TB9-15355

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-15355 TB9-15356 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision September 23, 2020 Date de la décision Panel E. Bobkin Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Naseem Mithoowani Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre

REASONS FOR DECISION

OVERVIEW [1] These are the reasons in the appeal brought by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Principal Appellant) and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Minor Appellant). The Principal Appellant is a citizen of Iraq, and the Minor Appellant is a citizen of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They appeal a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated May 28, 2019, rejecting their claims for refugee protection. I am issuing a split decision in this appeal as follows: (a) I allow the Principal Appellant's appeal. I find that she is not excluded from protection under article 1E of the Convention. I find that she is a Convention refugee based upon her religion, which is a Convention ground. (b) I dismiss the Minor Appellant's appeal and confirm the RPD's decision that he has not established a section 96 or 97 risk in the United Arab Emirates. [2] The Principal Appellant is a citizen of Iraq. She alleges that she and her family were threatened and attacked by an armed militia because they are Sunnis living in a Shiite area. The Principal Appellant was shot on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2004, and her family relocated to their grandfather's house until they left for the UAE on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2005. The Principal Appellant married a citizen of the UAE in XXXX 2009. She alleges that her husband had a second wife and child whom she was unaware of and that, when she discovered this, her husband

was physically and verbally abusive and threatened to take away her residency in the UAE. After the death of her father, the Principal Appellant came to Canada with the Minor Appellant and her mother, and the three made refugee claims. [3] The RPD allowed the claim of the Principal Appellant's mother but rejected the Appellants' claims. The RPD found that the Appellant was excluded from protection under article 1E of the Convention1 due to her status in the UAE. The RPD found that the Minor Appellant had not alleged any risk and had no section 96 or 97 risk in the UAE, where he is a citizen. The RPD acknowledged that, if the Principal Appellant was not excluded, she likely would meet the requirements for refugee status analysed against Iraq. [4] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in finding that the Principal Appellant has an excludable status in the UAE and that she is at risk in Iraq. They also argue that the Minor Appellant faces a risk of persecution in the UAE. The Appellants have submitted voluminous new evidence in support of their appeal. [5] I find that the RPD erred in assessing article 1E of the Convention and that the status the Appellant has or had in the UAE is not an excludable status. Therefore, I find she is not excluded from protection. I agree with the RPD that she is a Convention refugee vis-à-vis Iraq. I further find that the RPD correctly concluded that the Minor Appellant has not established a section 96 or 97 risk in the UAE. I find that the new evidence does not alter this conclusion.

ANALYSIS [6] I am issuing a split decision as follows: (a) I allow the appeal of the Principal Appellant. I substitute my own decision that the Principal Appellant is a Convention refugee. (b) I dismiss the appeal of the Minor Appellant. The RPD was correct in finding that the Minor Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection.

NEW EVIDENCE [7] According to the law,2 I can only accept evidence that: (i) arose after the RPD's decision; or (ii) was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or (iii) that the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [8] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.3 For evidence which is submitted after the perfection of the Appellants' record, they must also establish that the new evidence meets Rule 29 of the RAD Rules. [9] The Appellants submitted new evidence both with their appeal record and after their record was perfected. [10] The new evidence submitted with the appeal record included: (a) the statutory declaration of the Principal Appellant's mother (whose claim was accepted by the RPD); (b) the statutory declaration of the Principal Appellant; (c) photographs of the Principal Appellant; (d) documentation about citizenship in the UAE; (e) documentation about residency in the UAE; (f) a psychological assessment; (g) a true copy of the original ID card of the Minor Appellant; (h) evidence of the Principal Appellant's divorce from her husband; (i) evidence of the Principal Appellant's brother's asylum claim; and (j) evidence about divorced women and children in the UAE. [11] After the

perfection of the Appellants' record, they filed further submissions including: (k) documentation on UAE citizenship and immigration rules; (l) a Human Rights Watch report on the UAE; (m) news articles about women in the UAE; and (n) an update on the Principal Appellant's divorce. [12] I will address each category below. The statutory declaration of the Principal Appellant's mother (category a) is inadmissible [13] The Appellants have not explained how the statutory declaration of the Principal Appellant's mother meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).4 The information in the statutory declaration largely reiterates the Appellants' claim as described in their Basis of Claim forms (BOCs) and testimony. The Appellants have not established that any information in the declaration post-dates the rejection of the claim. The declarant testified at the RPD hearing, and therefore I find that the information in the declaration was reasonably available to the Appellants at the time of the hearing. The Appellants have not given any explanation to suggest this was evidence they could not reasonably have been expected to provide prior to the rejection of their claim. [14] The declaration is inadmissible. Photographs of the Appellant (category c) are inadmissible [15] The Appellant submitted two photographs of herself which she

explains show an acute allergic reaction to the stress of her situation with her husband.5 The photographs are from 2014. They do not post-date the rejection of the Appellants' claim. The Appellants have not explained how the other two prongs of the test for admission are met.6 The Principal Appellant alleged problems with her husband in her BOC; therefore, I find she has not established that evidence of these problems (such as the photographs) was something she could not reasonably have been expected to provide prior to the rejection of her claim.7 The Appellants have provided no explanation as to show that evidence was not reasonably available to them prior to the rejection of their claim. [16] The photographs are inadmissible. Documents about citizenship and residency in the UAE (categories d and e) are inadmissible [17] The Appellant submitted a number of documents about citizenship and residency in the UAE with their appeal record.8 The Appellants argue that it is admissible because they "could not have anticipated [it] as necessary prior to their hearing" because the issue of exclusion was not raised to the Appellants prior to the start of the hearing.9 I find this to be an incorrect legal argument from Counsel for several reasons. [18] First, the Appellants have not submitted any case law that suggests that the RPD has an obligation to raise a 1E exclusion issue prior to

the RPD hearing. Second, when the issue was raised at the hearing, the RPD gave the Appellants' Counsel an opportunity to review the material which was relevant (UAE citizenship law) and an opportunity to speak to the Principal Appellant.10 The Principal Appellant has not followed the proper procedure to bring allegations of incompetence against her former Counsel. Therefore, I do not accept the argument that Counsel erred in handling the article 1E exclusion, as former Counsel has not had the opportunity to respond to any such claim. [19] Finally, and most importantly, the date for considering new evidence is not the date of the hearing but rather the date of the rejection of the claim. Counsel has misstated the test. The RPD hearing was on April 16, 2019. The reasons were signed May 28, 2019, over one month later. Even accepting that the Appellants were not aware of the exclusion issue until the hearing and that Counsel did not consult with the Appellant before deciding to proceed, the Appellants had over one month after the hearing to submit any further evidence about article 1E exclusion and did not do so. They have given no explanation for this. Therefore, I find that this was not evidence which the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected to provide prior to the rejection of their claim. [20] The Appellants have not submitted that this evidence was not available

to them prior to the rejection of their claim nor have they alleged this evidence post-dates the rejection of the claim. Therefore, the test for admission under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA is not met, and this evidence is not admissible. The information in the Principal Appellant's statutory declaration, which post-dates the rejection of the claim by the RPD is admissible; the remainder of the information is not admissible (category b) [21] The Principal Appellant has submitted a statutory declaration.11 Much of the information is a restatement of the BOC and also an attachment of the new evidence as exhibits. I have considered this portion of the statutory declaration. [22] The statutory declaration also contains an update on events which occurred after the RPD claim was rejected, including the Principal Appellant's divorce and its impact on her and the Minor Appellant, her decision to seek psychological treatment and her brother's asylum claim. I find this portion of the statutory declaration is admissible, as it post-dates the rejection of the claim and therefore meets subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. It is also new, pursuant to the case law for this reason. I find the evidence credible, as it comes in the form of a statutory declaration and has no prima facie deficiencies. I also find it relevant to the questions on appeal. Therefore, it is admissible. There are no serious

credibility concerns with the admissible evidence, and therefore I cannot hold an oral hearing on the basis of it. [23] The Appellants' statutory declaration also contains inadmissible evidence. This includes allegations about what occurred at the hearing in terms of article 1E exclusion and allegations about the Minor Appellant being at risk for making a refugee claim about the UAE. I find this inadmissible for the same reasons discussed above in paragraphs 17 to 20. Regarding the article 1E exclusion, this was all evidence which could have been submitted in the time between the RPD hearing and the rejection of the claim, should the Appellants have wished to do so. The Appellants have not established that this evidence was not reasonably available to them or that they could not reasonably have been expected to submit it prior to the rejection of their claim. Similarly, with regard to allegations about the Minor Appellant, the Appellants were given an opportunity to explain any risk to the Minor Appellant at the hearing and did not do so.12 Aside from the alleged risk due to divorce (which was not present until after the rejection of the claim), the remainder of the alleged risks to the Minor Appellant were all allegedly present at the time of the RPD hearing. The Appellants have not explained why this information could not have been submitted prior to the rejection. I

therefore find this portion of the statutory declaration is inadmissible. The true copy of the original ID card of the Minor Appellant (category g) is inadmissible [24] The Appellants presented a copy of the Minor Appellant's UAE identification to the RPD. They present the original on appeal. They allege that this was not reasonably available to them and is therefore admissible. I find they have not established this. [25] The Principal Appellant's explanation states: "I didn't have this at the time of the hearing since it was left in the UAE."13 Counsel also argues this is something which was "unavailable to the Appellants at the time of the hearing for reasons beyond their control."14 Again, the Appellants have misstated the test. The relevant date is the rejection of the claim. This was over a month after the hearing. The Appellants have not explained why the document was not available to them prior to this time. They have not explained how they got the document, simply that they did not do so before the hearing. The burden is on the Appellants to satisfy the test. They have not done so. [26] The Appellants have not alleged that the evidence post-dates the rejection of the claim or that this was something they could not reasonably have been expected to present prior to the rejection of the claim. Therefore, I find they have not established that the document meets any of the

requirements of subsection 110(4). The card is inadmissible. The psychological assessment (category f), the evidence of the Principal Appellant's divorce from her husband and the divorce update (categories h and n), the evidence of the Principal Appellant's brother's asylum claim (category i), and the evidence about divorced women and children in the UAE (category j) are admissible [27] The Principal Appellant submits a psychological assessment, evidence about her divorce (along with information about divorce in the UAE generally) and evidence about her brother's refugee claim. I find this evidence is admissible. [28] The Appellant explains why she decided to seek psychological help after her hearing, and I accept this explanation. Therefore, the psychological evidence post-dates the rejection of the claim, as the report contains a diagnosis and information which post-dates the rejection. Similarly, the Appellant's divorce proceedings and her brother's refugee claim post-date the rejection. As for the general information about the divorce, given that the divorce post-dates the rejection, I accept that the Appellants could not have provided this evidence prior to the rejection. [29] I therefore find that all of this evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and also the newness requirement in the case law. I see no prima facie deficiencies in the evidence and

therefore find it credible for the purposes of admission. I also find it relevant to the question of the Principal Appellant's status in the UAE and her risk in Iraq, both of which are relevant to the appeal. Therefore, this evidence is admissible. [30] I note that the update on the divorce, indicating that the Principal Appellant's husband is not contesting the divorce was submitted after the record was perfected, and, therefore, I must also consider rule 29 of the RAD rules. I find this requirement for admission to be met. For the reasons given above, I find the divorce information is new, probative and relevant. I also accept the update could not have been provided with the record because it post-dates the filing of the record. Therefore, I find rule 29 does not bar the admission of this evidence. [31] I do not find that the evidence described above raises a serious issue of credibility with regard to the Appellants. I accept that the Principal Appellant is going through a divorce and has sought psychological help and that her brother has made a refugee claim. Therefore, this evidence does not meet the test for an oral hearing. The documentation on UAE citizenship and Immigration rules (category k), The Human Rights Watch report on the UAE (category l) and the news articles about women in the UAE (category m) which postdate the filing of the Appellants' record are

admissible [32] The Appellants submitted further documentation on UAE citizenship and immigration, a Human Rights Watch report and news articles on women in the UAE, on August 18, 2020, over one year after their appeal record was filed.15 Counsel explained that this was an update provided due to the suspension of the requirement to make an application during the COVID pandemic. While Counsel is correct that no application was necessary during this time, the communiqué on the graduated return to business explicitly explains that rule 29 of the RAD rules and subsection 110(4) of the IRPA apply to documents submitted without an application.16 The Appellants have not clearly explained how either of these provisions apply to the evidence submitted in their update but rely on the same arguments made in the memorandum filed with the appeal record. [33] I have examined the documents. I assessed the update to the divorce proceedings above. The remainder of the documents are country conditions documents either pertaining to citizenship and residency in the UAE or to the treatment of women in the UAE. All of these were issues before the RPD's decision. Some of the evidence post-dates the rejection of the RPD's claim, and some do not. Some of the evidence post-dates the perfection of the Appellants' record, and some do not. [34] I accept that all of the evidence which post-dates the

perfection of the appeal is admissible. The Appellants could not have submitted this with their Appellants' record, based on the timing of the documents. Further, the documents relate to residency status in the UAE and risk to women in the UAE, which are at issue on appeal. Therefore, this evidence meets rule 29, as it is new, relevant and probative and could not have been submitted with the Appellants' record. It is also new, pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the case law. I also find it to be relevant to the appeal, for the reasons explained. All of the evidence is third-party country conditions, which I find to be credible for the purposes of admission. I do not find this evidence to meet the test for an oral hearing, as it does not raise credibility issues regarding the Appellants because it is all general country conditions information. [35] I do not find that the documents which pre-date the rejection of the claim or the perfection of the Appellants' record are admissible. All of this evidence relates to issues argued in the appeal and in the memorandum submitted with the Appellants' record. The Appellants have not explained why this evidence could not have been submitted either with their Appellants' record or to the RPD. Much of it is repetitive of material which was in the Appellants' record (ex citizenship and residency in the UAE). Therefore, it has

little probative value or newness, as it is duplicative. I find this evidence does not meet rule 29 or subsection (for the evidence which post-dates the rejection of the claim) or 110(4) (for the evidence which pre-dates the rejection of the claim). It is not admissible. [36] Moreover, ultimately, this evidence is not relevant, as required by the case law, because, as will be discussed below, I find, based on the record before the RPD, that the Principal Appellant does not have an excludable status in the UAE, and, therefore, I need not consider whether she is at risk there or can return there (which is what this documentation pertains to). Therefore, the evidence is inadmissible. THE ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION (RAD) [37] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.17 There is an exception to this, where the RAD defers to the RPD if the RPD had a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral evidence. I do not find this case falls into the exception. Therefore, I will be looking at whether the RPD's decision was correct.

ANALYSIS [38] The RPD concluded that the Principal Appellant is excluded from protection by article 1E of the Convention. I find this conclusion is incorrect. I agree with the Appellants that the Principal Appellant is not excluded and that she meets the requirements for Convention refugee status. I find that the RPD correctly concluded that the Minor Appellant does not meet the requirements for Convention refugee status or protected person status. [39] I will address the issues as follows: (a) The RPD erred in finding the Principal Appellant excluded from protection under article 1E; (b) The Principal Appellant meets the requirements for Convention refugee status; and (c) The RPD correctly concluded that the Minor Appellant has not established a section 96 or 97 risk in the UAE. The RPD erred in finding the Principal Appellant excluded from protection under article 1E [40] The RPD concluded that, despite limited information on the rights of non-citizens in the UAE, the Principal Appellant had status in the UAE akin to that of a citizen. The RPD also concluded that the Principal Appellant could have accessed citizenship, that her allegations against her husband lacked credibility and that, if her residency was cancelled, she had not established that she could not re-obtain the status. As a result, the RPD found that the Principal Appellant was excluded from protection under

article 1E of the Convention. [41] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred by finding a prima facie excludable status, by applying the wrong legal test incorrectly and that new evidence shows that the Principal Appellant does not have excludable status. In my view, not all of these arguments are determinative. The determinative issue on exclusion is that the status that the Principal Appellant has or had at the time of the RPD hearing (regardless of whether she lost it and can reacquire it or still had it) is not an excludable status. [42] Generally, the status in the article 1E country must provide substantially the same rights as that of a national, including: (a) the right to return to the country of residence; (b) the right to work freely without restrictions; (c) the right to study; (d) full access to social services; and (e) the right to reside for an unlimited period of time, subject to conditions which do not render the status inherently vulnerable, or transient.18 [43] In considering the last right, the right to reside for an unlimited period of time, the Courts have held that the status in the article 1E need not guarantee "absolute protection from deportation from the third country" as not even Canadian permanent residents are entitled to such protection.19 For example, exclusion generally applies where the loss of status is within the refugee claimant's own actions

(for example, serious criminality) and/or a right of return, which is not discretionary, remains.20 However, article 1E exclusion, generally, does not apply where the status in the third country is contingent on factors outside of the refugee claimant's control. As the Court has explained, the status must not have an inherent vulnerability or transience.21 For example, exclusion generally does not apply in the following cases: (a) Where status must be renewed, and renewal is at the discretion of the government;22 (b) Where the article 1E country may remove the resident based on changes in the resident's home country;23 and (c) Where status in the article 1E country is dependent on the position or goodwill of a spouse or sponsor.24 [44] I find that the Principal Appellant's status in the UAE was inherently vulnerable, as it is dependent on a sponsor, in this case the Appellant's husband.25 Should the sponsor end the relationship, then the Principal Appellant's status would also be cancelled. I find that this vulnerability, which is out of the Principal Appellant's control, tends to show it is not excludable. [45] Moreover, I note that the documentary evidence suggests that individuals without citizenship in the UAE, particularly women, face restrictions to their rights to work, study and access to social services, including: (a) legal and economic discrimination; (b) unequal

benefits in the workplace; (c) discrimination in promotions and pay; (d) denial of a number of state services, including free education; and (e) difficulty finding employment in state-sponsored industries.26 [46] When I look at the evidence on the vulnerability of the Principal Appellant's status along with the country conditions on the treatment of non-citizen residents, I find that the RPD erred in concluding that the Principal Appellant's status was akin to that of a national in the UAE. I therefore need not consider whether the Principal Appellant's status was cancelled and whether she could re-acquire it, as the nature of the status does not attract article 1E exclusion. [47] Finally, I turned my mind to whether the Principal Appellant had access to citizenship in the UAE. The RPD appeared to find that she could have acquired citizenship there, but it did not make a clear finding in this regard and as the issue of citizenship is distinct from exclusion under article 1E.27 I find that it is not clear that the Principal Appellant could have acquired citizenship in the UAE at the time of her hearing, as the United States Department of State report indicates that a foreign woman may only receive citizenship after ten years of marriage to a UAE citizen, and this amount of time had not passed at the date of the RPD hearing.28 Therefore, I find it is not established, on a balance

of probabilities, that the Principal Appellant had access to citizenship in the UAE. [48] For all these reasons, I find that the RPD erred in concluding that the Principal Appellant was excluded from protection under article 1E of the Convention. The Principal Appellant meets the requirements for Convention refugee status [49] Given that I find that the RPD erred in concluding that the Appellant had article 1E status in the UAE, the only country of consideration is Iraq. The RPD concluded that the Principal Appellant's mother met the test for Convention refugee status concerning Iraq on the same facts alleged by the Principal Appellant. Moreover, the RPD noted that it was satisfied that the Principal Appellant "was subject to being shot in Iraq as a teenager during sectarian violence in Baghdad and as a result of that violence" and that, if the Principal Appellant was not excluded, she "likely has compelling reasons not to return to Baghdad." 29 The RPD accepted that the Principal Appellant's mother was a refugee for the same reasons.30 [50] I agree with the RPD, and I find that the RPD's reasons with regard to the Principal Appellant's mother apply to the Principal Appellant herself, were she to return to Iraq. In brief, the RPD concluded the following: (a) The Principal Appellant was shot due to sectarian violence; (b) The Principal Appellant's mother faces a risk of serious

harm amounting to persecution in the form of forced displacement, threats, physical harm and that this was based upon religion; (c) The state is unwilling and unable to provide protection from the above harm, particularly given the ongoing integration of militia groups into security services; and (d) It is unreasonable for a single woman who has lived abroad to relocate within Iraq.31 [51] All of these findings apply equally to the Principal Appellant. Therefore, on this basis, I find that the Principal Appellant meets the requirements for Convention refugee status. The RPD correctly concluded that the Minor Appellant has not established a section 96 or 97 risk in the UAE [52] The Minor Appellant is a citizen of the UAE. I find that the RPD correctly concluded that he has not established a serious possibility of persecution or a risk to life, a risk of torture or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, on a balance of probabilities, in the UAE. [53] At the RPD hearing, the Appellants clearly stated that they were not alleging the Minor Appellant faced any risk in the UAE. This was stated both by Counsel and by the Principal Appellant.32 On appeal, the Appellants now allege that he is at risk for the following reasons: (a) He has claimed refugee protection against the UAE which does not tolerate critique; and (b) His mother has initiated divorce proceedings against

his father, and the father may attempt to keep him from his mother or harm him to get back at his mother.33 [54] I find these risks to be speculative. [55] First, I do not find that the Minor Appellant has made a refugee claim against the UAE. In fact, as discussed above, the Principal Appellant explicitly stated that she was not advancing a claim for her son against the UAE, and the Minor Appellant did not even appear at the RPD hearing due to his age.34 I find it speculative to conclude that the UAE would view the Minor Appellant, an eight-year-old boy, as being a critic of the UAE regime due to his inclusion in his mother's claim in Canada. Additionally, the Appellants have provided no objective evidence about the UAE persecuting individuals who have made refugee claims, even if the Minor Appellant would be viewed as having done so. Similarly, the Appellants have provided no evidence to suggest that the UAE would be aware that the Minor Appellant has brought a refugee claim in Canada. Therefore, I cannot conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that the authorities would be aware of the claim. For all these reasons, I find it to be speculative that the Minor Appellant's inclusion in a refugee claim in Canada would subject him to a section 96 or 97 risk in the UAE. [56] Second, I find that the Appellants' arguments that the Principal Appellant's divorce would subject the

Minor Appellant to harm, including abuse or prolonged or permanent separation from his mother, is speculative. The Appellants' evidence is that the Principal Appellant's husband is not contesting the divorce35 and that he has in the past indicated that he would grant custody of the Minor Appellant to the Principal Appellant in the case of a divorce.36 I accept that there is general law that UAE-citizen fathers can obtain custody of older children upon divorce, but the Appellants have not established that this applies in this case, given the personal evidence. The Minor Appellant's father provided a signed statement indicating that he granted "infinite custody" to the Principal Appellant of the Minor Appellant.37 The Appellants have not provided any evidence to suggest that the Minor Appellant's father would not honour this, on a balance of probabilities. [57] Further, there is no evidence that the Minor Appellant's father had been abusive towards him in the past or has threatened him now that divorce proceedings have been initiated. For these reasons, I find it to be speculative to conclude that the divorce would expose the Minor Appellant to a serious possibility of persecution or a section 97 risk in the UAE. [58] Finally, although not explicitly argued, I considered the question of separation and family unity and whether this amounts to a risk of persecution or section 97

risk. I note that this question has been covered by my colleague in a RAD reasons of interest and, while I am by no means bound by the decision, I adopt the reasoning therein as the factual situations are sufficiently similar.38 The decision outlines that, generally, family unity does not exist in Canadian refugee law and that the onus of demonstrating that an individual falls within section 96 or 97 exists regardless of family unity.39 I further note that the decision explains that individuals such as the Minor Appellant have "access to other recourses with other administrative authorities who have the responsibility of ensuring family unity and the protection of the best interests of the child" and that, in situations such as this, a refugee (which the Principal Appellant now is) can include a family member in an application for permanent residence.40 This means that the Minor Appellant can apply for permanent residence as a dependent of his mother. [59] For these reasons, I find that the RPD correctly concluded that the Minor Appellant had not established a serious possibility of persecution or a risk to life, a risk of torture or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, on a balance of probabilities, in the UAE.

CONCLUSION [60] I issue the following split decision: (a) The Principal Appellant's appeal is allowed. I substitute my own decision that the Principal Appellant is a Convention refugee. (b) The Minor Appellant's appeal is dismissed. I confirm the decision of the RPD that the Minor Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Erin Bobkin E. Bobkin September 23, 2020 Date 1 United Nations, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees states: "E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he [or she] has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country." 2 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 3 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96; Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 283-284. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 287, 293. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 383. 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 25-26. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 295-332. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 383. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 190. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp.

285-291. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 186, 195. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 289. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 383. 15 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence submitted under Rule 29, August 18, 2020, at pp. 1-124. 16 https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-appeals/Pages/communique-graduated-return-business.aspx 17 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2645-17), Diner, November 14, 2018, 2018 FC 1145. 18 Shamlou, Pasha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4967-94), Teitelbaum, November 15, 1995; (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 135 (F.C.T.D.); (1995) 103 F.T.R. 241 (TD); and Rrotaj, Gjon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2919-15), Diner, February 8, 2016, 2016 FC 152, at para. 21. 19 Rrotaj, 2016 FC 152 (ibid.), at paras. 21, 25. 20 Rrotaj, 2016 FC 152 (ibid.), at paras. 21-28. 21 Rrotaj, 2016 FC 152, at para. 21. 22 Choezom, Tendzin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1420-04), von Finckenstein, September 30, 2004, 2004 FC 1329, at para 14. 23 M.C.I. v. Mohamud, Layla Ali (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4899-94), Rothstein, May 19, 1995; and Kanesharan, Vijeyaratnam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-269-96), Heald, September 23, 1996. 24 Murcia Romero, Ingrid Yulima v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3370-05), Snider, April 21, 2006, 2006 FC 506. 25 NDP for United Arab Emirates (March 31, 2020), item 14.1,

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Response to Information Request (RIR) ARE105443.E, "Exit procedures and documents required for resident foreigners who leave the country, ... (2014-April 2016)", April 14, 2016, at p. 1. 26 NDP for United Arab Emirates (March 31, 2020), item 2.1, United States Department of State, "United Arab Emirates: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019", March 11, 2020, at pp. 28-29; item 2.2, Amnesty International, "United Arab Emirates, Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Review of 2018", February 26, 2019; and item 2.4, Freedom House, "United Arab Emirates. Freedom in the World 2019", 2019. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 5. 28 NDP for United Arab Emirates (March 31, 2020), item 2.1 (supra, footnote 26), at p. 24. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 10. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 10. 31 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 11. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 186 and 195. 33 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 386. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 186 and 195. 35 Exhibit P-3, New Evidence submitted under Rule 29, August 18, 2020, at pp. 125-129. 36 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 305; and Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 223-224. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 305. 38 RAD Reasons of Interest, X (Re), 2019 CanLII 134803 (CA IRB). 39 RAD Reasons of Interest, X (Re), 2019

CanLII 134803 (CA IRB), paras. 7-8. 40 RAD Reasons of Interest, X (Re), 2019 CanLII 134803 (CA IRB), para. 10. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-15355 TB9-15356 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français