing abrogated the privilege against exposure to civil penalty.' "Whether Mr and Mrs Singh had a right or entitlement not to file affidavit evidence, a substantive amended defence or submissions until the close of the Fair Work Ombudsman's case in chief." 'Whether the application for leave to appeal was premature.']

Ratio Decidendi

Leave to appeal should not be granted because any appeal against the existing procedural orders was premature: the orders were subject to any claim based on the privilege against exposure to civil penalty, did not require Mr and Mrs Singh to abandon that privilege or necessarily shut them out from later relying on evidence, defences or submissions after the close of the Fair Work Ombudsman's case in chief, and any issue about leave to rely on such material should first be determined by the primary judge at the hearing.

Court Disposition

Application for leave to appeal dismissed.

Orders

  • ['The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.']