R v Geeves; R v Geeves (No. 5) [2024] NSWSC 939

R v Geeves; R v Geeves (No. 5) [2024] NSWSC 939

Evidence of Amber Haigh’s representations to various individuals was admitted or excluded based on whether the circumstances in which she made those statements satisfied the reliability requirements of s 65(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); second-hand hearsay and evidence elicited at the Inquest through leading questions, where the accused were unrepresented, and where cross-examination was not possible, were excluded as unfairly prejudicial, with probative value outweighed by the risk to fair trial.

Parties
Crown: Rex; Accused: Robert Samuel Geeves; Accused: Anne Margaret Geeves
Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
02 August 2024
Procedural Posture
Criminal Trial / Procedural Rulings on Evidence Admissibility
Outcome
Partial admission and partial exclusion of hearsay evidence; procedural rulings on individual statements as to admissibility.
Legal Topics
Hearsay, Exceptions, Admissibility, Evidence Act 1995 (nsw), Murder, Joint Criminal Enterprise

Case Brief

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Parties

Rex

Crown

Robert Samuel Geeves

Accused

Anne Margaret Geeves

Accused

Procedural Posture

Criminal Trial / Procedural Rulings on Evidence Admissibility

  1. 1 Whether hearsay representations made by Amber Haigh to various persons are admissible under s 65(2)(c) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
  2. 2 Whether evidence given at the Inquest into Amber Haigh's death in 2011 is admissible at the present trial
  3. 3 Whether various police statements and witness recollections meet reliability criteria for exceptions to hearsay

Ratio Decidendi

Evidence of Amber Haigh’s representations to various individuals was admitted or excluded based on whether the circumstances in which she made those statements satisfied the reliability requirements of s 65(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); second-hand hearsay and evidence elicited at the Inquest through leading questions, where the accused were unrepresented, and where cross-examination was not possible, were excluded as unfairly prejudicial, with probative value outweighed by the risk to fair trial.

Court Disposition

Partial admission and partial exclusion of hearsay evidence; procedural rulings on individual statements as to admissibility.

Orders

  • Evidence from Petrina Ingram, Jacqueline Cash (statement), Paul Harding (statement), Cindy Brown (statement), Angelina Goode (statement) admitted under s 65(2)(c) Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).
  • Evidence from Ray Harding limited to direct observation; second-hand hearsay excluded.