Kostov v State of New South Wales (Vexatious Proceedings) [2018] NSWSC 1794

Supreme Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Kostov v State of New South Wales (Vexatious Proceedings) [2018] NSWSC 1794 Hearing dates: 19 November 2018 Date of orders: 19 November 2018 Decision date: 19 November 2018 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Fagan J Decision: In matter No 2018/278855, Kostov v Attorney General of New South Wales:

(1) The proceedings are transferred from the Equity Division to the Common Law Division.

(2) The proceedings are listed before Fagan J on Friday 23 November 2018.

In matter No 2018/95485, Kostov v State of New South Wales:

(1) The plaintiff's notice of motion filed 18 September 2018 is dismissed with costs.

(2) The defendant's notice of motion filed 30 October 2018 is dismissed. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs.

Pursuant to s 8(7) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 it is ordered:

(1) Adriana Kostov is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales.

(2) The Registry of the Supreme Court is not to accept for filing, either online or in person, any document from Adriana Kostov in any proceeding which has already been commenced by her in any Division of the Supreme Court as at the date of these orders.

(3) Any application pursuant to s 9 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act to vary these orders, to permit Adriana Kostov to file a document in a proceeding which has been commenced prior to this date, is to be made by notice of motion in the affected proceeding, supported by evidence and/or argument in writing. Any such application with respect to Common Law Division proceedings is to be referred to the Common Law Division Civil List Judge.

(4) Any application by Adriana Kostov pursuant to s 14 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 for leave to institute fresh proceedings in the Common Law Division of this Court is upon filing to be referred to the Common Law Division Civil List Judge, and any application for leave to institute fresh proceedings in the Equity Division is to be referred to the Chief Judge in Equity. Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – parties – vexatious litigants – vexatious proceedings orders – Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), s 8 Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) Cases Cited: Kostov v Gibson [2018] NSWSC 428 Kostov v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1289 Kostov v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 858 Kostov v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWSC 1252 Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1722 Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 96 Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1071 Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 341 Kostov v Zhang [2016] NSWCA 262 Kostov v Zhang [2017] NSWDC 7 Kostov v Zhang [2017] NSWSC 456 Kostov v Zhang (No 2) [2017] NSWDC 18 Kostov v Zhang (No 3) [2017] NSWDC 89 Texts Cited: N/A Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Adriana Kostov (plaintiff) State of New South Wales (defendant) Representation: Counsel: S Chrysanthou with B Dean (defendant)

Solicitors: Self-represented (plaintiff) Crown Solicitor's Office (defendant) File Number(s): 2018/95485 Publication restriction: No

Judgment (EX TEMPORE, REVISED) 1. The proceedings before me, Kostov v State of New South Wales No 2018/95485, were commenced by statement of claim filed on 26 March 2018. The defendant wrote to the plaintiff on 9 May 2018 pointing out correctly and with detailed reasons that the statement of claim disclosed no viable cause of action. The pleading contained allegations of wrongs done to the plaintiff by Gibson DCJ in proceedings in the District Court and by a Registrar of this Court (in relation to the filing of documents and the waiver of fees). There were a number of other assertions which simply were not maintainable as the basis of claims for the relief the plaintiff sought. 2. On 17 May 2018 the Registrar ordered with the consent of the defendant that the plaintiff have leave to file an amended statement of claim by 7 June 2018. On 24 May 2018 the plaintiff informed the Registrar that she did not intend to file an amended document. The defendant therefore filed a notice of motion on 6 June 2018 seeking an order that the proceedings be summarily dismissed pursuant to r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). 3. On 7 August 2018 Rothman J heard the defendant's application. On that day his Honour ordered that the proceedings be dismissed, finding that they "are frivolous or vexatious; they do not disclose a reasonable cause of action; and on their face the proceedings are an abuse of process": Kostov v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWSC 1252 at [16]. 4. Ms Kostov has conducted these proceedings at all stages without independent legal advice or representation. On 5 September 2018 she filed a notice of motion seeking orders that Rothman J's determination be set aside, that his Honour's reasons "be suppressed from Caselaw" and that Ms Kostov be permitted to file an amended statement of claim. This course of proceeding followed a consistent pattern of the plaintiff's litigious behaviour, exhibited in numerous other proceedings to which I will refer shortly. The pattern is that of commencing a proceeding which discloses no cause of action and then when it is summarily dismissed applying, at the same level within the relevant court or tribunal, to have the summary dismissal set side. In some cases Ms Kostov has commenced a fresh proceeding to the same effect as the one which has been summarily dismissed. In a number of cases she has commenced at the one time multiple proceedings, all unfounded in law and in fact, for the same relief and on the same grounds. 5. Ms Kostov did not attend before Rothman J on 7 August 2018 when his Honour heard the defendant's application for dismissal of her claim. She had accepted that hearing date as suitable to herself at the time of it being fixed by the Registrar. Then on the day she informed Rothman J's associate that she would not attend due to work commitments. Again this fits a pattern exhibited in each of the proceedings in which Ms Kostov has been the moving party, and which I will summarise shortly. 6. Frequently the plaintiff phones or emails the staff of the judge who is allocated to hear one of her applications (or the Registrar before whom one of her matters is listed) and requests to re-arrange the time and/or to conduct the proceedings by phone. In cases where a telephone hearing is acceded to, she is commonly not available when called from court. From my own experience of hearing Ms Kostov's matters, conducting them by phone is not satisfactory due to her often excitable, intemperate and disorderly manner. She is often in a frame of mind to interrupt, to persist in talking over the top of the judge or opposing parties, to repeat herself and to pursue irrelevant and unhelpful propositions. 7. Ms Kostov's notice of motion to set aside Rothman J's orders of 7 August 2018 was listed at 10.00 am on 14 September 2018 before his Honour. At her request, it was adjourned to 2.00 pm on 18 September. Despite that time having been appointed at Ms Kostov's instigation, she did not appear and sent an email at 2.04 pm on 18 September 2018, whilst the Court was sitting, seeking to re-schedule the hearing. Rothman J refused to defer the matter, having other proceedings in the duty list to attend to. Ms Kostov's notice of motion was dismissed. At 4.14 pm the same day the plaintiff then filed a second notice of motion seeking that his Honour's orders of 18 September 2018, dismissing her first notice of motion, be set aside. This further application sought, again, that the orders of 7 August 2018 should be set aside. This is in conformity with the pattern which I have identified. The further notice of motion filed at 4.14 pm on 18 September 2018 is before me today. It is demonstrably vexatious and an abuse of process. I will dismiss it with costs. That will leave these proceedings at an end, dismissed summarily pursuant to Rothman J's order of 7 August 2018. The Court's file will be closed. 8. There is also before the Court today a notice of motion filed by the defendant seeking to prevent any further repetition of the procedural conduct that I have described. It seeks these orders: 1. Any further application by the plaintiff in proceedings 2018/95485 be made only with leave granted by the Common Law duty judge or other judge of the Supreme Court. 2. The registry not accept for filing, online or in person, any document from the plaintiff in proceedings 2018/95485 without such leave. 1. At 11.45 am on Thursday 15 November 2018 Ms Kostov emailed the Registrar, referring to the listing of this matter before the Court at 10.00 am today. She wrote: Due to work commitments (our principal is away, I work at a sole practitioner law firm) I will only be able to appear at 2.00 pm to argue the said motion. Would it be possible to move the hearing of the motion to 2.00 pm that afternoon and thus the duty judge can attend to other matters that morning referred from your list? I note Monday's judge has not been allocated as yet, otherwise I would have raised this with them today. 1. I was allocated to sit as duty judge today, Monday 19 November 2018, and to hear this matter. It was not reasonably practicable to accommodate Ms Kostov's request for a 2.00 pm listing given that, as duty judge, I would also have to attend to referrals from the Registrar, applications for warrants and other urgent business. At my request the Registrar replied at 1.00 pm on Thursday, 15 November to the effect that the matter would remain listed at 10.00 am and the parties would need to be in attendance. 2. Two other proceedings which have been commenced by Ms Kostov are listed before the Registrar on 21 November 2018 and are proposed to be referred to me that day. Another of her matters is allocated to my duty list for Friday, 23 November 2018. In view of this array of proceedings, all commenced by Ms Kostov and all listed for the week commencing 19 November 2018, I reviewed during Thursday 15 and Friday 16 November all files of the listed matters together with a number of others on the register of current proceedings. I formed the view that, prima facie, Ms Kostov's numerous proceedings in this Court, in the District Court, in the Local Court and in the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal have been vexatious within the meaning of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). 3. I therefore requested that the Registrar communicate the following to Ms Kostov by email, which he did at 1.23 pm on Friday, 16 November 2018, with a copy to the solicitor for the defendant in this matter (2018/95485) which is before me today. The email to Ms Kostov was as follows: Justice Fagan has asked me to bring to your attention specifically that the defendant's notice of motion in the above proceedings [ie 2018/95485], filed 30 October 2018, is returnable and is to be dealt with on Monday, 19 November 2018 at 10.00 am, as well as your own motion filed 18 September 2018. His Honour wishes to ensure that you understand that the defendant's motion seeks orders to prevent you filing any further document in these proceedings without the leave of a judge. In support of this application the defendant relies upon your manner conducting the proceedings to date. His Honour considers that your manner of conducting the proceedings may justify the Court acting on its own initiative to make vexatious proceedings orders against you under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008. In determining whether to make such orders his Honour will consider your conduct in this case and also generally your conduct of litigation in this Court over the past two years, including without limitation in the following matters: 1. There were then set out the titles and file numbers of six separate proceedings, including those brought by Ms Kostov against YPOL Pty Limited, Nationwide News Pty Limited, the Attorney General of New South Wales, and Amelie Housing. The Registrar's email continued: You will be given an opportunity to be heard as to whether a vexatious proceedings order ought to be made when the matter is before his Honour on Monday, 19 November 2018 commencing at 10.00 am. 1. Ms Kostov replied at 3.30 pm on Friday, 16 November 2018 that she did not wish to press her own motion in this present proceeding, being her motion to have set aside Rothman J's orders of 7 August 2018 dismissing the proceedings as vexatious and disclosing no cause of action. However, the email stated that Ms Kostov's position in that respect was conditional upon "the commentary Judge Gibson made about myself [being] removed from Caselaw". This is a reference to adverse findings concerning Ms Kostov's conduct of defamation proceedings in the District Court, to which I will refer later in these reasons. Those adverse finding were recorded and published in judgments of her Honour. 2. Ms Kostov attached an affidavit to this email in which she deposed to her endeavours to obtain legal advice. She claimed in the email that she had sought "legal advice on every opportunity" and requested that she be given a chance to obtain legal advice again. She referred to an order that Walton J had made on 9 November 2018 in other proceedings, adjourning an application before his Honour for two weeks to enable legal advice to be sought. She said that she is working in a sole practitioner's legal firm and therefore would not be able to attend the proceedings today.

Adjournment application on 19 November 2018 1. In the event Ms Kostov did attend before the Court today. She did not press her notice of motion to set aside Rothman J's orders of 7 August 2018. However, she sought an adjournment of the Court's consideration of whether vexatious proceedings orders should be made. I refused that application for an adjournment. It was put on the basis that she would seek legal advice. Ms Kostov has a law degree and in much of her correspondence with the Court and in affidavits she has proclaimed her competence in law. She has from time to time had solicitors or counsel appear for her briefly but never with any consistency. All of the numerous proceedings which prima facie show vexatious conduct have been instituted and conducted by her in person. In nearly all of them findings have already been made that her claims had no reasonable prospects of success and/or were abusive or vexatious. Ms Kostov was not legally represented in resisting summary dismissal of those matters on those grounds. 2. I do not regard as bona fide her claimed desire to be legally represented or to obtain advice in relation to the prospect of orders being made against her under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. I regard that expressed desire as merely manipulative, to try to delay the Court's overall consideration of her litigious conduct. Nor does Ms Kostov need an adjournment for the purposes of her own personal preparation. All the proceedings must necessarily be within her own full and current knowledge. The state of the Court's record concerning Ms Kostov's litigation, to which I will refer later in these reasons, is such that it has become pressing for her vexatious conduct to be brought to an end. If there was anything to be said as to why her conduct on the numerous files before this Court, the District Court and other Courts was not vexatious, it would have to be something very compelling and within Ms Kostov's ability to identify without an adjournment to obtain legal advice or to prepare herself. 3. In any event, the vexatious proceedings orders that I may make under the Act will provide, inherently by force of that Act, that Ms Kostov may apply to the Court for leave to commence fresh proceedings and she may obtain legal advice at her leisure before making any such application. If she considers that in any existing proceeding she has justification for filing any further documentation or agitating any further claims for relief, she may seek the leave of a judge and she may obtain legal advice before submitting any application for such leave. 4. Based upon Ms Kostov's conduct in previous proceedings I have no confidence that her obtaining legal advice would be of any benefit to her. She has had ample opportunity to seek such advice, if she had ever wanted it and had any intention of following it, over two years of the most extraordinary course of vexatious litigation as demonstrated on the files. If she has not obtained legal advice which would correct her from this path before today, it is not going to happen in the next little while. The Court cannot wait for her to obtain legal advice before taking steps to protect itself against her conduct and to protect litigants who face harassing proceedings being brought against them by her. 5. The past proceedings to which I refer which demonstrate her now familiar pattern of vexatious conduct are described under the following headings.

Kostov v Zhang & Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (District Court, 2016/51926 and 2016/86450) 1. Ms Kostov commenced proceedings against Ms Zhang, a journalist, and Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd on 17 February 2016 and 10 March 2016. She alleged defamation and injurious falsehood in respect of an article published in the Australian Financial Review. The history of these proceedings is fully summarised in the following judgments of Gibson DCJ: Kostov v Zhang [2017] NSWDC 7, published 2 February 2017; Kostov v Zhang (No 2) [2017] NSWDC 18, published 16 February 2017 and Kostov v Zhang (No 3) [2017] NSWDC 89, published 1 May 2017. 2. Stated as briefly as possible, the course of the proceedings described in Gibson DCJ's judgments commenced with Ms Kostov filing, immediately after her statements of claim, amended pleadings then notices of motion to amend her pleadings again. She failed to provide a valid address for service. She made an application for transfer of the proceedings to the Supreme Court very soon after she had commenced them in the District Court. This was dismissed by Wilson J: see Kostov v Zhang [2016] NSWSC 456. Ms Kostov sought leave to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal was refused: see Kostov v Zhang [2016] NSWCA 262. 3. By August 2016 Ms Kostov was attempting to file further amended statements of claim in the District Court. On a number of occasions when the defamation proceedings were listed before Gibson DCJ Ms Kostov failed to appear. She filed a notice of motion seeking to join further defendants. When procedural directions were made she failed to adhere to them. By the end of 2016 the proceedings had made virtually no progress, having been bogged down in Ms Kostov's procedural machinations. When the matters were listed before the judge in January 2017 Ms Kostov sent a stream of emails to the associate indicating her unavailability and seeking to rearrange dates and times. 4. Throughout 2016 she filed in one of the two proceedings no fewer than five amended pleadings, none of them with leave. She filed eight affidavits during the course of 2016 all related purely to procedural matters. As a result of this course of events the defendant ran up significant costs in the District Court and sought an order that Ms Kostov pay certain costs awarded to date and provide security as a condition of continuing with the proceedings. This application was listed for hearing in February 2017. Very shortly before the appointed hearing date Ms Kostov communicated to the judge that she would be unable to appear. She sent in 26 pages of submissions on the morning, primarily repeating earlier requests for an adjournment and the like. 5. The upshot of all of this was that her Honour Gibson DCJ stayed the proceedings until Ms Kostov should pay the costs already ordered against her in the District Court and in the Supreme Court. She was also ordered to provide within 28 days security for the defendants' future costs of the District Court proceedings. The costs were never paid and the security was never provided. The three judgments which her Honour published made reference to other proceedings which had been commenced in the Equity Division of this Court by the defendants' legal representatives seeking to restrain Ms Kostov from harassing them. Those proceedings came before the former Chief Judge in Equity, Bergin CJ in Eq, and on 22 November 2016 her Honour made orders in an attempt to protect the defendants' legal representatives. 6. The second judgment of Gibson DCJ, Kostov v Zhang (No 2), was concerned with a notice of motion which Ms Kostov filed on the afternoon of 2 February 2017 seeking to have set aside the orders that her Honour had made earlier that day. That application was dismissed by her Honour and Ms Kostov was ordered to pay the defendants' costs. In an application of a kind which has become typical of Ms Kostov's litigious conduct, she made an oral application to Gibson DCJ that the earlier judgment (of 2 February 2017) be suppressed. Gibson DCJ refused that application. This refusal was the subject of yet another notice of motion filed by Ms Kostov, seeking reversal of her Honour's decision. That further notice of motion was dismissed. 7. Those District Court proceedings came to an end because Ms Kostov did not satisfy an existing costs order or provide security for future costs. All that was achieved was the infliction of very significant costs on the defendants and a substantial burden upon the District Court.

Kostov v Judith Gibson and the State of New South Wales (Supreme Court Common Law Division, 2018/52935) 1. On 16 February 2018 Ms Kostov filed a statement of claim against Gibson DCJ and the State of New South Wales. This pleaded causes of action in defamation against the two defendants based upon the contents of Gibson DCJ's judgments. The making of such a claim self-evidently ran up against the barrier of s 27 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), that is, that the judgments were published on occasions of absolute privilege. Accordingly, the defendants applied to have the proceedings dismissed. That application was dealt with by Beech-Jones J on 6 April 2018. His Honour's reasons for dismissing the proceedings with costs are reported as Kostov v Gibson [2018] NSWSC 428. 2. No sooner had his Honour given that decision, with ex-tempore reasons, than Ms Kostov applied to the defamation list judge to have his Honour's orders set aside. That came before McCallum J who refused to deal with the notice of motion on the basis that it was incompetent in respect of proceedings that had been finally disposed of.

Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd (Supreme Court Common Law Division, 2016/131955 and 2016/257819) 1. Ms Kostov commenced proceedings in April 2016 against the law firm YPOL Pty Limited and Mr Eastman. YPOL Pty Ltd were solicitors for Mr Eastman. Ms Kostov alleged that Mr Eastman had made allegations against her of disseminating confidential information and that he had instructed YPOL to correspond with her about it. She brought these proceedings against Mr Eastman and YPOL to obtain relief in respect of the correspondence concerning the dissemination of the confidential information. The pleading contained no recognisable or coherent cause of action. Unsurprisingly, it was dismissed with costs on 14 July 2016 by Harrison J: Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 96. 2. Ms Kostov forthwith filed notices of motion in that proceeding seeking to reverse his Honour's orders. She then commenced fresh proceedings alleging exactly the same matters. This came before Bellew J on 1 December 2016. His Honour ordered that the second proceedings be stayed unless and until the costs of the first proceeding should be paid: Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1722. 3. By that stage Ms Kostov had corresponded with YPOL Pty Ltd and their solicitors in the litigation copiously, inundating all members and employed solicitors of the two firms (that is, the defendant party and its solicitors on the record) with intemperate and at times scandalous and abusive emails. The defendants obtained from Bellew J an order that Ms Kostov not communicate with the defendants or their solicitors except by email to a nominated address. Ms Kostov disregarded this and continued to issue a stream of email correspondence. The defendants charged her with contempt of Bellew J's order. I tried that charge and found the contempt proved: Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 341. That judgment was handed down on 28 March 2017. 4. Ms Kostov did not appear to answer the charge but requested that she be heard over the telephone. She was contacted by that means but the connection had to be terminated because of her manner of conducting herself. Subsequently I dealt with the question of penalty for the contempt in Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1071. My decisions in those matters have been appealed by Ms Ms Kostov to the Court of Appeal and the Court has reserved its decision.

Kostov v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (Supreme Court Equity Division, 2018/83736; Common Law Division, 2018/83731; Equity Division, 2018/248745; Common Law Division, 2018/258386) 1. Ms Kostov commenced Equity Division proceedings 2018/83736 on 15 March 2018 seeking ex parte orders that the defendant cease publication of a certain article and an injunction against further publication of it. This ex parte relief was refused by Kunc J on 16 March 2018. As usual, Ms Kostov followed this refusal with an application by notice of motion to set aside his Honour's orders. This came before Hallen J, who dismissed Ms Kostov's application on 19 March 2018. 2. Ms Kostov had already commenced separate proceedings in this Division, No 2018/83731, against the same defendant in respect of the same alleged defamatory publication. McCallum J heard an application by the defendant to have those proceedings dismissed on the basis that the imputations relied upon by Ms Kostov were not in fact conveyed by the relevant published matter. McCallum J upheld that application and dismissed the proceedings on 8 June 2018: Kostov v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 858. 3. On 13 August 2018, Ms Kostov filed a summons in the Equity Division, No 2018/248745, seeking orders for take-down or removal of the same material from a website and claiming an injunction prohibiting further publication. That relief was sought ex parte and was refused by Rein J: Kostov v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 1289. His Honour noted that Ms Kostov had brought the ex parte application without informing the Court that there had been a prior unsuccessful application to Kunc J, a matter which his Honour had discovered through his own inquiries. The proceedings were then transferred to the Common Law Division. Davies J heard a summary dismissal application under r 13.4 on 30 October 2018 and his Honour's decision is reserved. A review of that file shows that Ms Kostov had on 29 October 2018 sought an adjournment of the hearing listed before Davies J, which was refused. After Davies J had reserved judgment on 3 October 2018, Ms Kostov applied the next day to Walton J to re-open the proceedings. This was refused. 4. Ms Kostov commenced another proceeding, again concerning the same published matter and the same defendant, Common Law Division No 2018/258386. She sought damages as well as an injunction. A notice of motion was filed by the defendants for summary dismissal. That also was heard by Davies J on 30 October 2018, and his Honour's decision is reserved.

Kostov v Amelie Housing (Supreme Court Common Law Division, 2018/300259 and 2018/300286) 1. In 2017 Ms Kostov was a tenant of a room in a house in Harris Street, Pyrmont, leased to her by Amelie Housing. Amelie Housing commenced proceedings against her in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal for unpaid rent in a very small sum. Amelie Housing sought an order that the lease be terminated if the rent was not paid. The Tribunal at first instance made orders for payment. Ms Kostov did not pay. Amelie Housing returned to the Tribunal to request orders for possession. Such orders were made. Ms Kostov then instituted an internal appeal. That was decided against her by an Appeal Panel of the Tribunal. Ms Kostov then made repeated applications to successive Appeal Panels for review of the first decision. Those repetitive re-agitations of the same matter were an abuse of the Tribunal's process. 2. At the same time as those successive internal Tribunal appeals were being mounted, Ms Kostov commenced a proceeding in the Local Court claiming damages arising from alleged wrongdoing in relation to her occupancy of the premises. The Local Court in July 2018 refused an application by Ms Kostov to amend her statement of claim by adding an additional party. In August 2018 the Local Court dismissed the proceedings for want of prosecution. Ms Kostov had failed to comply with directions for the service of evidence. 3. Ms Kostov has purported to commence an appeal to this Court against those interlocutory decisions of the Local Court in matter No 2018/300259. I say "purported" to appeal because she requires leave and leave has not been sought. Her prospects of leave being granted are negligible. The matter is next listed before the Registrar on 21 November 2018. 4. The defendant to those proceedings brought an application before Johnson J on 18 October 2018 to have them regularised because the defendant was misnamed. On 18 October 2018 his Honour gave directions to put the proceedings in order: Kostov v St Vincent de Paul Housing t/as Amelie Housing [2018] NSWSC 1581. Ms Kostov forthwith filed a notice of motion to have his Honour's orders set aside. Johnson J had given her leave to file an amended summons which would correct the name of the defendant but as yet she has not done so. 5. The notice of motion to set aside Johnson J's orders was filed five days after those orders were given, on 23 October 2018. Ms Kostov attached to her notice of motion extensive annexures comprising of a large body of emails of no apparent relevance. She filed on 8 November 2018 written submissions with further bulky but irrelevant annexures. 6. In Johnson J's judgment his Honour summarised the proceedings which had already taken place in the Tribunal concerning the residential lease which underlay the Local Court case and the purported appeal to this Court. His Honour's description shows that Ms Kostov's performance in the Tribunal conformed to the pattern of chaos, disruption, irrelevance and lack of legal merit which has been seen in all her proceedings in this Court, the District Court and in the Local Court. The statement of claim in the Local Court itself appears to disclose no cause of action. How Ms Kostov could expect to obtain leave to appeal in respect of an interlocutory Local Court decision in a proceeding which, on its face, is not maintainable is completely incomprehensible. 7. Ms Kostov commenced a second proceeding in this Court against Amelie Housing, No 2018/300286, seeking to appeal one of the Tribunal's decisions on a question of law. On the documents filed in that proceeding, no question of law is apparent.

Kostov v Attorney General of New South Wales (Supreme Court Common Law Division, 2018/278855) 1. On 24 August 2018 the Attorney General applied to the Court to have lifted suppression orders which apply to some of the judgments which have been handed down concerning Ms Kostov's proceedings. The Attorney General's purpose was to examine the judgments with a view to determining whether he should apply for vexatious proceedings orders against Ms Kostov. This request for lifting of suppression of the judgments was referred to the Chief Judge of the Division, who made the orders in chambers on 28 August 2018. 2. On 28 August 2018 the Registrar informed the Crown Solicitor that the orders had been made. They had the effect of varying previous suppression orders or non-publication orders only to the extent of enabling the Attorney General to review the judgments. The previous suppression orders were not lifted globally. The variations were entered on JusticeLink in respect of each of the proceedings affected. Ms Kostov was informed that this variation had been made to the restriction upon access to the judgments. On 7 September 2018 and subsequent days she protested the variation in strong terms by emails to the Crown Solicitor, to the Court and to various holders of public office. 3. Ms Kostov was advised by letter of 10 September 2018 from the Crown Solicitor that the variations only permitted access to the judgments by the Attorney General and his advisers, and not more general access. Ms Kostov was informed that an application for vexatious proceedings orders against her was being considered. 4. On 10 September 2018 the plaintiff requested the Court to provide an urgent listing the next day for her to apply orally to have the variations to the suppression orders reversed. This request for listing was granted and she was advised she would be heard by the Common Law duty judge at 2.00 pm on 11 September 2018. During that morning, Ms Kostov sent a number of emails requesting adjournment of the urgent listing. This was refused by the duty judge through his staff. Ms Kostov did not appear at the appointed time, 2.00 pm on 11 September 2018, and the duty judge accordingly made no order. 5. The plaintiff then filed a summons in the Equity Division at 4.29 pm seeking a stay of the Chief Judge's variation orders made on 28 August 2018. The commencement of this further proceeding in another Division of the Court was entirely unnecessary and disruptive. The plaintiff had the opportunity to advance any argument against the release of the judgments to the Attorney General at the time she had requested an urgent listing before the Duty Judge. 6. Ms Kostov could not have any valid argument against release of the judgments to the Attorney General for the purpose the Attorney has nominated, whatever may have been the ground upon which restricted access to those judgments was ordered in the first place. The Attorney has the statutory power to apply for vexatious proceedings orders and he would only be in a position to do so if he should have access to decisions of the Court in proceedings in which the person under consideration has been a party. 7. I doubt that Ms Kostov ever had a right to be heard in opposition to the variation of the judgment publication restrictions in such circumstances. Granting access for the Attorney General to review the judgments to inform a decision about bringing an application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act is a matter integral to the administration of justice and to the Court's control over the use of its processes. It is not a matter inter partes. 8. However, if principles of procedural fairness are applicable in such a way as to require that Ms Kostov be accorded a hearing in opposition to the release of the judgments the opportunity for such a hearing was accorded at 2.00 pm on 11 September 2018. Ms Kostov did not avail herself of that opportunity. The commencement of fresh proceedings to agitate the issue in these circumstances is an abuse of process. 9. Notwithstanding these considerations the Attorney General, in overabundant fairness to Ms Kostov, consented to the Chief Judge's variations being set aside and commenced a separate proceeding in which to obtain those variations afresh, following a hearing. The separate proceedings are entitled Attorney General of New South Wales v Adriana Kostov, No 2018/322913. 10. I propose to make orders in Ms Kostov's proceedings No 2018/278855 that they be transferred from the Equity Division to the Common Law Division and secondly that they be listed before me on Friday 23 November 2018. On that day the Attorney General's application in No 2018/322913 to vary the restrictions on publication of judgments will also be before me. It appears that both proceedings may be regarded as redundant because of the vexatious proceedings orders I will make today, and that they may be dismissed.

Conclusion 1. This survey of Ms Kostov's proceedings is not comprehensive. I have referred to sufficient of the matters in which she has been involved and which I have had time to review, to identify the basis upon which I conclude that she should be subject to orders under the Act. I have not repeated herein the detail of Ms Kostov's unreasonable litigious conduct and abuse of process in every case. The reasons published by other judges, which I have cited in this judgment, must be read in conjunction with this judgment to understand the full extent of Ms Kostov's vexatiousness. 2. I will not order a stay, pursuant to s 8(7)(a) of the Act, of all proceedings already commenced by Ms Kostov which remain current. Some of her current proceedings in this Court appear hopeless and it would be preferable for them to be dealt with by early summary dismissal, if appropriate, rather than have them linger under a stay. It will be open to any defendant to seek a stay or dismissal of any current proceedings in this Court, or in any other court or tribunal, by application filed in such proceedings. Ms Kostov will not be able to advance any current proceedings in this Court except by leave, which will have to be sought by her for any step she wishes to take.

Orders 1. In matter No 2018/278855, Kostov v Attorney General of New South Wales: 1. The proceedings are transferred from the Equity Division to the Common Law Division. 2. The proceedings are listed before Fagan J on Friday 23 November 2018. 1. In matter No 2018/95485, Kostov v State of New South Wales: 1. The plaintiff's notice of motion filed 18 September 2018 is dismissed with costs. 2. The defendant's notice of motion filed 30 October 2018 is dismissed. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs. 1. Pursuant to s 8(7) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 it is ordered: 1. Adriana Kostov is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales. 2. The Registry of the Supreme Court is not to accept for filing, either online or in person, any document from Adriana Kostov in any proceeding which has already been commenced by her in any Division of the Supreme Court as at the date of these orders. 3. Any application pursuant to s 9 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act to vary these orders, to permit Adriana Kostov to file a document in a proceeding which has been commenced prior to this date, is to be made by notice of motion in the affected proceeding, supported by evidence and/or argument in writing. Any such application with respect to Common Law Division proceedings is to be referred to the Common Law Division Civil List Judge. 4. Any application by Adriana Kostov pursuant to s 14 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 for leave to institute fresh proceedings in the Common Law Division of this Court is upon filing to be referred to the Common Law Division Civil List Judge, and any application for leave to institute fresh proceedings in the Equity Division is to be referred to the Chief Judge in Equity.

********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 03 December 2018