Hooper v Port Stephens Council (No 5) [2010] NSWLEC 194

Hooper v Port Stephens Council (No 5) [2010] NSWLEC 194

Because r 36.16(3A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 permits the Court to determine a timely notice of motion to set aside or vary an order as if the order had not been entered, there was normally no utility in restraining entry of the costs orders; with the respondents consenting, the prior order should be vacated.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
01 October 2010
Procedural Posture
Practice and Procedure / Applicant's Application to Vacate an Order That Costs Orders Not Be Entered Until Further Order
Outcome
Application allowed; prior order vacated by consent and travel costs ordered.
Legal Topics
['entry of Orders' 'variation or Setting Aside of Orders' 'notice of Motion' 'vacating Interlocutory Order']
['civil Procedure' 'costs' 'land and Environment Court Procedure'] ['entry of Orders' 'variation or Setting Aside of Orders' 'notice of Motion' 'vacating Interlocutory Order']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Practice and Procedure / Applicant's Application to Vacate an Order That Costs Orders Not Be Entered Until Further Order

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ['Whether it was necessary or appropriate to maintain an order restraining entry of costs orders where a timely notice of motion to set aside or vary an entered order may be determined as if the order had not been entered.' 'Whether Order 1 made by Justice Biscoe on 24 September 2010 should be vacated.']

Ratio Decidendi

Because r 36.16(3A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 permits the Court to determine a timely notice of motion to set aside or vary an order as if the order had not been entered, there was normally no utility in restraining entry of the costs orders; with the respondents consenting, the prior order should be vacated.

Court Disposition

Application allowed; prior order vacated by consent and travel costs ordered.

Orders

  • ['Order 1 made by Justice Biscoe on 24 September 2010 is vacated.' "The second respondent is to pay the applicant's reasonable travel costs relating to the hearing on 1 October 2010 as agreed or assessed."]