Health Care Complaints Commission v Balasubramaniam (No 2)

Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Health Care Complaints Commission v Balasubramaniam (No 2) [2026] NSWCATOD 128 Hearing dates: 3 September 2026 Date of orders: 29 September 2026 Decision date: 29 September 2026 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: Hon M Le Poer Trench ADCJ, Principal Member Prof R Z Shaban, Senior Member L Ovington, Senior Member F Taylor, General Member Decision: (1) The Respondent’s registration is cancelled pursuant to section 149C(1)(b) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW). (2) Pursuant to section 149C(7) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, an application for the review of orders 1 and 3 hereof may not be made until the expiration of five years from the date of this order. (3) Pursuant to section 149C(5)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, the Respondent is prohibited from providing a health service, as defined by section 4 of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW), unless and until the Tribunal makes a reinstatement or other order under section 163B of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. (4) The Respondent is to pay the Commission’s costs, as agreed, or assessed under clause 13 of Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. (5) The disclosure of the names and addresses of the persons listed in the Schedule to the

Complaint is prohibited under section 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) and/or clause 7 of the Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. Catchwords: OCCUPATION - Registered Nurse – Stage Two – Guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct and Professional Misconduct – Cancellation of Registration Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) Cases Cited: Health Care Complaints Commission v Balasubramaniam [2026] NSWCATOD 94 Sabag v Health Care Complaints Commission [2001] NSWCA 411 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Health Care Complaints Commission (Applicant) Suresh Kumar Balasubramaniam (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: D New (Applicant) Solicitor: Health Care Complaints Commission (Applicant) Respondent (self-represented) File Number(s): 2025/00178004 Publication restriction: The disclosure of the names and addresses of the persons listed in the Schedule to the Complaint is prohibited under section 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 and/or clause 7 of the Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW).

REASONS FOR DECISION This is a Stage Two hearing. The Tribunal by its decision published 7 July 2026 found the Respondent guilty of both unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct. That decision was reported as Health Care Complaints Commission v Balasubramaniam [2026] NSWCATOD 94. In the Stage One hearing the Respondent was self-represented and he has continued to be self-represented in this hearing. The Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC or the Commission) relied upon the following documents: Exhibit X1: Further Amended Application. MFI 10: A Chronology of relevant events. MFI 11: The HCCC written submission for Stage Two. The Respondent relied on the following documents: Exhibit Z1: Copy letter from the Respondent dated 19 August 2026 with annexures A to E. MFI 12: The Respondents written Stage Two submissions. The Respondent also stated he may seek to refer to a written submission he provided for the Stage One hearing which was dated 18 May 2026. At the commencement of the hearing the HCCC sought leave to amend their application which had been relied upon in the Stage One hearing. The amendment sought only one change of consequence to the Respondent. That change sought to restrain the Respondent from making an application to the Tribunal for review of any possible cancellation order, until the expiration of five years from the date of the

cancellation order. The submission of the HCCC set out the reason it sought to amend the Application to be as follows: Frist, in this case the Tribunal heard oral evidence from Patients A, B and C in addition to their written statement. Their oral testimony cast a far clearer picture of their mental health and substance use vulnerabilities and the impact of the Respondent’s behaviour on them. Second, when the complaint was first filed by the Commission, there was no evidence from Witness AM. Her evidence also cast a concern about the Respondent’s propensity to engage in unethical and highly inappropriate behaviour, warranting protective orders and a non-review period that is long enough for the Tribunal to be confident the risk of his repeated behaviour is significantly mitigated. Third, the orders were prior to the findings of the Tribunal which included the tendency findings regarding the Respondent’s inappropriate sexualised conduct towards vulnerable female patients. For the above reasons, the Complaint was amended to increase the non-review period from 3 years to 5 years. In Sabag v Health Care Complaints Commission [2001] NSWCA 411 at [67] Davies AJA Sperling articulated the purpose of the inquiry (stage one and stage two): “The very purpose of an inquiry is to ascertain not only what has occurred in the past but whether there is a likelihood that the conduct will be

repeated in the future. Thus, in Health Care Complaints Commission v Pham [1999] NSWCA 39, Meagher JA, with whom Beazley and Fitzgerald JJA agreed, said:- "The seriousness of Dr Pham's misconduct and his gross abuse of his position as a medical practitioner are self-evident. Despite warning, he persisted in extremely unethical and illegal conduct over a considerable period. He was heedless of the consequences to the patients affected and plainly motivated by greed. His false testimony to the Tribunal tends to suggest a lack of remorse, and gives no cause for confidence that he will voluntarily behave properly in the future." On reflection after the findings of the Tribunal in Stage One, the evidence of the complainants and the tendency finding, the HCCC considered it in the public interest to seek a non-review period of 5 years. Of course, the ultimate decision on the protective orders is for the Tribunal. That the HCCC amended the complaint to seek an extended non-review period is a step in procedural fairness, to place the respondent and the Tribunal on notice of the revised orders sought. Having considered the above submission, and being cognisant of the ability of the Tribunal to impose a non-review period either in excess of that sought by the HCCC or less than that sought, we concluded the leave to amend the application should be granted. Accordingly the HCCC was granted

leave to proceed on it’s further amended application Exhibit X1. The HCCC case. In addition to the documents identified above, the HCCC relied on all of the evidence admitted in the Stage One hearing and the decision made by the Tribunal. The Amended Application (exhibit X1) sought the following orders: 1. To the extent that leave to file the application is required by rule 23(3)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Rules 2014, the applicant seeks leave pursuant to section 41 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW).

2. An order prohibiting the disclosure of the names and addresses of the persons listed in the Schedule to the Complaint under section 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 and/or clause 7 of the Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) (“National Law”).

3. Cancellation of the Respondent’s registration, pursuant to section 149C(1)(b) of the National Law.

4. Pursuant to section 149C(5)(a) of the National Law, a prohibition order prohibiting the Responded from providing a health service, as defined by section 4 of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993, unless and until the Tribunal makes a reinstatement or other order under section 163B of the National Law.

5. Pursuant to section 149C(7) of the National Law, an application for the review of orders three and four here of may not be made until the expiration of five years from the date of the Tribunal’s orders.

6. An order that the Responded pay the Commission’s costs, as agreed or assessed under clause 13 of Schedule 5D of the National Law. As set out above, the HCCC provided a written submission. In that document we particularly noted the following. The HCCC referred to the Stage One decision of the Tribunal and to the findings of guilt which it had sought. The HCCC highlighted the findings made by the Tribunal as to the tendency evidence as it related to the conduct of the Respondent. The HCCC referred to the finding made at paragraph 696 of the Stage One hearing as follows: “696. Having seen and heard the evidence of Witness AM, we conclude that if we do accept that evidence to show a tendency of the Respondent to conduct himself in a manner: (a) To have a sexual interest in female patients; and (b) To act on that interest by deliberately/intentionally approaching female patients and engaging in personal conversations outside of the nurse/patient relationship and/or to sexually assault the patient, it would add weight to the evidence of Patient A such that on the application of the balance of probabilities to the evidence set out by us in relation to Particular 1 of Complaint One, we would have found that allegation established. It would also follow that we would have found Particular 3 of Complaint One established.” The HCCC pointed to the established evidence it brought to the

Tribunal, in relation to the Respondent’s conduct. It submitted the seriousness of that conduct should be reflected in the protective order made. It submitted: “All the women were vulnerable. They needed help. They each admitted themselves into an environment believing they could each get the support they needed for their drug/alcohol/ and mental health concerns. The respondent exploited their mental health vulnerabilities.”… “At a time when each patient needed support, the respondent abused his professional role and made each of these women feel scared, vulnerable and exploited.”…. “The Respondent’s conduct is one of the most serious examples of unprofessional conduct a nurse could display.” The HCCC addressed the evidence which the Tribunal found established in relation to each of the three complainants. It also addressed the evidence of Witness AM. Portions of the Tribunal’s Stage One decision were cited. We do not repeat those passages here. In relation to the evidence of the Respondent, given in the Stage One hearing and also the seriousness of his conduct as found by the Tribunal, the HCCC included the following submission.

39. At [407] and [408] of the Stage 1 decision, the Tribunal noted that the respondent knew that as a nurse it was highly inappropriate to talk to patients about where to buy alcohol; about sexual relationships; muscles on their body such as abdominal muscles; where to buy drugs; gang affiliations; about his own personal details.

40. The respondent gave evidence that he knew it was highly inappropriate to talk to a patient about wanting more children than his wife would give him; that it was highly inappropriate to touch patients on the breast, stomach, thigh or bottom and it was inappropriate to cuddle a patient in bed or to do “burpees” or “squats”.

41. At [667] the Tribunal found, regarding Complaint One: “We are satisfied that our findings in relation to Complaint One demonstrate conduct by the Respondent of a very serious nature. The Respondent questioned a patient who was experiencing withdrawal from a serious drug addiction and addiction to alcohol. She was a voluntary patient in SJG motivated to put herself through a process which she told us was an extremely hard undertaking. The conduct of the Respondent, we are satisfied, made her recovery a more difficult undertaking because she became very concerned about the conduct of the Respondent and what his motivation might have been to question her about the life she was attempting to leave behind and start afresh.

42. At [699] the Tribunal found the motivation for the respondent’s treatment of the patients was sexual because the Tribunal found it “difficult to see any other motivation on his part given…. [there was] no apparent therapeutic purpose of motivation”.

43. At [670] the Tribunal found the respondent’s conduct towards Patient A (and witness AM): “Reprehensible given that the conduct was visited upon three highly vulnerable patients. Two of the patients were attempting to change their lives by solving their addictions to prescribed and not prescribed drugs and/or alcohol abuse. Patient A had been subjected to horrific and illegal treatment and personal degradation during her life as a result of her drug and alcohol abuse. Her ambition was to leave that all behind and change her life to one which removes her from all the horror which had befallen her prior to her admission to SJG in December 2021. [Emphasis added] 44. Similarly, the Tribunal was critical of the respondent’s conduct towards Patients B and C. At [675], the Tribunal stated: The conduct occurred where both Patient B and Patient C were clearly vulnerable persons. They were vulnerable because of their illnesses. They were disarmed of the normal defenses which they would have had were they medically well. Both patients were also captive to a power imbalance.

45. The Tribunal found that Complaints One, Two and Three individually and/or collectively were of a sufficiently serious nature to justify suspension or cancellation (at {677]).

CANCELLATION 54. On a finding of professional misconduct, the Tribunal has the power to cancel the respondent’s registration.

55. The Commission seeks a non-review period of 5 years (s. 149C(4)(b).

56. The reputation of the nursing profession and public expectation would be significantly disturbed if there was knowledge that the respondent, given this proven conduct, was permitted to practice.

57. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Piper [2014] NSWCATOD 62, the Tribunal said (at [48]): “… [T]he object of protection includes deterring the practitioner from repeating the conduct and significantly, in this case, deterring others who may consider engaging in similar conduct (NSW Bar Association v Hamman (1999) NSWCA 404. As noted by Basten JA in NSW Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340): ‘There are also important but indirect effects to be considered. First, the order reminds other members of the profession of the public interest in the maintenance of high professional standards. Secondly and more specifically, it may give emphasis to the unacceptability of the kind of conduct involved in the disciplinary offence. Thirdly, by speaking to the public at large, it seeks to maintain confidence in the high standards of the profession. The underlying purpose is not self-aggrandisement on the part of the profession, but a recognition of the social value in the availability of the services provided to the public, combined with an understanding the vulnerability of many who may require such services’.” 58. In Chen v Health Care Complaints Commission [2017] NSWCA 186 Basten JA stated at [21] and [22]: [21] Finally, in determining whether to suspend the practitioner’s registration or cancel it, it is entirely appropriate for the Tribunal to take into account the

consequences of the order being considered. Unless a period of suspension is made conditional, renewal of the practitioner’s registration will occur automatically on completion of the period of suspension. By contrast, an order of cancellation will require the practitioner to justify re-registration. Uncertainty as to the future may lead the Tribunal to cancel a registration rather than suspend it. [22] The fixing of a period within which re-registration may not be sought may be seen to have a twofold operation. On the one hand, it indicates the minimum period within which the Tribunal considers the person should not be able to practise his or her profession; on the other hand, it holds open the possibility that an application for re-registration thereafter will at least be considered. It is entirely proper for the Tribunal to consider all aspects of the possible orders available to it in determining what order to make.” 59. If the respondent’s registration is cancelled, the respondent will have to justify re-registration in a Tribunal hearing. This is apposite in the present case in circumstances where the respondent denied his conduct and victim blamed the patients and where there is no evidence on which the Tribunal can be confident that the respondent has good prospects of rehabilitation or is unlikely to reoffend and the findings of the Tribunal speak unfavourably as to his character.

60. The Tribunal cannot assume that a practitioner has reformed without ‘clear proof’, and more than the mere passage of time without misconduct.4 Reformation is the exception rather than the norm.5 The Tribunal must be satisfied that the practitioner has demonstrated integrity, trustworthiness, high moral and ethical values and a capacity to comply with relevant obligations, codes of practice, such that it is appropriate for the practitioner to be held out to the public as a person worthy of their confidence.6 (See, e.g., Dawson v Law Society of New South Wales [1989] NSWCA 58 (Mahoney JA); Crickett v Medical Council of New South Wales (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 115, [56].) 61. The cancellation with a non-review period of five years is protective and justified because: a. The respondent’s professional and personal integrity are seriously and significantly undermined by the complaints; b. His registration before a period of five years would undermine confidence in and damage the reputation of the health profession; c. There is no evidence of his current insight into the impact of his conduct on his profession or on the patients, not just his person; d. There is no evidence of risk factors being meaningfully treated to minimise risk of reoffending; and e. It permits a period for the respondent to address his risk factor with therapy.

62. The order denounces the respondent’s conduct and is of sufficient consequence to hold the respondent accountable and responsible for his sexual objectification and exploitation of highly vulnerable females.

63. The order deters him and other like-minded nurses and emphasises that respecting professional and personal boundaries are central ethical standards.

64. The punitive effect on the respondent is not irrelevant to this context (Lee v Health Care Complaints Commission [2012] NISSWA 80) but that is not its primary purpose. In relation to the prohibition period of 5 years as sought by the HCCC it submitted the following:

PROHIBTION ORDER 65. The Commission seeks an order prohibiting the respondent from providing any health services unless and until such a time as the Tribunal makes a reinstatement order.

66. A prohibition order is available if the Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent poses a substantial risk to the health of members of the public (s. 149C(5)(a)). The rationale for the making of the Prohibition order is aligned with the protective purpose of the legislation: Health Care Complaints Commission v Bao-Quy Nguyen-Phuoc (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 94 at [35].

67. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Menz (No 2) NSWCATOD 172 the Tribunal considered the expressions “substantial risk” in s. 149C(5)(a) stating at [19] that: “…. Given the context in which it is used, the word “substantial” [in s. 149C(5)(a)] in our view should be interpreted to mean a risk that is real and material. It is implicit from the terms of s 149C(5) that the question of whether a person poses a substantial risk to the health of the public must be assessed by evaluating the risk posed to the public if the person were to be involved in the provision of health services.” 68. The risk the respondent poses is a risk of opportunistically taking sexual advantage of vulnerable female patients. That risk is real and material unless and until the respondent’s risk factors are addressed and treated. Even if that risk is low, the consequences to any female victim and the undermining of the reputation of the nursing profession are grave.

69. As the Tribunal iterated in its findings in the Stage 1 Decision, the respondent’s conduct was “reprehensible”.

70. This protective jurisdiction cannot risk the respondent returning to provide nursing service unless and until he can justify to the Tribunal a true reformation of character and provide the Tribunal with confidence that the respondent would not repeat this offending. Supervision alone cannot address the possible risk.

71. The prohibition order for the permanent period sought is justified and appropriate in circumstances where: a. The respondent has a tendency to engage in sexualised conduct; b. The respondent’s experience involves interacting with highly vulnerable women; c. The respondent repeated his behaviour even after being put on notice of it at SJOG and having his employment terminated for that behaviour; d. The respondent has shown no evidence of what self-restraint he may show in the future; e. The respondent denies his behaviour; f. The respondent has had no meaningful treatment for his behaviour; g. The respondent has demonstrated no insight into the impact of his conduct on these women (seeking to victim blame throughout the hearing); h. The respondent has provided no detailed evidence from a treating health professional that sets out the behavioural tools the respondent has been taught that may mitigate his risk of repeating his behaviour; and i. The respondent has provided no evidence of how he would reduce the risk of repeat offending.

72. The orders sought are within the Tribunal’s power and are justified, appropriate and reasonable given the conduct that sustains the complaints. The Respondent’s Evidence The Respondent relied on the evidence set out in exhibit Z1. That included a statement made by the Respondent which was dated 19 August 2026. In that statement the Respondent maintained his denial of each factual allegation made by or on behalf of the patients. He stated: “Nothing in this statement, including my participation in counselling, professional education, or my willingness to comply with any future lawful order, is intended to be an admission of any alleged conduct or an acceptance of the factual basis of the Stage One findings.” The Respondent then set out detail of his personal and professional background. Of particular note is the fact that the Respondent has not worked as a nurse since 22 August 2023. This raises a matter which will need to be considered in relation to the prohibition period sought by the HCCC. The Respondent stated: “The prolonged absence from nursing work, combined with the ongoing proceedings and uncertainty about my professional future, has had a significant financial, personal and psychological impact on me and my family.” The Respondent then set out detail of the hardship which has faced his family and himself because he has not been able to work as a nurse for three

years. The Respondent has sought assistance from a psychologist because of symptoms of anxiety and depression following his being unable to work as a nurse. The Respondent stated: “I have sought counselling and psychological support because I wish to manage stress appropriately, remain stable, and become better able to respond constructively to difficult professional circumstances.” In support of an order which does not require suspension or cancellation of his registration, the Respondent submitted: “If I am lawfully authorised to return to nursing, I will continue to comply with workplace policies, applicable professional standards, and any lawful conditions of practice.” The Respondent submitted: “I submit that cancellation, disqualification and a prohibition order of the kind sort by the HCCC are not necessary or proportionate protective outcomes in my circumstances.” The Respondent stated that he would comply with any conditions the Tribunal may impose on his registration, should he be permitted to continue in the profession of nursing. In making that submission the Respondent stated further: “This is not a concession that any particular condition is presently necessary.” The Respondent relied on professional references which he supplied, and which we will address hereafter. He then stated under the heading “Orders Sought” that the Tribunal should not make the orders

sought by the HCCC. The Respondent included the following documents with his submission. A Medical Certificate from Dr Sushma Bayya. That advised the that the Respondent had attended the practice for a Mental Health Care Plan since 2023. He has been referred to a psychologist for anxiety and depression therapy. A Medical Certificate signed by Dr Krishnapillai, dated 3 August 2026. It evidences consultations in December 2025 for stress. A letter from Sushama Sathe, psychologist, dated 27 July 2026 detailing observations, assessments and treatment in 2023 and 2025. A recommendation is provided which states: “Work under the supervision of a clinical nurse educator or other appropriate supervisor for a defined period, with regular review.” The Respondent then annexed a Certificate of Completion of a AHPD course on “Professional Boundaries in Health.” Annexure E to the statement of the Respondent is a list of Professional and Character references. There are 14 in all. We have read each of those documents. The Respondent provided detail of the continuing professional education he has completed. Discussion and Conclusions The decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in Chen (quoted above) is of particular application to the current determination. Here the Respondent completely denies each and every allegation which has been considered by the Tribunal and found established. Because of that,

the Respondent has not provided any evidence of remorse. The findings made against him by the Tribunal are of the most serious of allegations which could be made against a registered nurse. In considering what protective order to make the Tribunal concludes that cancellation of the Respondent’s registration is required as a protective order. When considering what period of time to set as non-review period, the Tribunal needs to consider when it might be seen as possible for the Respondent to apply to the Tribunal for re-registration. In this case it is difficult to see how the Respondent could at any time in the future apply for registration without the ability to show remorse for the conduct the Tribunal has found he exhibited to the subject patients. To the extent that it may be a relevant consideration, we have taken into consideration that the Respondent has not worked as a nurse since 22 August 2023. Notwithstanding our comments above, we propose to fix a non-review period of five years, as sought by the HCCC. We do so as we cannot completely foresee what the Respondent may be able to do to change his behaviour and be able to convince a future differently constituted Tribunal that he is a fit and proper person to be registered as a nurse. The HCCC further seeks a prohibition that the Respondent not be permitted to be employed in any health service, as defined in section 4

of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW), for so long as his registration as a nurse remains cancelled. We have had regard to the list of health services as defined in that Act and we take the view that order should be made. The HCCC also seeks an order prohibiting disclosure of the names of persons listed in the Schedule to the Complaint it relied upon in the Stage One hearing. Such an order, we are satisfied needs to be made. We had made such an order when we published the Stage One decision. The Costs Application The HCCC submitted it had been wholly successful in its Complaint. The Tribunal had found the Respondent guilty of both unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct. In support of a costs order the HCCC submitted; “COSTS 73.The Commission seeks a costs order. The Tribunal has power to order costs pursuant to Schedule 5D, cl. 13 of the National Law. It is settled law that the “usual rule” of costs following the event applies to this jurisdiction: Health Care Complaints Commission v Philipiah [2013] NSWCA 342 (Philipiah) at [42]; Qasim v Health Care Complaints Commission [2015] NSWCA 282 at [85]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Do [2014] NSWCA 307 at [51].

74. The purpose of the order is compensatory, not punitive. The usual rule assumes that where an applicant succeeds it will have incurred costs because the respondent's conduct made it necessary for the applicant to bring the proceedings: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534.

75. The Tribunal can have regard to the circumstances of the case, including the evidence adduced, the conduct of the parties, the lead up to the commencement of proceedings and the ultimate result.

76. The fact that the respondent lacks the financial capacity to meet a costs order is not relevant to whether the power to order costs should be exercised: Philipiah at [42].” We find in the circumstances of this case that the Respondent should be ordered to pay the costs of the HCCC as it seeks. In making that order we are aware that the Respondent has been placed in a difficult financial position since he was dismissed from his employment in August 2023. He has not been able to work in his profession of nursing. The Respondent’s wife is employed as a registered nurse and has been the only wage earner in the Respondent’s immediate family since August 2023. The Respondent and his wife have two dependant children. The imposition of the cost order sought by the HCCC will, we accept, be an enormous financial burden for the Respondent. Protective and other Orders to be made We will make the following orders: The Respondent’s registration is cancelled pursuant to section 149C(1)(b) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW). Pursuant to section 149C(7) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, an application for the review of orders 1 and 3 hereof may not be made until the expiration of five years from the date of this order. Pursuant to section 149C(5)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law, the Respondent is prohibited from providing a

health service, as defined by section 4 of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW), unless and until the Tribunal makes a reinstatement or other order under section 163B of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. The Respondent is to pay the Commission’s costs, as agreed, or assessed under clause 13 of Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. The disclosure of the names and addresses of the persons listed in the Schedule to the Complaint is prohibited under section 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) and/or clause 7 of the Schedule 5D of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law. ** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 29 September 2026