Dagg v Davis [2013] NSWCA 203

Dagg v Davis [2013] NSWCA 203

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed because there was no substantial issue of principle requiring appellate review, and no substantial injustice would result from refusal of leave. The Court was not satisfied that the claim was clearly futile or that the decision below involved an error of principle in the exercise of discretion. Delay and prejudice arguments did not warrant intervention, and any futility or s 54 Civil Liability Act argument should be addressed at trial.

Parties
First Applicant: Samuel Dagg; Second Applicant: Tracey Dagg; Respondent: Peter Francis Davis
Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
28 June 2013
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal / Interlocutory Application Leave to Appeal From District Court Decision
Outcome
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs
Legal Topics
Extension of Time to Commence Proceedings, Leave to Appeal, Limitation Periods, Prejudice Due to Delay, Duty of Care for Learner Driver Supervision
Civil Procedure Personal Injury Motor Vehicle Accidents Extension of Time to Commence Proceedings Leave to Appeal Limitation Periods Prejudice Due to Delay Duty of Care for Learner Driver Supervision

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

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Parties

Samuel Dagg

First Applicant

Tracey Dagg

Second Applicant

Peter Francis Davis

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Application for Leave to Appeal / Interlocutory Application Leave to Appeal From District Court Decision

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in commencing proceedings was provided under s 109(3) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW)
  2. 2 Whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of discretion to grant extension of time
  3. 3 Whether there was substantial injustice if leave not granted

Ratio Decidendi

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed because there was no substantial issue of principle requiring appellate review, and no substantial injustice would result from refusal of leave. The Court was not satisfied that the claim was clearly futile or that the decision below involved an error of principle in the exercise of discretion. Delay and prejudice arguments did not warrant intervention, and any futility or s 54 Civil Liability Act argument should be addressed at trial.

Court Disposition

Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs

Orders

  • Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs