Terry Patrick Sharples v Adam Mark Hanson [2006] FCAFC 161

Terry Patrick Sharples v Adam Mark Hanson [2006] FCAFC 161

Leave to appeal was refused because the proposed appeal was doomed to failure. Leave was required because the order below was not final. The applicant identified no statutory justification, and there was no general discretion, to extend time for commencing the proceeding. The defamation limitation period ran from publication and had expired before proceedings were brought; the alleged December 1999 republication was not linked to any respondent or proposed fifth respondent; there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment; and the trade practices and corporations claims had been statute-barred for years.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
10 November 2006
Procedural Posture
Application for Leave to Appeal From a Single Judge's Order Dismissing an Application for Extension of Time and Striking Out the Application and Statement of Claim as Statute Barred / Full Court Determination of Extension of Time to Bring an Application for Leave to Appeal and Whether Leave to Appeal Should Be Granted
Outcome
Time was extended for bringing an application for leave to appeal, but leave to appeal was refused.
Legal Topics
['whether Leave Required to Appeal' 'final and Interlocutory Orders' 'extension of Time to Institute Proceedings' 'limitation Period for Defamation Action' 'republication of Defamatory Matter' 'fraudulent Concealment' 'statute Barred Claims' 'amendment Under Federal Court Rules O 13']
['practice and Procedure' 'limitation of Actions' 'defamation' 'trade Practices' 'corporations Law'] ['whether Leave Required to Appeal' 'final and Interlocutory Orders' 'extension of Time to Institute Proceedings' 'limitation Period for Defamation Action' 'republication of Defamatory Matter' 'fraudulent Concealment' 'statute Barred Claims' 'amendment Under Federal Court Rules O 13']

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

More case intelligence is available

Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.

Full judgment text Downloadable case file Legal principles 1 Authorities cited 2 Party arguments 2 Amounts and remedies 1
Sign in to unlock

Procedural Posture

Application for Leave to Appeal From a Single Judge's Order Dismissing an Application for Extension of Time and Striking Out the Application and Statement of Claim as Statute Barred / Full Court Determination of Extension of Time to Bring an Application for Leave to Appeal and Whether Leave to Appeal Should Be Granted

Legal Issues

  1. 1 ["Whether the single judge's order was final or interlocutory so that leave to appeal was required." "Whether there was a statutory basis to extend time for the applicant's defamation claim after the limitation period had expired." 'Whether alleged receipt of the article by Mr Ettridge in December 1999 amounted to a republication connected to the respondents so that time ran from that later date.' 'Whether fraudulent concealment postponed the running of the limitation period.' 'Whether the trade practices and corporations legislation claims could proceed after their limitation periods had expired.']

Ratio Decidendi

Leave to appeal was refused because the proposed appeal was doomed to failure. Leave was required because the order below was not final. The applicant identified no statutory justification, and there was no general discretion, to extend time for commencing the proceeding. The defamation limitation period ran from publication and had expired before proceedings were brought; the alleged December 1999 republication was not linked to any respondent or proposed fifth respondent; there was no evidence of fraudulent concealment; and the trade practices and corporations claims had been statute-barred for years.

Court Disposition

Time was extended for bringing an application for leave to appeal, but leave to appeal was refused.

Orders

  • ['Time is extended for the bringing of an application for leave to appeal.' 'Leave to appeal is refused.' 'The applicant pay the costs and/or expenses of the first, second and third respondents.']