R v Keir [2002] NSWCCA 30

R v Keir [2002] NSWCCA 30

The trial judge's directions wrongly permitted the jury to treat the 660,000 to one likelihood ratio as a 660,000 to one probability that the bones were those of Jean Angela Keir and that contrary identification evidence was inaccurate. That was a prosecutor's fallacy and the later redirection did not correct it, but reinforced the misuse of the statistic. Because the identification evidence could have raised a reasonable doubt and it could not be said that the appellant would inevitably have been convicted without the error, the proviso was not applied and the conviction was quashed.

Jurisdiction
Australia
Judgment Date
28 February 2002
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal Against Conviction and Sentence / Court of Criminal Appeal
Outcome
Appeal allowed; conviction quashed; new trial ordered.
Legal Topics
['dna Statistical Evidence' "prosecutor's Fallacy" 'jury Directions' 'identification Evidence' 'substantial Miscarriage of Justice' 'criminal Appeal Proviso']

Case Brief

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Procedural Posture

Criminal Appeal Against Conviction and Sentence / Court of Criminal Appeal

  1. 1 ["Whether the trial judge erred in directions concerning the significance of DNA statistical evidence by leaving the jury with a prosecutor's fallacy." 'Whether a later redirection rectified the error in the DNA statistical evidence directions.' 'Whether, despite the error, a substantial miscarriage of justice had not occurred so that the proviso in s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 should be applied.']

Ratio Decidendi

The trial judge's directions wrongly permitted the jury to treat the 660,000 to one likelihood ratio as a 660,000 to one probability that the bones were those of Jean Angela Keir and that contrary identification evidence was inaccurate. That was a prosecutor's fallacy and the later redirection did not correct it, but reinforced the misuse of the statistic. Because the identification evidence could have raised a reasonable doubt and it could not be said that the appellant would inevitably have been convicted without the error, the proviso was not applied and the conviction was quashed.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; conviction quashed; new trial ordered.

Orders

  • ['The appeal be allowed.' 'The conviction be quashed.' 'A new trial be held.']