Kringas v Cooma-Monaro Shire Council [2000] NSWLEC 53

Kringas v Cooma-Monaro Shire Council [2000] NSWLEC 53

For the purpose of the definition of '1997 holding' under the LEP, land is required to have direct vehicular access to a public road vested in the council or to a classified road at the date of application of the definition (the date of determination of consent). The definition is not satisfied by land that would only have such access at a future time. Clause 14(2)(b) applies to the subdivision, except for cl 14(2)(b)(ii) which is confined to subdivisions of a '1997 holding'.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
17 March 2000
Procedural Posture
Development Question of Law / Part Heard, Reference of Questions of Law for Determination
Outcome
Questions of law answered; application referred back to Commissioner Hussey for factual determination
Legal Topics
['development Consent' 'subdivision' 'lep Construction' 'vehicular Access' 'statutory Interpretation']
['planning Law' 'environmental Law'] ['development Consent' 'subdivision' 'lep Construction' 'vehicular Access' 'statutory Interpretation']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Development Question of Law / Part Heard, Reference of Questions of Law for Determination

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ["Whether the definition of '1997 holding' requires direct vehicular access at a specified time under the LEP" "Whether clause 14(2)(b) applies to the subdivision of land not qualifying as a '1997 holding'" 'Whether the proposed subdivision is permissible under the LEP']

Ratio Decidendi

For the purpose of the definition of '1997 holding' under the LEP, land is required to have direct vehicular access to a public road vested in the council or to a classified road at the date of application of the definition (the date of determination of consent). The definition is not satisfied by land that would only have such access at a future time. Clause 14(2)(b) applies to the subdivision, except for cl 14(2)(b)(ii) which is confined to subdivisions of a '1997 holding'.

Court Disposition

Questions of law answered; application referred back to Commissioner Hussey for factual determination

Orders

  • ["For the purpose of the definition of '1997 holding', required vehicular access must exist at the relevant date, not at a future time." 'Clause 14(2)(b) applies to Lot 50, except for 14(2)(b)(ii).' 'Third question does not arise.']