Van der Meer v Qantas Airways Limited

District Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Van der Meer v Qantas Airways Limited [2026] NSWDC 354 Hearing dates: 25 September 2026 Date of orders: 25 September 2026 Decision date: 25 September 2026 Jurisdiction: Civil Before: Tsavdaridis ADCJ Decision: (1) On the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion filed 25 August 2026, and pursuant to s 64(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), leave is granted to the Plaintiff to file an Amended Statement of Claim within 14 days of these orders, addressing the matters raised in my Reasons for Decision and the submissions of the parties today. (2) The Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant’s costs of and incidental to the Notice of Motion, on the ordinary basis, as agreed or assessed. (3) The matter is adjourned to 28 October 2026 for directions hearing (Case Management List) before the Judicial Registrar. (4) The Court notes that the Plaintiff has not yet filed the Statement of Particulars (Personal Injury Proceedings) which he had been directed by the Judicial Registrar on 18 June 2026 to file by 3 July 2026. Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – Amendment – Where plaintiff seeks to amend amended Statement of Claim – Where plaintiff has advanced four iterations of proposed Amended Statement of Claim – Claim now seeks to join the operator airline (as carrier and as second defendant) while maintaining claim against current defendant (as the

carrier’s agent and as first defendant) – Principles of case management – Leave granted to amend Legislation Cited: Australian Consumer Law encapsulated in Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 3(3), 60, 61 Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth) ss 31, 31(1AA), 33, 34, 36, 37 Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1967 (NSW) ss 4, 5 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ss 56, 56(3), 57, 58, 58(2)(b), 64, 64(1), 64(1)(b), 64(2), 64(4), 65 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 14.28, 19.1, 19.2(4) Cases Cited: Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1073 Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 Brannock v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 218; (2010) 241 FLR 218 Fernance v Nominal Defendant (1989) 17 NSWLR 710 Texts Cited: Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, opened for signature 28 May 1999, 2242 UNTS 309 (entered into force 4 November 2003) (the Montreal Convention) Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Roy Van der Meer (Plaintiff / Applicant to the Notice of Motion) Qantas Airways Limited (Defendant / Respondent to the Notice of Motion) Representation: Counsel: Mr R Lynch (Plaintiff) Mr B Lloyd (Defendant) Solicitors: Law Partners Personal Injury Lawyers

(Plaintiff) HWLE Lawyers (Defendant) File Number(s): 2025/00477710 Publication restriction: Nil JUDGMENT – EX TEMPORE – REVISED Overview This is an ex tempore decision in relation to the plaintiff’s Notice of Motion to amend his Statement of Claim filed 9 December 2025. The proceedings are in the nature of a personal injury claim brought by the plaintiff on a number of bases. It is alleged that at or about 3.00 p.m. on 7 December 2024, the plaintiff was a passenger about to embark upon a Qantas flight (Flight No. QF2207) from Sydney to Albury. At or about that time, it had rained in the vicinity of the Qantas Domestic Terminal of Sydney Airport and he proceeded to follow instructions to board his flight, which included a direction to walk down a set of portable metal stairs from the terminal to the tarmac, which, it was originally asserted, were not covered with a canopy. As a result, the stair treads of the portable stairs were alleged to be contaminated with rainwater, which constituted a slip hazard. As the plaintiff began to walk down the portable stairs, and after reaching the third step from the top, he slipped on the wet stair tread and fell heavily down the stairs, suffering various injuries. Parenthetically, it was later asserted by the plaintiff, in one of the iterations of four proposed Amended Statements of Claim, that the stairs were indeed covered by a canopy, but

that they had been exposed to the rain and wet weather generally. I understood this to have been the result, in part, of the defendant’s solicitors obtaining and serving on the plaintiff’s solicitors CCTV footage depicting a canopy over the subject stairs and the plaintiff standing at the top of the stairs, wearing a Hawaiian shirt, holding the handle of a black suitcase in his right hand, with his left hand appearing to be free, and a sign beneath the handrail of the subject stairs which read, “Always hold handrail when using stairs”. Indeed the CCTV stills and photos also depicted yellow friction-based stair edge strips on each of the stairs. The Claim The plaintiff initially brought the proceedings as against the defendant in the tort of negligence, in respect of loss including personal injury within the meaning of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (CLA), the Australian Consumer Law encapsulated in Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (ACL), the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959 (Cth) (CACLA (Cth)), to be distinguished from the Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1967 (NSW) (CACLA (NSW), and Art 17 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, opened for signature 28 May 1999, 2242 UNTS 309 (entered into force 4 November 2003) (the Montreal Convention), on the basis of an asserted duty which the

defendant owed to take reasonable care to avoid injury to the plaintiff arising from the risk of harm and the risk of injury of which, the plaintiff asserted, the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge. (It is noted that the plaintiff, in its third iteration of the proposed Amended Statement of Claim, abandons the claim under the CACLA (Cth), but in its fourth iteration today, seeks to re-enliven this. I understood that the employment of the Montreal Convention related to the “accident” (the word used in the Convention) suffered by the plaintiff and which features as part of his claim under the CACLA (Cth), which, by virtue of s 9B, has the force of law in Australia in relation to any carriage by air to which the Montreal Convention applies. To the extent that the claim is based in the traditional tort of negligence, it was asserted that the negligence which caused the harm was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm, that is, factually causative, and it is appropriate for the scope of the defendant’s liability to extend to the harm so caused, that is, the scope of liability, in accordance with s 5D of the CLA. To the extent that the claim was founded in the ACL, it was asserted that the plaintiff was a consumer for domestic purposes within the meaning of the s 3(3) of the ACL and, as such, there existed an implied guarantee that the flight related services

would be rendered with due care and skill, would be safe and free from defects, and would be reasonably fit for purpose, pursuant to s 60 (and, although not specifically pleaded, presumably, s 61) of the ACL. The Notice of Motion The plaintiff’s Notice of Motion filed 25 August 2026 seeks that leave be granted, pursuant to s 64 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA), to file and serve a proposed Amended Statement of Claim. The plaintiff relied on three affidavits in support of the Notice of Motion, all from the plaintiff’s solicitor, Mr Beycan Irmako, sworn 9 September 2026, 14 September 2026 and 22 September 2026, respectively. Commencing briefly with the latter two, those affidavits are not determinative of the issue the subject of the Notice of Motion. They correct an earlier erroneous assertion that the photograph which had been annexed to the first affidavit was not a photograph of the subject stairs but, rather, a photograph of stairs similar to the ones on which the plaintiff fell. They also correct an earlier erroneous assertion that the stairs were not covered by a canopy when, indeed, they were. Turning to the first and principal affidavit, the plaintiff’s solicitor has annexed relevant communications which have passed between the plaintiff’s solicitors and the defendant’s solicitors in the prelude to the filing of the Notice of Motion, the correspondence of

which concerned the identity of the proper defendant and whether a claim was maintainable as against the current defendant and which, in the main, emanates from correspondence from the plaintiff’s solicitors seeking clarification from the defendant as to whether it “owned, occupied, operated or managed” the subject stairs referred to in the Statement of Claim. A Defence has not yet been filed, although the letter from the defendant’s solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors dated 9 May 2025 is instructive, such that the defendant asserts, amongst other things, that prior to the commencement of boarding for the subject flight, an announcement was made over the public address (PA) system at Gate 16, warning passengers that the stairs may be slippery due to rain and advising passengers to hold onto the handrail while descending the stairs. Further, a marshaller was positioned on the tarmac, at the base of the stairs to the aircraft, about 10 m away and had a clear view of the stairs to the tarmac. It was asserted that the marshaller saw the plaintiff lose control of his hand luggage, then attempted to grab his hand luggage but missed, then attempted to grab the handrail but also missed, losing his balance and falling down the stairs. In particular, the defendant contends that the subject stairs were an inert piece of equipment, suitable for use in inclement weather, and the

plaintiff’s injuries were wholly caused or contributed to by his own actions or, alternatively, his own internal, personal, particular or peculiar reaction to the normal operation of the subject stairs, when he lost control and attempted to grab his hand luggage, such that his injuries were not caused by an unusual or unexpected event external to him during embarkation of the subject flight. In both the letter from the defendant’s solicitors dated 9 May 2025 and in a subsequent letter dated 16 September 2026, the defendant’s solicitors invite the plaintiff to withdraw the Statement of Claim, and the Notice of Motion. The defendant relied on two affidavits in opposition to the Notice of Motion, both from the defendant’s solicitor, Ms Carol Cheng, sworn 9 September 2026 and 22 September 2026, respectively. Generally speaking, the affidavits and correspondence annexed detail the efforts made by the defendant’s solicitor to obtain CCTV footage, photographs and other material, partly through a subpoena to Sydney Airport Corporation Limited, and confirm a number of irregularities with respect to the original Statement of Claim, in particular, the plaintiff’s assertion that the subject stairs did not include a canopy and that there were no anti-slip measures in place, and noting that the CACLA (Cth) claim was no longer being pressed by the plaintiff. I note that the fourth iteration

of the proposed Amended Statement of Claim re-enlivens this. All of these efforts appear to have been made in a timely manner, within the context of the communications between the respective solicitors regarding the identity of the proper defendant. The second of the two affidavits seeks to rebut the assertion by the plaintiff’s solicitor that at no time prior to 16 September 2026 had the plaintiff’s solicitors been served or made aware of the footage when, indeed, the defendant’s subpoena to Sydney Airport Corporation Limited was provided, as is the usual practice, to the plaintiff’s solicitors on or about 25 June 2026 attached to correspondence which indicated that it was returnable on 21 July 2026. It was not immediately apparent what the remaining dispute between the parties with respect to the Notice of Motion was when the file was delivered to me in readiness for the hearing of the Notice of Motion. This, however, changed this morning when a fourth iteration of the proposed Amended Statement of Claim was tendered, seeking to join Sunstate Airlines (QLD) Pty Ltd (Sunstate Airlines) as the carrier and as second defendant. The more substantive content of the correspondence from the defendant’s solicitors, on the issue of the identity of the proper defendant, is outlined in the assertions from the defendant’s solicitors in the following correspondence: HWLE Lawyers’ (the

defendant’s solicitors) letter dated 5 March 2026, outlining the general civil aviation related principles. HWLE Lawyers’ letter dated 22 May 2026, asserting that: Qantas was responsible for the maintenance of the stairs used by the carrier for embarkation of passengers. A carrier has an obligation generally to provide for its passengers’ safety. This includes an obligation to ensure that passenger stairs utilised to embark its passengers were properly inspected, maintained and repaired. HWLE Lawyers’ letter dated 25 June 2026, asserting that: Qantas was the owner of the stairs utilised by the carrier to embark passengers. Qantas was responsible for ensuring the stairs were properly inspected, maintained and repaired. Without the services provided by Qantas, the carrier would have been unable to embark its passengers from the aircraft and unable to perform its duties under the contract of carriage. Qantas was not the carrier. Qantas was the agent of the carrier within the meaning ascribed in s 33 of the CACLA (Cth) and therefore entitled to rely on the conditions and limitations of liability in Pt IV of the CACLA (Cth). The plaintiff cannot circumvent the limited liability pursuant to s 31 of the CACLA (Cth), regardless of whether he decides to join, or otherwise commence proceedings against, the carrier. HWLE Lawyers’ letter dated 17 July 2026, asserting that: Qantas was the

ultimate owner of the stairs. Qantas was responsible for inspecting, maintaining and repairing the stairs, which were utilised by the carrier to embark passengers. Qantas was an agent of the carrier. As an agent, Qantas is entitled to rely on the conditions and limitations of liability under s 31 of the CACLA (Cth) (limit of liability) and s 36 of the CACLA (Cth) (liability in substitution for any other civil liability). The plaintiff cannot maintain an action against Qantas under the CLA or the ACL. HWLE Lawyers’ letter dated 10 August 2026, asserting that: Qantas was an agent of the carrier within the meaning ascribed in s 33 of the CACLA (Cth). The plaintiff’s claim against Qantas will still be governed by the CACLA (NSW) and Part IV of the CACLA (Cth). The plaintiff cannot maintain an action against Qantas under the CLA or the ACL. The defendant does not consent to the plaintiff filing either the first, second or third (and, as I understood the defendant’s submissions today, the fourth) proposed Amended Statement of Claim which, the defendant asserts, is still defective, embarrassing and liable to be struck out. Consideration The principles governing applications to amend are well-established and, to the extent applicable to the present application, may briefly be summarised as follows. Section 64 (headed “Amendment of documents generally”) of the CPA, through s 64(1),

empowers the Court to order, at any stage of the proceedings, that any document in the proceedings be amended or that leave be granted to a party to amend any document in the proceedings. An important qualification, however, is found in s 64(2) of the CPA which is prefaced as being subject to s 58 (headed “Court to follow dictates of justice”) and which provides that all necessary amendments are to be made for the purpose of determining the real questions raised by, or otherwise depending on, the proceedings, correcting any defect or error in the proceedings and avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings. Section 64(3) of the CPA is a facilitative provision which provides that, insofar as an order granting leave to amend would have the effect of adding or substituting a cause of action that has arisen after the commencement of the proceedings, the date of commencement of the proceedings, in relation to that cause of action, is, subject to s 65 (headed “Amendment of originating process after expiry of limitation period”), taken to be the date on which the amendment is made. Further, by virtue of s 64(4) of the CPA, in the case of a mistake in the name of a party, the section applies to the person intended to be made a party as if he or she were a party. The dictates of justice outlined in s 58 of the CPA, pursuant to which the power in s 64 is subjected, pull in mandatory, on the

one hand, and permissive, on the other, directions. In determining where the dictates of justice lie, the Court must have regard to the provisions of s 56 (headed “Overriding purpose”) to facilitate the quick, just and cheap resolution of the real issues in proceedings, and s 57 (headed “Objects of case management”) including the just determination of the proceedings, the efficient disposal of the business of the Court, the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources, and the timely disposal of the proceedings, and all other proceedings in the Court, at a cost affordable by the respective parties. The Court is not constrained by other matters it may wish to take into account, such as those listed in s 58(2)(b) of the CPA, including the degree of difficulty or complexity to which the issues in the proceedings give rise; the degree of expedition with which the respective parties have approached the proceedings, including the degree to which they have been timely in their interlocutory activities; the degree to which any lack of expedition in approaching the proceedings has arisen from circumstances beyond the control of the respective party; the degree to which the respective parties have fulfilled their duties under s 56(3) of the CPA (which imposes an obligation on a party to civil proceedings to assist the Court to further the overriding purpose, to

participate in the processes of the Court and to comply with the directions and orders of the Court); the use that any party has made, or could have made, of any opportunity that has been available to the party in the course of the proceedings, whether under rules of court, the practice of the court or any direction of a procedural nature given in the proceeding; the degree of injustice that would be suffered by the respective parties as a consequence of any order or direction; and, of course, any other matter the Court considers relevant in the circumstances. It is trite to observe that the question of amendment of a party’s claim (outside the parameters of r 19.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) which permit, without leave, a plaintiff to amend a Statement of Claim once within 28 days after the date on which it was filed) is dependent upon the exercise of the Court’s discretionary power: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 (Aon) (at 212 [96]) (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, French CJ agreeing in a separate judgment). As was observed by the High Court in Aon, the real issues in a proceeding, for the purposes of ss 56 - 58 of the CPA, may extend beyond the pleadings: Aon (at 205 [71]). The minimisation of delay and expense of proceedings, the plurality held, were plainly intended

to guide the exercise of discretion: Aon (at 205 [72]). One of the matters raised by the defendant’s representatives is that in the event that leave is granted to the plaintiff to amend its Statement of Claim so as to file either the first, second, third or fourth iteration of the proposed Amended Statement of Claim, the defendant reserves its right to bring an application to strike out the pleadings under r 14.28 of the UCPR on the basis that the plaintiff’s case is not maintainable as against the defendant either under the CLA or the ACL. I understood this submission to have been underscored by the fact that s 4 of the CACLA (NSW) applies to the carriage of a passenger by air in the course of commercial transport operations under a contract for the carriage of the passenger within New South Wales, and s 5 of the CACLA (NSW), subject to some exceptions, picks up Part IV (and Part IVA) of the CACLA (Cth) and applies it to carriage to which the CACLA (NSW) applies as if those provisions were incorporated in the CACLA (NSW), and, therefore, the monetary limit of compensation for a passenger’s injury under Part IV of the CACLA (Cth) is, by virtue of s 31(1AA) of the CACLA (Cth), $925,000.00. To this end, I understood the defendant’s submission to be that any amendment which would be futile, such that it would be liable to be struck out if it had appeared in the original pleading,

is a matter which would ordinarily militate against the granting of the leave now sought: see Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1073. In seeking to act in accordance with the dictates of justice, I am cognisant that a refusal of the plaintiff’s application today will likely result in a further Notice of Motion to regularise the issues raised by the defendant, particularly with respect to the fact that the plaintiff has pleaded the CACLA (Cth), as opposed, or in addition, to the CACLA (NSW), which will cause undue delay and cost to both parties. Conversely, any successful application today, given the issues raised, will, in my view, inevitably result in the bringing of another Notice of Motion, this time by the defendant, to ventilate the same subject matter outlined in the parties’ submissions and the five pieces of correspondence referred to earlier in these reasons and which will, similarly, have the effect of creating further delay and cost to both parties. It was, initially, difficult to ascertain why the plaintiff was so wedded to a Statement of Claim as against the current defendant when it had formally been put on notice that the proper carrier was Sunstate Airlines and any addition, or more properly, any substitution of the current defendant for Sunstate Airlines, pursuant to r 19.2(4) of the UCPR, would see that the date

of commencement of proceedings in relation to that party is taken to be the date on which the amended document is filed and, therefore, the relevant date for the purpose of computing the limitation period: see Fernance v Nominal Defendant (1989) 17 NSWLR 710. This is relevant given that s 31 of the CACLA (Cth), which imputes liability to a carrier for damage by reason of bodily injury suffered by a passenger resulting from an accident (which refers to the event rather than the cause of injury and which acquires its meaning from the Montreal Convention) which takes place on board an aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking, and s 34 of the CACLA (Cth), which requires proceedings under that Act to be commenced within two years, will prevail over State legislation and which would otherwise have prevented an amendment to plead a new cause of action which might have been statute barred at the time of amendment. Here, the injuries are said to have been sustained on 7 December 2024 and, on any view, any claim is within the limitation period. In the end, the defendant asserted that notwithstanding the plaintiff, through its fourth iteration of the proposed Amended Statement of Claim seeking to proceed as against both the current defendant (as the carrier’s agent and as first defendant) and Sunstate Airlines (as the carrier and as second

defendant), the plaintiff’s claim against the carrier will be exclusively governed by s 4 of the CACLA (NSW), which incorporates the provisions of Part IV of the CACLA (Cth), and that s 36 (which forms part of Part IV of the CACLA (Cth), provides that the carrier’s liability pursuant to the CACLA (NSW) and the CACLA (Cth) is “in substitution” for any civil liability it would have had to the plaintiff under any other law. It was on this basis that the defendant continued to assert that the plaintiff could not maintain an action against the carrier in negligence under the CLA. Further, the defendant asserted that at all material times, the current defendant was the agent of the carrier, within the meaning of s 33 of the CACLA (Cth) and, therefore, is entitled to rely on the conditions and limits of liability in Part IV of the CACLA (Cth), including s 36 of the CACLA (Cth), such that the plaintiff’s claim against the current defendant would also be exclusively governed by the CACLA (NSW) and Part IV of the CACLA (Cth) and that the current defendant’s liability pursuant to the CACLA (NSW) and the CACLA (Cth) is “in substitution” for any civil liability it would have had to the plaintiff under any other law. It was on this basis that the defendant continued to assert that the plaintiff could not maintain an action against the current defendant under the CLA or the ACL. The fact that

the fourth iteration of the proposed Amended Statement of Claim seeks to join Sunstate Airlines in one capacity, but seeks to maintain its claim against the current defendant in another capacity, is an available course in the event that the Court, when hearing the matter on its merits at trial, even if it be that the plaintiff’s claim is found to be exclusively governed by the CACLA (NSW) and the CACLA (Cth), decides to indemnify any person or to apportion liability to a concurrent tortfeasor pursuant to s 37 of the CACLA (Cth). The defendant conceded as much in response to a question from the bench, although not with respect to the substantive point it sought to emphasise, namely, that the residual actions as pleaded under the CLA and the ACL cannot be maintained. It is, at this juncture, not the Court’s function to determine the entirety of the proceedings on their merits. In my view, there is a real triable issue with respect to the subject matter of the statement of claim in relation to which the parties’ representatives made extensive, pointed submissions. As to whether the current defendant is, or should be, characterised as a carrier’s agent is a matter which will feature prominently at trial. So too will the limits of its duties to the plaintiff whether as the carrier’s agent or as “ground handler” (as is pleaded in the fourth iteration of the proposed Amended Statement

of Claim) in relation to the use, operation, positioning and maintenance of the subject stairs. Whilst, on the one hand, the defendant’s position regarding the CACLA (NSW) and the CACLA (Cth) has remained fairly static throughout its communications with the plaintiff, the role of the current defendant throughout the lengthy written communications identified earlier in these reasons was an evolving exercise, culminating in the characterisation of the carrier’s agent. The defendant called upon, in aid of its submissions, the decision in Brannock v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 218; (2010) 241 FLR 218. Although the facts behind this decision also involved a passenger sustaining an injury as a result of the use of stairs much like the plaintiff in the present case, my reading of the judgment led me to the conclusion that the case stood for an unrelated proposition, namely, that questions of whether embarkation stairs were safe and caused a passenger to fall were not relevant in deciding if an “accident” had occurred in accordance with international air carriers’ liability principles. In light of this, even if at first blush the CACLA (Cth) and the CACLA (NSW) seemingly forecloses all other residual actions, in order for the current defendant to avail itself of the protection in s 33 of the CACLA (Cth), it must prove that “he or she acted within the scope of his or her

employment or authority”. Hurdles such as this ought not, in my view, be overlooked so as to summarily preclude, at a relatively early stage in the proceedings, the plaintiff from formulating and pursuing his rights at law in a way which seeks to advance, as against all potential tortfeasors, his claim in the widest possible way. While the plaintiff may have been, in some respects, dilatory in refining its precise causes of action across four proposed Amended Statements of Claim, I am satisfied, on balance, that the dictates of justice, and the objects of case management, are best served by granting the plaintiff’s application to amend. Orders For these reasons, I make the following orders and notations: On the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion filed 25 August 2026, and pursuant to s 64(1)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), leave is granted to the Plaintiff to file an Amended Statement of Claim within 14 days of these orders, addressing the matters raised in my Reasons for Decision and the submissions of the parties today. The Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant’s costs of and incidental to the Notice of Motion, on the ordinary basis, as agreed or assessed. The matter is adjourned to 28 October 2026 for directions hearing (Case Management List) before the Judicial Registrar. The Court notes that the Plaintiff has not yet filed the Statement of Particulars (Personal Injury

Proceedings) which he had been directed by the Judicial Registrar on 18 June 2026 to file by 3 July 2026. ** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 28 September 2026