R v Piccin [2001] NSWCCA 35

R v Piccin [2001] NSWCCA 35

The conviction for malicious wounding was sustainable because, despite criticisms of the complainant's evidence, it was open to the jury to accept his essential allegations beyond reasonable doubt, and the acquittal on the circumstantial malicious damage count was not inconsistent with that verdict. The stalking conviction could not stand because the Crown did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to cause the complainant to fear physical harm; other reasonable inferences about her intention remained open. The trial judge did not miscarry the trial by discharging only the biased juror and proceeding with eleven jurors, and the character directions were sufficient.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
09 February 2001
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal Against Conviction / Appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal From Convictions in the District Court
Outcome
Appeal allowed in part.
Legal Topics
['malicious Wounding' 'stalking' 'inconsistent Verdicts' 'unreasonable Verdict' 'discharge of Juror' 'good Character Directions' 'crimes Act S562 Ab']
['criminal Law' 'criminal Procedure' 'evidence'] ['malicious Wounding' 'stalking' 'inconsistent Verdicts' 'unreasonable Verdict' 'discharge of Juror' 'good Character Directions' 'crimes Act S562 Ab']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal Against Conviction / Appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal From Convictions in the District Court

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ["Whether the complainant's credibility was so diminished that it was unsafe to sustain the conviction for malicious wounding." 'Whether the verdict of guilty on count 1(b) for malicious wounding was inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty on count 2 for malicious damage.' 'Whether the trial judge correctly defined stalking for the jury.' 'Whether the conviction on count 3(b) for stalking was unreasonable because the Crown had not proved an intention to cause fear of personal injury as the only reasonable inference.' 'Whether the trial miscarried because the trial judge discharged one biased juror but did not discharge the whole jury.' "Whether the trial judge gave adequate directions about the appellant's good character."]

Ratio Decidendi

The conviction for malicious wounding was sustainable because, despite criticisms of the complainant's evidence, it was open to the jury to accept his essential allegations beyond reasonable doubt, and the acquittal on the circumstantial malicious damage count was not inconsistent with that verdict. The stalking conviction could not stand because the Crown did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to cause the complainant to fear physical harm; other reasonable inferences about her intention remained open. The trial judge did not miscarry the trial by discharging only the biased juror and proceeding with eleven jurors, and the character directions were sufficient.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed in part.

Orders

  • ['The appeal in respect of the conviction on Count 1(b) of the indictment is dismissed.' 'The appeal in respect of the conviction on Count 3(b) of the indictment is upheld, and that conviction is quashed.' 'Within 21 days the appellant is to put on any application advised in relation to the sentence on Count 1(b),...