Chel v Fairfax Media Publications (No 6) [2017] NSWSC 230
Section 26 of the Defamation Act does not require a contextual imputation to be defamatory. Defamatory imputations pleaded by the plaintiff and found to be substantially true may be considered as contextual imputations under s 26(b). The jury should decide if remaining defamatory imputations do not further harm the reputation because of the truth of all contextual imputations collectively, without considering evidence of the plaintiff’s prior reputation, as that is reserved for the judge in assessing damages.
- Parties
- Plaintiff: Lili Chel; First Defendant: Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd; Second Defendant: Vanda Carson
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Judgment Date
- 14 March 2017
- Procedural Posture
- Defamation / Procedural and Other Rulings During Trial
- Outcome
- Defendants' defence of contextual truth rejected by the jury after further deliberation; proceedings stood over for submissions on damages.
- Legal Topics
- Contextual Truth Defence, Substantial Truth, Defamatory Imputations, Jury Directions, Section 26 Defamation Act, Harm to Reputation
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Lili Chel
Plaintiff
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd
First Defendant
Vanda Carson
Second Defendant
Procedural Posture
Defamation / Procedural and Other Rulings During Trial
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a contextual imputation must be defamatory for the purposes of s 26 of the Defamation Act
- 2 Whether an imputation pleaded by the plaintiff and found to be defamatory and substantially true can be deployed by the plaintiff, by the defendant, or disregarded in applying s 26
- 3 Whether the effect of all defamatory imputations on reputation should be considered along with facts surrounding all contextual imputations
Ratio Decidendi
Section 26 of the Defamation Act does not require a contextual imputation to be defamatory. Defamatory imputations pleaded by the plaintiff and found to be substantially true may be considered as contextual imputations under s 26(b). The jury should decide if remaining defamatory imputations do not further harm the reputation because of the truth of all contextual imputations collectively, without considering evidence of the plaintiff’s prior reputation, as that is reserved for the judge in assessing damages.
Court Disposition
Defendants' defence of contextual truth rejected by the jury after further deliberation; proceedings stood over for submissions on damages.
Orders
- Jury directed to answer question in the form of Annexure A concerning whether certain defamatory imputations do not further harm the reputation due to the substantial truth of contextual imputations.
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