O'Neill v Mann [2000] FCA 1680

O'Neill v Mann [2000] FCA 1680

Leave to discontinue was appropriate because termination of the protracted litigation was in the interests of the parties and the justice system, but the absence of evidence explaining the discontinuance and the applicant's attempt to retain the benefit of an interlocutory Full Court costs order made it unfair to allow discontinuance without terms. The proper order was to grant leave only on the applicant undertaking not to take steps to have taxed the Full Court costs orders, and to make no further order as to costs.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
29 November 2000
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Discontinue a Defamation Proceeding / Application for Leave to Discontinue and Related Costs Issue
Outcome
Leave to discontinue granted on condition that the applicant undertake not to take steps to have taxed the Full Court costs orders; no order as to costs.
Legal Topics
['leave to Discontinue Proceedings' 'conditional Terms on Discontinuance' 'costs on Discontinuance' 'taxation of Interlocutory Costs Orders']
['practice and Procedure' 'costs' 'defamation'] ['leave to Discontinue Proceedings' 'conditional Terms on Discontinuance' 'costs on Discontinuance' 'taxation of Interlocutory Costs Orders']

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Procedural Posture

Application for Leave to Discontinue a Defamation Proceeding / Application for Leave to Discontinue and Related Costs Issue

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ['Whether leave should be granted to discontinue the defamation proceeding.' 'Whether the grant of leave should be conditional on the applicant undertaking not to take steps to have taxed the costs orders of the Full Court.' 'Whether any order as to costs should be made in the circumstances of the discontinuance.']

Ratio Decidendi

Leave to discontinue was appropriate because termination of the protracted litigation was in the interests of the parties and the justice system, but the absence of evidence explaining the discontinuance and the applicant's attempt to retain the benefit of an interlocutory Full Court costs order made it unfair to allow discontinuance without terms. The proper order was to grant leave only on the applicant undertaking not to take steps to have taxed the Full Court costs orders, and to make no further order as to costs.

Court Disposition

Leave to discontinue granted on condition that the applicant undertake not to take steps to have taxed the Full Court costs orders; no order as to costs.

Orders

  • ['On the applicant undertaking not to take steps to have taxed the costs orders of the Full Court in ACT G29 of 1994, leave is given to discontinue this proceeding.']