Marlow, J.A. v The Queen [1987] FCA 669
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Posture
- Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Sentence Imposed by Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The Children's Court had no power to commit for sentence as distinct from committing for trial, and the legal process prescribed by the Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 must be followed.
Court disposition
Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; matter remitted to the Children's Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.
Orders
- The appeal be allowed.
- Conviction and sentence be set aside.
- The matter be remitted to the Children's Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.
02
Material facts
Parties
John Alexander Marlow
Appellant Counsel: Mr S. PilkintonThe Queen
Respondent Counsel: Mr G. Lalor03
Procedural history
Posture
Criminal Appeal / Appeal From Sentence Imposed by Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
Whether the Children's Court had power to commit a young person for sentence as distinct from committing for trial
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The counsel for the young person concurred with the submission that there was no power in the Children's Court to commit for sentence as distinct from committing for trial.
- Respondent
- Counsel for the Crown raised the point that there was no power in the Children's Court to commit for sentence as distinct from committing for trial.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Child Welfare Ordinance 1957
Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 provides special procedures for disposing of cases involving young persons, distinct from procedures for adults.
- 02
Child Welfare Ordinance 1957
There is no provision in the Ordinance for the Children's Court to commit for sentence as distinct from committing for trial.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The Children's Court had no power to commit for sentence as distinct from committing for trial, and the legal process prescribed by the Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 must be followed.
Obiter and limits
- The Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 is not ameliorated by any provision of the Magistrates Court Ordinance 1930.
- The proceedings in the Children's Court are intended to be less formal and less formidable than those in the Magistrates Court.
Court disposition
Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; matter remitted to the Children's Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.
- The appeal be allowed.
- Conviction and sentence be set aside.
- The matter be remitted to the Children's Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.
Source and reliance status
Official court record
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Court record
Judgment
* JUDGMENT No. Ob9./.21 sosseus . , CATCHWORDS _- . - - ~
CRIMINAL LAW - ACT -° whether power in Children's Court to commit .
for sentence as distinct from- committing for trial -. Child'. _
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JOHN ALEXANDER MARLOW v. THE QUEEN No. ACT G49 of 1987
CORAM: Fox, Lockhart and Kelly dd.
Canberra
18 September 1987
"2 DEC 1987
FEDERAL Cou AUSTRALIA. OF
PRINGIP,
REGISTAY
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"IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALI
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY - ~
) ) : - i ~. ) .No. ACT G-49 of 1987 .-._
. DISTRICT REGISTRY _ | .- GENERAL DIVISION - )
ON -APPEAL from the Supreme. Court of the Australian Capital Territory oe . BETWEEN :
JOHN ALEXANDER MARLOW
Appellant AND: : THE QUEEN Respondent
MINUTE OF ORDER JUDGES MAKING ORDER: FOX, LOCKHART AND KELLY JJ. DATE OF ORDER: 18 SEPTEMBER 1987 WHERE MADE: CANBERRA
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. Conviction and sentence be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the Children's Court to be dealt with in accordance with law.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
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NOT FOR-GENERAL DISTRIBUTION 2
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) -
_ . 7 y . - . . ) . No. ACT G 49 of 1987 ) - : - - ) } )
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
oo ON APPEAL from the Supreme - Court of the Australian Capital Territory
BETWEEN :
JOHN ALEXANDER MARLOW
Appellant
THE QUEEN
Respondent
CORAM: FOX, LOCKHART AND KELLY JJ.
DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1987
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EX TEMPORE
THE COURT:
The court will deliver iudament in this matter now.
This case came before us as an appeal from a sentence imposed by Gallop dg. in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The appellant is a younq person who was committed for sentence before the Supreme Court bv the Children's
Court of the Territorv.
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A preliminary- matter has been raised by counsel for the Crown. It was not a point that was taken-before Gallop J. Put shortly, it is that there was no power in the Children's Court to
commit for sentence as distinct from committing for trial.
Counsel for the young person has concurred in this submission: Having heard argument on the matter, we are of the view that the
point taken is correct in law.
The result is more than a minor procedural defect. The Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 provides ina special wav for the disposal of cases before it with the obvious intention of making those proceedings less formal and less formidable than proceedings taken against older persons before the Magistrates Court. There is, for example, no provision in the Ordinance for the taking of pleas of quilty. Many indictable offences can be dealt with completely by the magistrate. The present was such an offence but the magistrate thought that the circumstances were
such that the case should be dealt with in the Supreme Court.
At an early stage the leqal representative of the yound person said that the latter had admitted the offence. Details were then qiven to the magistrate and it doubtless seemed incongruous that having decided that the only matter was sentencing and that it should be by the Supreme Court. the younq person should. in the terms of the Ordinance. be committed for trial. This means that despite what has gone on before, an
information must be presented to the Supreme Court and on
arraianment the plea of quiltv taken.
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- 'This is, however. the result of the legislation and the
Child Welfare Ordinance 1957 is not ameliorated in this respect
bv any- provision of the Magistrates Court Ordinance 1930. We are-
therefore of the view that the_appeal should be allowed, the
conviction and sentence set aside and the matter remitted to the
Children's Court to be dealt with-in accordance with law.
Counsel for the Appellant:
Solicitors for the Appellant:
Counsel for the Crown:
Solicitors for the Crown:
Date of hearina:
Date judgment delivered:
I certify that this and the two (2) preceding pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the
Court. S Associate: A
Date: 18 September 1987
Mr S. Pilkinton Porter Pilkinton
Mr G. Lalor
Director of Public Prosecutions
Canberra: 18 September 1987 Canberra: 18 September 1987
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