Kraft General Foods Incorporated v Gaines Pet Foods Corporation [1995] FCA 767

Kraft General Foods Incorporated v Gaines Pet Foods Corporation [1995] FCA 767

Leave to appeal was granted because the primary judge's construction of "a person aggrieved" in s. 23(1) raised a question of some importance in trade marks law, could affect the registrar's practice, and was important to the applicant. The respondent did not need an extension of time for a cross-appeal because it...

Source-derived case information.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
08 September 1995
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal / Leave to Appeal From Judgment of a Single Judge to a Full Court
Outcome
Leave to appeal granted; costs of the application to be costs in the appeal.
Legal Topics
['removal of Registered Trade Marks' 'person Aggrieved' 'leave to Appeal' 'cross Appeal' 'costs']
['trade Marks' 'intellectual Property' 'appellate Procedure'] ['removal of Registered Trade Marks' 'person Aggrieved' 'leave to Appeal' 'cross Appeal' 'costs']

Source-derived case record

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Procedural Posture

Application for Leave to Appeal / Leave to Appeal From Judgment of a Single Judge to a Full Court

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ['Whether leave should be granted to appeal from the judgment of Hill J given on 28 July 1995.' 'Whether the primary judge\'s construction of "a person aggrieved" within s. 23(1) of the Trademarks Act raised a sufficiently important question for leave to appeal.' 'Whether the respondent required leave to extend time to file a notice of cross-appeal.']

Ratio Decidendi

Leave to appeal was granted because the primary judge's construction of "a person aggrieved" in s. 23(1) raised a question of some importance in trade marks law, could affect the registrar's practice, and was important to the applicant. The respondent did not need an extension of time for a cross-appeal because it would have a right to cross-appeal once the applicant filed and served its notice of appeal. The respondent's opposition was not unreasonable, so the costs of the application were ordered to be costs in the appeal.

Court Disposition

Leave to appeal granted; costs of the application to be costs in the appeal.

Orders

  • ['The Court grants leave to the applicant to appeal from a judgment of Hill J. on 28 July 1995 in this matter.' 'The costs of the application be costs in the appeal.']