Prentice v Nugan Packing Co Ltd [1950] HCA 51

Prentice v Nugan Packing Co Ltd [1950] HCA 51

Section 92 (3) permits an employee to sue in a district court or court of petty sessions only as an alternative to an application under s. 92 (2). Once six months have elapsed after termination of employment, an application under s. 92 (2) is no longer available, so a proceeding under s. 92 (3) is not being brought "in lieu of" such an application and is out of time. The appellant's District Court action was commenced more than six months after termination and could not be maintained.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Procedural Posture
Appeal by Special Leave Concerning Recovery of Award Wages and the Time Limit in S. 92 of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 1948 (n.s.w.) / High Court Appeal From a Rule of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Making Absolute an Order Nisi for Prohibition Restraining Further Proceedings on a District Court Judgment
Outcome
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Topics
['recovery of Wages Fixed by Award' 'six Month Time Limit After Termination of Employment' 'meaning of "in Lieu Of" in S. 92 (3)' 'district Court Proceedings as an Alternative to Application to an Industrial Magistrate']

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Procedural Posture

Appeal by Special Leave Concerning Recovery of Award Wages and the Time Limit in S. 92 of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 1948 (n.s.w.) / High Court Appeal From a Rule of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Making Absolute an Order Nisi for Prohibition Restraining Further Proceedings on a District Court Judgment

  1. 1 ['Whether proceedings in a district court under s. 92 (3) of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940-1948 (N.S.W.) to recover award wages must be commenced not later than six months after termination of employment.' 'Whether the words "in lieu of applying for an order under subsection two" require the employee to be able, at the time of suing, to make an application to an industrial magistrate under s. 92 (2).']

Ratio Decidendi

Section 92 (3) permits an employee to sue in a district court or court of petty sessions only as an alternative to an application under s. 92 (2). Once six months have elapsed after termination of employment, an application under s. 92 (2) is no longer available, so a proceeding under s. 92 (3) is not being brought "in lieu of" such an application and is out of time. The appellant's District Court action was commenced more than six months after termination and could not be maintained.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Orders

  • ['Appeal dismissed with costs.']