Klewer v Rheinberger & Ors [2004] NSWSC 91

Klewer v Rheinberger & Ors [2004] NSWSC 91

The plaintiff's challenge to the first order sought in the Summons had been finally disposed of by the Court of Appeal, but the second order sought was affected by the unchallenged order of the Deputy Chief Magistrate and by Dowd J's interlocutory consent order. Because the second defendant's request to vacate Dowd J's order should be heard by a Judge, the proceedings needed to remain on foot and the Notice of Motion was stood over to that hearing.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
25 February 2004
Procedural Posture
Notice of Motion for Summary Dismissal Pursuant to Pt 13 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 / Hearing of the Second Defendant's Notice of Motion; Stood Over to the Hearing of the Application to Vacate the Interlocutory Order of Dowd J
Outcome
The second defendant's Notice of Motion was stood over to the hearing of the application to vacate the interlocutory order of Dowd J, with costs reserved.
Legal Topics
['summary Dismissal' 'apprehension of Bias' 'interlocutory Orders' 'transfer of Local Court Proceedings']
['civil Procedure' 'administrative Law'] ['summary Dismissal' 'apprehension of Bias' 'interlocutory Orders' 'transfer of Local Court Proceedings']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Notice of Motion for Summary Dismissal Pursuant to Pt 13 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 / Hearing of the Second Defendant's Notice of Motion; Stood Over to the Hearing of the Application to Vacate the Interlocutory Order of Dowd J

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ["Whether the second defendant was entitled to summary dismissal of the plaintiff's Summons." "Whether the plaintiff could continue to pursue relief preventing the first defendant from hearing matters involving her after the Court of Appeal had set aside Levine J's orders and dismissed her application." 'Whether the request to vacate the interlocutory consent order of Dowd J should be determined by a Judge.']

Ratio Decidendi

The plaintiff's challenge to the first order sought in the Summons had been finally disposed of by the Court of Appeal, but the second order sought was affected by the unchallenged order of the Deputy Chief Magistrate and by Dowd J's interlocutory consent order. Because the second defendant's request to vacate Dowd J's order should be heard by a Judge, the proceedings needed to remain on foot and the Notice of Motion was stood over to that hearing.

Court Disposition

The second defendant's Notice of Motion was stood over to the hearing of the application to vacate the interlocutory order of Dowd J, with costs reserved.

Orders

  • ["The second defendant's Notice of Motion is stood over to the hearing of the application to vacate the interlocutory order of Dowd J." 'Costs are reserved.']