National Tertiary Education Industry Union v University of Sydney [2021] FCAFC 159
The Full Court held that cl 315 of the 2018 agreement does confer enforceable rights of intellectual freedom, qualified by cl 317 (requiring exercise in accordance with highest ethical, professional and legal standards), and that conduct properly constituting the exercise of those rights cannot be misconduct or serious misconduct. The primary judge erred in not making objective findings as to whether the impugned conduct was such an exercise and in treating the question of misconduct as one for reasonable satisfaction of the University's delegate rather than the court. The construction and application of cll 315-317 and the role of the Code of Conduct required remittal for proper...
- Parties
- First Appellant: National Tertiary Education Industry Union; Second Appellant: Tim Anderson; Respondent: University of Sydney
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Judgment Date
- 31 August 2021
- Procedural Posture
- Appeal / Judgment on Appeal
- Outcome
- Appeal allowed. Orders of primary judge set aside. Matter remitted for rehearing on specified terms.
- Legal Topics
- Intellectual Freedom, Enterprise Agreement Interpretation, Misconduct and Serious Misconduct, Academic Freedom, Employment Termination, Code of Conduct, Remittal
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
National Tertiary Education Industry Union
First Appellant
Tim Anderson
Second Appellant
University of Sydney
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Appeal / Judgment on Appeal
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the enterprise agreement confers an enforceable right of intellectual freedom.
- 2 Whether exercise of intellectual freedom can constitute "misconduct" or "serious misconduct" within the meaning of the agreement.
- 3 Whether posting the lunch photo was sufficiently connected to employment to constitute misconduct.
Ratio Decidendi
The Full Court held that cl 315 of the 2018 agreement does confer enforceable rights of intellectual freedom, qualified by cl 317 (requiring exercise in accordance with highest ethical, professional and legal standards), and that conduct properly constituting the exercise of those rights cannot be misconduct or serious misconduct. The primary judge erred in not making objective findings as to whether the impugned conduct was such an exercise and in treating the question of misconduct as one for reasonable satisfaction of the University's delegate rather than the court. The construction and application of cll 315-317 and the role of the Code of Conduct required remittal for proper...
Court Disposition
Appeal allowed. Orders of primary judge set aside. Matter remitted for rehearing on specified terms.
Orders
- The appeal be allowed.
- Order 1 made on 26 November 2020 be set aside.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
Sign in to read
Sign in to read the full judgment text
Sign in to read the full judgment text. Downloads and additional research tools may depend on your plan.
Sign in to read the full judgment