R. v. Bergeron

R. v. Bergeron

Where the accused intentionally attacked a known justice system participant and his conduct was directed at that participant because of his role, the trial judge may infer specific intent to provoke fear and to impede performance of duties if the accused knew or foresaw that provoking fear would be a certain or...

Source-derived case information.

Citation
2013 BCSC 443
Parties
Crown: Regina; Accused: Adrien Real Bergeron
Court
Supreme Court of British Columbia
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
1 March 2013
Procedural Posture
Criminal / Trial Verdict/conclusion (conviction)
Outcome
Guilty on Count 8 (offence contrary to s.423.1 of the Criminal Code)
Legal Topics
Intimidation of Justice System Participants (s.423.1), Mens Rea and Specific Intent, Foreseeability as Basis for Intent, Assault, Mischief, Circumstantial Evidence
Source Language
english
Criminal Law Intimidation of Justice System Participants (s.423.1) Mens Rea and Specific Intent Foreseeability as Basis for Intent Assault Mischief Circumstantial Evidence

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Parties

Regina

Crown

Adrien Real Bergeron

Accused

Procedural Posture

Criminal / Trial Verdict/conclusion (conviction)

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite intent under s.423.1(1)(b) to provoke fear in a justice system participant in order to impede performance of duties
  2. 2 Whether foreseeability that conduct would provoke fear suffices to establish the requisite specific intent
  3. 3 Standard for drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence in proving specific intent

Ratio Decidendi

Where the accused intentionally attacked a known justice system participant and his conduct was directed at that participant because of his role, the trial judge may infer specific intent to provoke fear and to impede performance of duties if the accused knew or foresaw that provoking fear would be a certain or substantially certain consequence of his actions; the evidence in this case established that foreseeability and thus the requisite specific intent under s.423.1.

Court Disposition

Guilty on Count 8 (offence contrary to s.423.1 of the Criminal Code)