Gordon and Gotch (Australasia) Limited v Cox [1923] HCA 8
The respondent is entitled to taxed costs incurred in opposing a motion for special leave to appeal, as such costs are part of the 'costs of appeal'; it is for the voluntarily appearing party to satisfy the taxing officer that the costs were not incurred unnecessarily or through over-caution, which was so satisfied...
Source-derived case information.
- Parties
- Appellant: Gordon & Gotch (Australasia) Ltd.; Respondent: Frederick John Cox
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Judgment Date
- 27 March 1923
- Procedural Posture
- Review of Taxation of Costs on Appeal / Summons to Review Registrar's Taxation Decision Following Dismissal of High Court Appeal
- Outcome
- Summons to review taxation allowed
- Legal Topics
- Taxation of Costs, Costs of Motion for Special Leave to Appeal, Interpretation of 'costs of Appeal'
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Gordon & Gotch (Australasia) Ltd.
Appellant
Frederick John Cox
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Review of Taxation of Costs on Appeal / Summons to Review Registrar's Taxation Decision Following Dismissal of High Court Appeal
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the respondent is entitled to recover as part of the 'costs of appeal' the costs incurred in unsuccessfully opposing a motion for special leave to appeal
Ratio Decidendi
The respondent is entitled to taxed costs incurred in opposing a motion for special leave to appeal, as such costs are part of the 'costs of appeal'; it is for the voluntarily appearing party to satisfy the taxing officer that the costs were not incurred unnecessarily or through over-caution, which was so satisfied here.
Court Disposition
Summons to review taxation allowed
Orders
- Items 1 to 7 of the respondent's bill of costs are to be allowed as a matter of principle
- Registrar to consider the amount to be allowed in respect of each item
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
51 paragraphs
R.] OF AUSTRALIA. 465
her evidence—which was availed of—William Emest Robbins ¥- ©. or A- s still absent and unable himself to give further evidence. Under eke
se circumstances a further investigation of the capital required Rosarss th Migitae calli Piss ret q. Herman for the appellants' cal ling—if it be a profession—is necessary, and [ysrrrure v. FEeprRAL
r some other Justice, for that purpose, than by a determination See p SIONER
f the appeal upon the mere question of the burden of proof. TAXATION. The appeal is dismissed with costs. ae
Appeal dismissed with costs.
'Solicitors for the appellants, MeNab, Dowling & Wilson. Solicitors for the respondent, Chambers, McNab & McNab for
J. L. W.
{HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.}
AND ' é 3 . Responpent.
¢—High Court—Costs—Taxation—Costs of appeal—Costs of opposing motion 4 ©, oy A for special leave. 1923, : :
Costs of a motion for special leave to appeal to the High Court are costs of || \~ Baca ppeal, Mezzourne, Feb. 27; Upon an appeal to the High Court by special leave an order was made that Mar. 27. the respondent's costs of the appeal should be taxed, and paid by the appellant, Starke J
The respondent had voluntarily appeared upon the motion for special leave (Ix Cuawnens.) and unsuccessfully opposed it, but no order had been made as to the costs of the
motion.
H.C. or A.
1923, —_ Gorvon &
OTH (AusTRAL- asta) Lrp. a Cox.
Mar, 27.
HIGH COURT
Held, that the respondent was entitled to his taxed costs of the motion. special leave if he established that such costs had not been incurred unneg sarily or through oyer-caution.
Revtew of taxation. An appeal had been brought by special leave by Gordon & Got (Australasia) Ltd. to the High Court, Frederick John Cox being tl respondent. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's co of the appeal were ordered to be taxed and to be paid by the app lant (1). The respondent had appeared on the motion, although no notice of the motion had been served on him, and had opposed granting of special leave. The respondent brought in his bill costs for taxation, and included in it (items 1 to 7) were the co incurred in opposing the granting of special leave. These costs th Registrar disallowed. The respondent now applied by summons to review the decision of the Registrar, and the summons was heard by Starke J. Other imaterial facts are stated in the judgment hereunder.
Home, for the respondent, in support.
The managing clerk of the appellant's solicitors, for the appellant to oppose.
Starke J. delivered the following written judgment :—
This was a summons to review taxation. An appeal had beer brought by Gordon & Gotch Ltd. to this Court pursuant to order giving special leave to appeal. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and Cox's "costs of this appeal" were ordered to b taxed, and paid by the appellant. Cox appeared voluntarily o} the motion for special leave to appeal, and opposed it. The Court gave Ean but subject a) a ather onerous ng undertaking Nothing
Cox claims that his costs on this motion are part of si costs of appeal to which he is entitled under the order dismissing the appeal. (1) (1923) 31 C.L.R., 370.
2 C.L.R.] OF AUSTRALIA.
the appeal being taken " (see Kevan' v. Joyce (1) ). And appellants obtaining orders for "costs of appeal" are allowed, on taxation in this Court, the costs of any motion for special leave to appeal unless the Court has otherwise provided. This, I think, is right, for the order for special leave to appeal is, in these cases, a necessary step in the appeal : it is the first step in the proceedings by way of ppeal, and is an extra expense incurred " by reason of the appeal being taken." The proceedings in appeal do not here start, as in ases where the appeal is of right, by the notice of appeal, but with the application to the Court for leave to appeal.
It is difficult, if the appellant is entitled to his costs of motion for leave to appeal under an order for costs of appeal, to deny that a respondent who opposes the motion on notice is similarly entitled _ to his costs of so opposing it, in cases in which the " costs of appeal" are awarded to him. The fact that the respondent voluntarily opposes the motion for leave to appeal does not, in my opinion, narrow the meaning of the words "costs of appeal." But it does, I think, throw upon the party who voluntarily appears the duty of satisfying the taxing officer that the costs were not incurred unneces- sarily or through over-caution. The burden is no light one. But as I was a member of the Court which granted the' leave to appeal and heard the appeal, J will not remit the matter to the taxing officer to inquire whether the costs in this case were reasonably and properly incurred, for I have no doubt that they were. The circum- stances were peculiar and special. Gordon & Gotch Ltd. had reserved to it in the order against which it desired to appeal general liberty to amend its pleadings. The respondent was, I think, well justified in appearing and insisting that supposed matters of law should not be decided on pleadings which might at any time be amended. An undertaking was required from the appellant abandoning this leave to amend so far as any matters were brought to 4 appeal, Ultimately the Court held that the appeal was due to mis- apprehension of the decision of the Supreme Court, and to faulty _ pleading, and by consent restored leave to amend. But the inter- vention of the respondent was clearly justified, and ought perhaps to
(1) (1897) 1 LR., 1, at p. 5.
"Costs of appeal" means 'extra expense incurred by reason of HC. oF A.
1923.
anes; Gorpon & Goren (AvusTRAL- asta) Lr. v. Cox.
Starke J.
468 HIGH COURT
H.C. or A. have induced the Court, in the first instance, to refuse leave te
1923. 1 appeal. Gorvos & I allow the summons to review taxation, and direct the Prineipa
(wee Registrar that the items nos. 1 to 7 mentioned in the bill of cost
eae ees ought, in point of principle, to be allowed, and remit to him for Cox. purpose of considering the amount that should be allowed in res
starkeg. Of each item. Appellant Gordon & Gotch Ltd. to pay £1 1s. cost of this summons.
Order accordingly.
Solicitors for the respondent, Home & Wilkinson.
Solicitors for the appellant, Williams & Matthews. 7 BL
(HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.)
FLANAGAN AND ANOTHER sae . APPELLANTS: DEFENDANTS,
AND
THE NATIONAL TRUSTEES, EXECUTORS AND AGENCY COMPANY OF AUS- ReEsPONDE! TRALASIA LIMITED AND OTHERS
Prawtire AND DEFENDANTS,
H.C. or A. ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF 1923, VICTORIA. ee
Metnourne, Will—Interpretation—* Die without leaving issue"—Death at any time—Gift to May 15-16. children for life with remainder to their children—Survivorship—Death without isswe—No disposition of accrued shares—Residue—Intestacy—Wills Act 1915
ecieeawense (Vict.) (No. 2749), sec. 23. Aug. 9. By his will a testator, after disposing of his household effects, gave all the Knox CJ., § sl 5 Isaacs, Higgins, residue of his personal estate and all his real estate to trustees upon trust — oo to apply the income to the support and maintenance of his wife and children