Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Limited trading as Commsec

Court of Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Limited trading as Commsec [2026] NSWCA 202 Hearing dates: 17 September 2026 Decision date: 22 September 2026 Before: Leeming JA; Adamson JA Decision: (1) Dismiss the notice of appeal filed on 2 June 2026 as incompetent. (2) Refuse leave to appeal. (3) Order the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings. (4) If the respondent seeks an order that the costs be ordered in a gross sum pursuant to s 98(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), direct: (a) the respondent to file and serve any such application together with evidence and submissions relied on in support within 14 days of the date of this order; (b) the applicant to file and serve any evidence and submissions in response to any such application within a further 14 days; and (c) the respondent to file and serve any evidence and submissions in reply within a further 7 days. (5) Order that any application that costs be paid in a gross sum be dealt with on the papers. Catchwords: APPEALS — leave to appeal — interlocutory decisions — whether leave to appeal ought be granted — where applicant relies on a misapprehension as to order for default judgment — where no issue of principle, question of public importance or reasonably clear injustice shown Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 75 Supreme

Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 101 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 13.4, 14.28 Cases Cited: Majak v Rose (No 5) [2017] NSWCA 238 PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48 Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2026] ACTSC 77 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Arjun Prakash (Applicant) Commonwealth Securities Limited trading as Commsec (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: Applicant (Self-represented) J Foley (Respondent) Solicitors: Not applicable (Applicant) Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (Respondent) File Number(s): 2026/179231 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Common Law Citation: [2026] NSWSC 432; [2026] NSWSC 455; [2026] NSWSC 505 Date of Decision: 29 April 2026; 4 May 2026; 12 May 2026 Before: Sirtes J File Number(s): 2025/427216 [Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

JUDGMENT THE COURT: By summons filed on 19 June 2026, Mr Arjun Prakash (the applicant) seeks leave to appeal against orders made by Sirtes J (the primary judge) in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court (the Court below) on 29 April 2026 (Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2026] NSWSC 432) (Prakash No 1), 4 May 2026 (Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 455) (Prakash No 2). There is no separate challenge to the determination of the quantum of the gross sum costs order made by the primary judge on 12 May 2026 (Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 3) [2026] NSWSC 505 (Prakash No 3). Although the applicant filed a notice of appeal on 2 June 2026, the appeal was incompetent as the applicant needs leave to appeal pursuant to s 101(2)(e) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) since each of the decisions challenged was an interlocutory order. In order to obtain leave to appeal, the applicant needs to demonstrate an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something which is merely arguable: see the summary of authorities in PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48 at [6] (Bell P and Simpson AJA). For the reasons which follow we are not persuaded that the applicant has raised an issue of principle or a question of public importance. Nor are we persuaded that there is any reasonably clear

injustice going beyond the merely arguable. Accordingly, leave to appeal ought be refused. The background The application for leave to appeal is made in the following circumstances. The applicant traded options contracts using an account with the respondent, Commonwealth Securities Ltd trading as Commsec (Commsec), which he opened in July 2024. On 11 April 2025, Commsec made a margin call on the applicant’s account for $823,412.50 which comprised an ASX margin of $79,440.50 and a Commsec margin of $743,972. In his proposed amended statement of claim sought to be filed in the Court below on 23 December 2025 (but rejected by the Registry), the applicant claims that, as a result of Commsec’s alleged wrongdoing (which is said to amount to fraud), he suffered loss, amounting to $5,126,850, on which he claims interest. On 27 June 2025, the applicant commenced proceedings against Commsec in the Supreme Court of Queensland. On 26 September 2025, the applicant commenced further proceedings against Commsec in the Supreme Court of Queensland on the same basis as the first proceedings had been commenced. On 21 November 2025, both proceedings were dismissed on Commsec’s application: the second on the basis that it was an abuse of process and the first on the basis that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed and that the proceedings were also an abuse of process. On 14 October 2025, the

applicant commenced proceedings against Commsec to the same effect in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (the ACT proceedings). On 27 March 2026, on Commsec’s application, Muller AJ dismissed the ACT proceedings as an abuse of process: Prakash v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2026] ACTSC 77. The proceedings in the Court below were commenced by statement of claim filed on 5 November 2025 (while both the Queensland proceedings and the ACT proceedings were still on foot). It was served by 14 November 2025 and Commsec filed a notice of appearance on 21 November 2025. On 13 December 2025, the applicant filed a notice of motion for default judgment and Commsec, which had not filed a defence, filed a notice of motion for summary dismissal of the proceedings. The applicant was under the mistaken apprehension that, by filing a motion for default judgment, he had, in fact, obtained default judgment. However, the Court record established that this was not the case. On 22 April 2026 the applicant filed a notice to produce dated 14 April 2026 on Commsec, seeking production of extensive records in Commsec’s possession relating to the calculation of margin calls. It was given a return date of 6 May 2026 (that is, after the hearing before the primary judge). On 15 April 2026, the applicant filed a notice of motion in the Court below in which he sought the following orders: 1. That pursuant to UCPR 12.7(2), the Defendant’s Notice of Motion filed 13 December 2025 (seeking orders under UCPR 13.4 and 14.28) be dismissed for want of due despatch, as the proceedings were already disposed of by the final, sealed judgment entered on 30 March 2026.

2. A declaration that the Defendant is in default pursuant to UCPR 16.2(1), having failed to file a verified Defence (Form 7A) within the time limited by UCPR 14.3.

3. That the Defendant’s Written Submissions filed 9 April 2026 be struck out as procedurally moot and an abuse of process under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

4. That pursuant to UCPR 18.3(3), this motion be determined in chambers on 23 April 2026 without a hearing.

5. The Defendant pay the Plaintiff’s costs of this motion as agreed or assessed.

6. A declaration that the final default judgment entered on 30 March 2026 is perfected and remains in full force and effect.

7. That pursuant to UCPR 36.4(3), the judgment entered on 30 March 2026 take effect immediately for the purposes of enforcement, notwithstanding the usual 28-day period.

8. That the Plaintiff have leave to proceed with immediate enforcement of the judgment debt, including but not limited to the issuance of a Writ for the Levy of Property (Form 66) or Garnishee Orders (Forms 53-55).

9. That the Defendant ‘s recent filings be stayed or dismissed under UCPR 12. 7 to prevent any further obstruction of the enforcement of the sealed judgment.

10. That pursuant to UCPR 21.12, the Defendant be precluded from relying on any documents or evidence related to margin calculations or risk policies that were not produced in response to the Plaintiffs Form 19 Notice to Produce served on 26 March 2026.

11. That the Defendant’s applications under UCPR 13.4 and 14 .28 be dismissed as they fail to address the systemic non-disclosure of the margin formulation described as “0 .9 x Risk Margin while ignoring Premium Margin.” 12. That the Court declare the “Ben Doe” margin calculation method to be a breach of the Defendant’s statutory duty to act “efficiently , honestly, and fairly” under Section 912A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) .

13. That Investigations by ASIC, ACCC, APRA, AFP be ordered in the Systemic fraud, Unconscionable Conduct and SCAM of Commonwealth Securities Ltd.

14. That NortonRoseFulbright be investigated for Perjury. These applications were heard by the primary judge on 23 April 2026. The primary judge refused the applicant’s application for default judgment since, although Commsec had not filed a defence, it had sought summary dismissal of the proceedings on the same day on which the applicant sought default judgment. The primary judge dismissed the proceedings pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), r 13.4, which provides: 13.4 Frivolous and vexatious proceedings (1) If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings— (a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or (b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or (c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court, the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1). His Honour found the proceedings to be an abuse of process within the meaning of UCPR, r 13.4(1)(c), as they amount to a relitigation of proceedings that were summarily dismissed in Queensland as an abuse of process. The primary judge also found that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed by the proceedings and that their dismissal was also

warranted on this basis. The primary judge referred to the applicant’s notice of motion filed on 15 April 2026 at [19] of Prakash (No 1) and said: On 15 April 2026, Mr Prakash filed a third Notice of Motion. By that motion he sought an array of relief, ranging from a dismissal of CommSec’s motion for want of due despatch, writs of execution, declaratory relief in relation to the substantive claim, and the referral of the matter for investigation by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Strictly speaking, that motion was not listed for hearing before the Court. In any event, no submissions were made in relation to it at the hearing, and the relief sought by it is peripheral to the issues I must decide. His Honour identified the crux of the applicant’s complaint in the amended statement of claim at [65] of Prakash (No 1): The crux of Mr Prakash’s complaint appears to be that the margin requirements imposed by CommSec were too high which caused loss when he was unable to meet them. This contention is in part informed by Mr Prakash’s claim that he had valuable “deep in the money” positions in his portfolio which CommSec either undervalued or ignored when calculating his risk profile and formulating its margin

requirements. Furthermore, Mr Prakash says that the formula CommSec used to calculate its margin requirements was never revealed to him when his account was active and was not permitted by the terms governing the account. The primary judge noted that Commsec relied on cll 20 and 21 of its Commsec Exchange Traded Options Product Disclosure Statement and Terms and Conditions (PDS) and that cl 21 of the PDS entitled Commsec “in its absolute discretion, appropriate in connection with the obligations incurred” to demand the payment of money or provision of security: [67] of Prakash (No 1). Commsec said when it closed out the applicant’s positions on 15 May 2025, it lost $91,051.25: [90] of Prakash (No 1). The primary judge noted the applicant’s complaints against Commsec including breach of contract, fraud, misleading or deceptive conduct, unconscionable conduct and negligence: [72]-[76] of Prakash (No 1). The primary judge referred to the allegations of fraud and the absence of particulars: [73] of Prakash (No 1). His Honour continued: 74 … There must be an articulated legal structure that corrals this array of disparate facts into some, even loosely, coherent legal framework. None exists. 75 Mr Prakash cites many rules and regulations from various entities, including ASIC, the ASX, and others. His claim does not make apparent how CommSec has breached those requirements, or how

such breaches are actionable at law. 76 There are several allegations of criminal conduct by CommSec. Similar charges were levelled at CommSec’s legal representatives prior to and at the hearing. There is no foundation for those allegations. They are scandalous. Had they been made by a legal practitioner that practitioner would be liable to professional sanction. In any event, and contrary to Mr Prakash’s submission, this is a civil case and not a criminal one. The commission of a criminal offence does not, by itself, give rise to an action at law. 77 I accept that Mr Prakash is a self-represented litigant. However, even if he had the benefit of legal assistance to refine his position, I have determined that his claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. It must be dismissed. Although it was not strictly necessary to do so, the primary judge also addressed the alternative application made by Commsec: that the amended statement of claim be struck out pursuant to UCPR, r 14.28, which provides: 14.28 Circumstances in which court may strike out pleadings (1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the whole or any part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading— (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or (b) has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings,

or (c) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1). The primary judge said, at [82]-[83] of Prakash (No 1): 82 The Amended Statement of Claim does not comply with any of these requirements. The pleadings are prolix. The Amended Statement of Claim is 35 pages in length. It does not put CommSec on notice of the specific legal claim or claims it must meet, but is instead an imprecise recitation of Mr Prakash’s complaints about its conduct. The several allegations of fraud, negligence, and misleading or deceptive conduct are mere assertion and are unparticularised. 83 To my mind there is no question that the Amended Statement of Claim is embarrassing, fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and must be struck out. His Honour refused to grant leave to the applicant to replead. On 29 April 2026, the primary judge dismissed the applicant’s application for default judgment, dismissed the applicant’s claim pursuant to UCPR, r 13.4, ordered the applicant to pay Commsec’s costs of the proceedings and made directions regarding Commsec’s application for a gross sum costs order. On 4 May 2026, the primary judge refused the applicant’s application that his Honour recuse himself on the grounds of apprehended bias: Prakash (No 2). On 12 May 2026, the primary judge ordered the

applicant to pay Commsec’s costs in the gross sum of $68,181.82: Prakash No 3. The proposed appeal if leave is granted In his summons seeking leave to appeal, the applicant relies on six proposed grounds of appeal as follows: SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL [UCPR 51.10) The Applicant submits that this application raises fundamental questions of law and involves a severe, documented denial of procedural fairness that meets the strict statutory criteria for appellate intervention [UCPR 51.53]: Ground 1: The Lower Court Acted Entirely Functus Officio [UCPR 36.16] The Applicant’s Form 38 Default Judgment was regularised, sealed, and perfected on 13 April 2026 [UCPR 36.16]. Under the unyielding statutory timeline of UCPR Rule 36.16(3C) , the trial division’s jurisdiction to alter, vary, or set aside that perfected ledger entry expired permanently on 27 April 2026 [UCPR 36.16]. Because that timeline passed in total silence without a valid Form 7B Ground of Opposition or verified corporate affidavit on the record, the primary court’s power was completely exhausted. The subsequent 29 April strike-out entries represent an unmitigated jurisdictional nullity [UCPR 36.16]. Ground 2: Total Denial of Procedural Fairness and Due Process [UCPR 51.53] The trial division systematically quashed the Applicant’s active Form 20 Stay Motion and suppressed the active Form 24 Subpoena to

Produce-which legally demanded CommSec hand over their raw options trading desk logs-behind closed doors, without conducting a single oral hearing, allowing cross-examination, or permitting the Applicant to present arguments [UCPR 51.53]. This closed-door case destruction is a fatal violation of natural justice [UCPR 51.53] . Ground 3: CommSec’s Permanent, Unsworn Corporate Default Track [UCPR Part 35] The Respondent has conducted this entire multi-million dollar dispute with in an absolute corporate signatory vacuum containing 0 sworn corporate facts, 0 corporate affidavits verified by CommSec executives, and 0 valid defences [UCPR Part 35]. Under the strict operation of UCPR Part 35, their legal representatives hold absolutely zero standing to speaking or resist enforcement using unverified solicitor hearsay and clerical placeholders [UCPR Part 35]. Ground 4: Core Systemic Disclosures and AFSL Algorithmic Crimes [s 1013D] The underlying lawsuit involves a severe statutory breach under Section 1013D and Section 912A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Respondent deployed hidden 148x, 12x, and 7x pricing multipliers inside its options trading software that were completely omitted from its public PDS disclosures, artificially bloating retail risk boundaries to force equity liquidation events [s 912A, s 1013D]. This case raises an overriding public interest issue regarding

licensing transparency in Australian financial markets. The orders sought by the applicant, if the appeal is allowed are: ORDERS SOUGHT BY THE APPLICANT [UCPR 51.10] The Applicant seeks the following orders from the Court of Appeal: 1. GRANT OF LEAVE: That the Applicant be granted formal Leave to Appeal under UCPR Rule 51.10 against the interlocutory case-management notes and strike-out entries issued by the trial division [UCPR 51.10].

2. TOTAL JURISDICTIONAL QUASHING: That the electronic chamber notes of 29 April 2026, the subsequent case management directions of 4 May 2026, and the back-office registry log entries of 12 May 2026 marking the file portal status as “Case Closed” be formally declared a jurisdictional nullity, quashed , and wiped from the master records [UCPR 36.16, UCPR 51.56].

3. LEDGER RESTORATION: That the Applicant’s regularised, ink-sealed, and perfected 13 April 2026 Form 38 Default Judgment for the capital debt asset sum of $5,500,000.00 be fully restored to an unhindered, active state of execution on the Supreme Court master database [UCPR 36.16].

4. MANDATORY ENFORCEMENT UNBLOCKING: That the Level 5 counter clerks be immediately procedurally mandated to sign, seal, and issue the Applicant’s pending execution packets, specifically comprising Form 46 (Writ for the Levy of Property) and Form 69 (Garnishee Order for Debts) (UCPR 4.4 , UCPR 36.16]. 5. 72-HOUR REPLIES ULTIMATUM: That under UCPR Rule 51.56, the Respondent be placed on a compressed 72-hour maximum case management ultimatum to file any responsive evidence, which must be signed under oath by the CommSec CEO, the CBA Group CEO, or the Company Secretary, or face permanent exclusion from these proceedings [UCPR Part 35, UCPR 51.56]. Consideration In the hearing in this Court, the applicant made oral submissions which summarised his written submissions to the effect that he had suffered a gross injustice because Commsec had made a margin call on his trading account which he alleged was illegal (on several grounds, including fraud) and had had devastating financial consequences for him for which he sought compensation by way of the proceedings in the Court below. The issue with which this Court is concerned is the relatively narrow issue whether leave to appeal ought be granted in accordance with the principles set out earlier in these reasons. Before turning to the proposed grounds, it is convenient to outline the effect of the orders sought in the proposed appeal

(extracted above). Prayer 1 seeks, as is appropriate, a grant of leave to appeal and is, for that reason, unobjectionable. Prayers 2-5 seek orders, including an order for enforcement, consequential on there being a valid and unassailable default judgment in the applicant’s favour. Prayer 5 seeks an order requiring certain officers of Commsec to provide sworn evidence on oath. The jurisprudential basis for prayer 5 is not articulated and would appear to be lacking. Proposed ground 1: alleged error in hearing the motions on 23 April 2026 when default judgment had already been entered It can be seen from the orders sought and the proposed grounds of appeal that the applicant’s principal submission is that he obtained default judgment prior to the hearing before the primary judge and that, accordingly, the primary judge had no power to dismiss his proceedings. As noted above, this submission is factually erroneous as it is inconsistent with the Court’s record, as set out above. As proposed ground 1 rests squarely on this misapprehension, it is without merit. Proposed ground 2: alleged denial of procedural fairness in not addressing the motion for a stay or the extant subpoena The applicant submitted that it was a denial of procedural fairness for the primary judge not to determine his application for a stay (which we take to be a reference to his motion filed on 15 April 2026) or

to allow him to agitate issues concerning his subpoena to Commsec in the hearing on 23 April 2026. We apprehend that the reference to the applicant’s subpoena to Commsec is a reference to the notice to produce which was filed by the applicant on 22 April 2026 and given a return date of 6 May 2026. The transcript of the hearing in the Court below indicates that the primary judge afforded an opportunity to the applicant to address his Honour about matters germane to the notices of motion which were before his Honour. The applicant did not address the primary judge about the notice to produce which was, in any event, not returnable until 6 May 2026. The primary judge gave reasons for not addressing the motion filed on 15 April 2026 at the hearing on 23 April 2026 at [19] of Prakash (No 2) (extracted above). His Honour’s reasons concerned matters of practice and procedure, including that, as a matter of procedural fairness to both parties, only those motions which are listed to be heard on a particular day will be heard on that day. Further, as the applicant did not address the Court on that motion or the notice to produce on 23 April 2026, his Honour did not address it. As the primary judge dismissed the proceedings on the bases set out above, there was no reason for the return date of the notice to produce to be preserved or the notice of motion filed on 15 April 2026 to be

heard. Insofar as the applicant considered that he would be entitled to cross-examine Commsec personnel about the documents produced merely by reason of their having been produced, he was mistaken. We discern no issue of principle, question of public importance or reasonably clear injustice going beyond the merely arguable in his Honour’s approach. Proposed ground 3: alleged error in the primary judge relying on hearsay evidence in the determination of the notices of motion We apprehend that the gravamen of ground 3 is that Commsec chose to rely on affidavits of its solicitor, Ms Rhiannon Zahra, in support of its motion for summary dismissal and in opposition to the applicant’s motion for default judgment, rather than calling employees or officers of Commsec. Commsec’s forensic choice was orthodox for interlocutory applications. It followed from this forensic choice that the evidence adduced on behalf of Commsec was hearsay. However, it was admissible pursuant to s 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which provides that “[i]n an interlocutory proceeding, the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence if the party who adduces it also adduces evidence of its source.” The proceeding before the primary judge on 23 April 2026 was interlocutory and therefore s 75 of the Evidence Act applied. We discern no issue of principle, question of public importance or reasonably clear injustice

going beyond the merely arguable in the primary judge admitting and taking into account the affidavits of Ms Zahra on the motions before his Honour. Proposed ground 4: public importance of alleged breaches by Commsec The applicant’s proposed ground 4 raises what he submitted was an “overriding public interest regarding licensing transparency in Australian financial markets”. The issue, when stated at that level of generality, is an important one. However, the issue for this Court is whether leave ought be granted to the applicant to appeal against the primary judge’s refusal to enter default judgment and his Honour’s dismissal of the proceedings brought by the applicant against Commsec. It is this latter issue which must be shown to be one of principle or public importance or to give rise to a reasonably clear injustice going beyond the merely arguable. For the reasons given above, the applicant has not shown that it does. Prakash (No 2) The applicant did not articulate any basis for challenging his Honour’s refusal to recuse himself. No relief to that effect is contained in the summons for leave to appeal and no oral submissions were made to challenge it. It would appear that the basis for the allegation of apprehended bias was that the primary judge had rejected the applicant’s arguments. As the primary judge noted at [14] of Prakash (No 2), citing Majak v Rose (No 5) [2017]

NSWCA 238 at [12] (Leeming and Simpson JJA and Emmett AJA), this is not a proper basis for such an allegation. Miscellaneous matters Two final points should be made. The first is that the applicant included a great deal of material in the white folders prepared for the hearing of the application for leave. In all there were in excess of 1800 pages of material, and a large number of affidavits made by him. We do not wish it to be thought that we have overlooked this. They need not be summarised because none of this material went to the issues on which the grant or refusal of leave to appeal turned. Those issues have been addressed above. Secondly, on the morning of the day after judgment was reserved, the applicant supplied a further email to the Court with the heading “Deliberate pagination error deception hindrance yet Material facts seen in the Court establishes enough ground for Leave granted”. The email contained a lengthy submission with nine main headings, the first of which was “1. THE OPENING ANCHOR: THE DELIBERATE PAGINATION DECEPTION HINDRANCE” and which concluded “9. MODERN REGULATORY MANDATES & TOTAL JUDICIAL INJUSTICE”. The email should not have been sent after judgment was reserved, although we are not critical of Mr Prakash, who is not a lawyer, on that front. The email referred to exchanges at the hearing reflecting the fact that the members of the Court could

not follow immediately the page numbers to which Mr Prakash referred, and Mr Prakash could not immediately follow the page numbers to which the Court referred. It became evident that Mr Prakash was not using the pagination in the White Folders which the Registrar had directed the respondent to file and serve. Why that occurred is unclear, but it is unnecessary to consider that any further. Nonetheless, at all times where this difficulty arose, the members of the Court and Mr Prakash were able eventually to get to the right document (for the most part, being pages of the Product Disclosure Statement). We note that Mr Prakash was permitted to address for approximately triple the time ordinarily allowed in an application of this nature. We do not consider that this caused any material disadvantage to Mr Prakash, nor did it have any impact upon the outcome of the application for leave. It is unnecessary to summarise the other matters raised in Mr Prakash’s email, which do not bear upon the issues governing the grant of leave. Orders For the reasons given above, the Court orders: Dismiss the notice of appeal filed on 2 June 2026 as incompetent. Refuse leave to appeal. Order the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings. If the respondent seeks an order that the costs be ordered in a gross sum pursuant to s 98(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), direct: the

respondent to file and serve any such application together with evidence and submissions relied on in support within 14 days of the date of this order; the applicant to file and serve any evidence and submissions in response to any such application within a further 14 days; and the respondent to file and serve any evidence and submissions in reply within a further 7 days. Order that any application that costs be paid in a gross sum be dealt with on the papers. ** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 September 2026