HMTQ v. Billings

2004 BCSC 653 HMTQ v. Billings IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: HMTQ v. Billings, 2004 BCSC 653 Date: 20040514 Docket: 22343-2 Registry: Vancouver HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN AGAINST PETER LEVI BILLINGS Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice S.R. Romilly Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown M.C. Luchenko C.P. Pike Counsel for the Accused P.J. Wilson, Q.C. Date and Place of Hearing: May 14, 2004 Vancouver, B.C. A. Nature of hearing [1] The accused was charged with first degree murder and was found guilty by a jury of the included offence of manslaughter. For the reasons stated below, on this charge I sentence the accused to a period of six years in the penitentiary. The accused has already served 19½ months of this sentence in pre-trial custody. Because I have decided to credit the accused for two days for each day he has spent in pre-trial custody, he will be given a credit of 39 months, i.e. a credit of three years and three months. The remaining sentence that he will have to serve for this offence will therefore be two years and nine months. [2] Because it is impossible for me to know what facts the jury found in arriving at their decision, I propose to allude to some of the evidence that was led at the trial. B. BACKGROUND OF THE ACCUSED [3] The accused is 27 years old. He was 25 years old at the time of the offence. He comes from a very supportive background. His mother has been in court throughout these proceedings. The accused is one of six children of Mr. and Mrs. Billings. He completed two years of university and has been gainfully employed since he left college. He became hopelessly addicted to crack cocaine and heroin and was addicted to these drugs at the time of the offence. C. Evidence led at Trial 1) Evidence of Planning [4] The accused and his girlfriend, Sheila Mort, were seriously addicted to crack cocaine and heroin. Neither of them had any previous criminal record. The accused found it difficult to finance his drug habit and began complaining to friends about his dial-a-dope drug dealer, a Vietnamese woman, Kim-Dung Doan. He thought she was "ripping him off" and he was resentful of her being late in delivering the drugs he had ordered. [5] Some time after the body of Kim-Dung Doan was found in the Birkenhead River, an extract was found on the accused's computer containing "dark writings". [6] Michael Rivest, one of the accused's roommates, testified that both he and his other roommate, Daryan Angle, saw this extract on the accused's computer in a Word document. He testified that a portion of the document referred to the accused mentioning how he hated to wait for drugs. Then it went on to say that the next time he had to wait for drugs, he would like to get into the car and when she said "so sorry, for being late" he would like to grab her head and bash it into the window until the window broke or her skull caved in. Then he would drive the car and her off a cliff at which point he would use all her drugs he found in the car and use the money to find a brand new dealer the next day. [7] Michael Rivest testified that he did not know if the words "so sorry for being late" were italicized but it seemed to suggest broken English or the English of someone who's English was not their first language. It seemed to suggest that those words were spoken by someone with a strong accent, possibly an Asian accent. [8] Daryan Angle's version of the same entry was that the accused wrote about hating the wait for drugs. The remainder went as follows: I think about getting into her car and smiling as she says, "I valy, busee, valy busee"" Then throttle her neck, repeatedly smashing her head against the car window over and over while laughing. I would then drive the car over a cliff into the ocean, do all of her drugs that night, take all the money and look for a new source the next day. [9] When asked about these writings the accused told Michael Rivest that the extract from the computer was just some writing he had been working on which had no relevance to the killing. He told his roommate that they were words he wanted to incorporate into a play. These two roommates testified that the extract was undated but the last day that it was updated was August 20, 2002. [10] Michael Betmanis, a co-worker of the accused, testified that five days before the killing of Kim-Dung Doan the accused said in a joking way, "Why don't we kill a drug dealer and take the car and get out of town." This witness testified that he could not recall the word "money" being used in the joke but he remembers that the accused had used the words "road trip" in the joke. [11] Mr. Weeds, another co-worker, was told a similar "joke." After the "joke" was told to Michael Betmanis by the accused they went over to Mr. Weeds where the accused repeated the same or a similar "joke." Stephen Weeds recalls the "joke" that was told to him before he was in the company of Michael Betmanis as being as follows: "Why don't we kill my drug dealer, steal her car and her money and go cross-country". [12] Both Mr. Betmanis and Mr. Weeds treated these "jokes" as being a "rant" or dark humour. [13] In view of the events that transpired a few days after these "jokes" or "rants" were made by the accused, the statements were indeed prophetic. The drug dealer that was killed was a woman; she was a Vietnamese woman and as such had an Asian accent; her car and money were stolen by the accused after she was killed; the accused stole her money and drugs and then drove her car from Vancouver to Edmonton. 2) The Intoxication Defence [14] The accused testified that he and Sheila Mort used up the last of their drugs either immediately before or immediately after they made the call to Kim-Dung Doan to order drugs. According to the records from Telus (Exhibit 27) that call was made at 4:16 a.m. on September 2, 2002 and Kim-Dung Doan returned the call saying that she was at the house on East 24th at 4:28 a.m. Under cross-examination the accused admitted that by the time Kim-Dung Doan had got to the house the major effects of the crack cocaine that he had taken would have worn off. [15] In addition, the Crown suggested that the accused was not intoxicated as he was acutely aware that he should check on Ms. Mort because she was away dealing with Ms. Doan longer than the transactions usually took; he also had the presence of mind to gather weights to weigh down the body; to get garbage bags to cover the body; to get packing tape to tape up the garbage bags and the bag that was placed on the head of Kim-Dung Doan; and to get the cord from his telephone to tie the tarpaulin on the body. The Crown also suggested that it may also be significant that the accused seemed to be able to recall minute details of the incident involving the killing. The accused was also adamant that Sheila Mort took no part in the killing of Kim-Dung Doan. [16] In any event, it was certainly open to the jury to find that the defence of intoxication by drugs vitiated the intent of the accused to kill Ms. Doan. 3) Evidence of Killing [17] Five days after making these "jokes" to Mr. Betmanis and Mr. Weeds, the accused or Sheila Mort called their dial-a-dope dealer for some drugs. It is not clear from the evidence whether the accused and Sheila Mort were in the process of using the last of their stash of drugs when they made the call to Kim-Dung Doan. What is clear is that although they both claimed to have money, they wanted a "front" from Kim-Dung Doan. I understand that a "front" is a process whereby one buys drugs on credit. [18] Sheila Mort testified that because more than a minute or two had elapsed from the time she went out to complete the dial-a dope transaction, the accused came to Ms. Doan's vehicle. Ms. Mort testified that the accused got into the back seat of the vehicle and told Ms. Doan to calm down. Ms. Mort remembers that during the struggle in the vehicle the accused tried to grab Ms. Doan's hands to settle her down. [19] Ms. Mort testified that she wasn't looking and did not know how the altercation between the accused and Ms. Doan began. She testified that there were sounds of a scuffle and that she heard a slapping. She did not think of offering assistance. She said at some point she heard sounds coming from the area of the altercation. It was quiet and muffled and soon after it was quiet and that after the quiet muffled sound she did not hear from Ms. Doan again. In fact the next time she looked, Ms. Doan was obviously dead. [20] The accused also testified that during the altercation with Ms. Doan he grabbed her hands and her neck and after grabbing her neck she became silent. He testified that the killing was almost instantaneous. [21] The accused and Ms. Mort put the body of Ms. Doan into the back of the deceased's car and drove to a point near Whistler where the accused dumped the body into the Birkenhead River. Before doing that, however, he taped the deceased's head with a Salvation Army bag, taped garbage bags to the body, inserted seven and one half pound weights to the body, one of which he placed in the pants of the deceased and wrapped the deceased's body in a tarpaulin that he brought from his home. The accused and his girlfriend then spent two days in Kamloops and then they drove the deceased's car to Edmonton where they were involved in an accident. [22] It would appear that the jury reached their verdict of manslaughter based on their finding that the killing of Ms. Doan was the result of an accidental act committed in the course of the unlawful act of assault. [23] This finding was possible because the evidence of Dr. Lee, who performed the autopsy of Ms. Doan, was called into question by the evidence of Dr. Rice. 4) The Evidence of Dr. Lee and Dr. Rice [24] With respect to the testimony of Dr. Rice, it may be significant that counsel for the accused did not comply with the provisions of s. 657.3(3) of the Criminal Code. Although Crown Counsel grumbled a bit about this omission, they did not ask for an adjournment, consequently none was granted. [25] The evidence of Dr. Lee was that at the time of examination of the body of Kim-Dung Doan the body had been in water for almost two weeks and was beginning to decompose. Dr. Lee testified that the decomposition made it impossible for him to notice whether there were any petechial haemorrhages to the face of Kim-Dung Doan. Dr. Lee noticed very little sign of trauma to the body of Kim-Dung Doan. There was a two-centimetre bruise on the sternal colloidal mastoid muscle, some contusions to the right chest, intramuscular bruising in the lower abdomen and bruising to the right wrist. [26] Dr. Lee testified that a plastic sheet could be used to smother someone from behind. Dr. Lee further testified that one could not commit suicide with the plastic sheet (Exhibit 16A) that was found in the belongings of the accused because after applying it to the face one would lose consciousness and let go of it, unless there was some sort of mechanism to maintain the pressure after the person lost consciousness. [27] Both Dr. Lee and Dr. Rice testified that they felt that it is very difficult to smother a healthy adult. They agree that smothering deaths are usually found among infants, the elderly, or people who are incapacitated in some way. However, the difference between the experts is that Dr. Lee felt that smothering was a likely cause of death in this case while Dr. Rice felt that smothering was an unlikely cause of death in this case. [28] Under cross-examination, Dr. Lee agreed that fatal pressure to the neck provides one of the most complex and controversial areas of asphyxial death. Dr. Lee agreed that it is difficult to explain and diagnose. Defence counsel drew the attention of Dr. Lee to an excerpt from Bernard Knight's book on Forensic Pathology. Dr. Lee testified that a lot of the quotation was "really speculation because you can't - not legally, do experiments on strangulation." [29] When quoted portions of Bernard Knight's book on "vagal reflex", Dr. Lee responded that the author is: speculating that because those findings are not present on cases of neck compression, that the proposed mechanism is vagal inhibition. Again, that's something that you really can't prove or disprove. That certainly is a possibility, and that's all I can say. [30] Further in his testimony, Dr. Lee stated that while there are cases where a person dies suddenly from apparently minor injuries, he does take issue with slight pressure causing death in normally healthy individuals. He gives the example of cardiac sinus massages performed in doctors' offices and hospitals and is unaware of any deaths occurring in healthy individuals from that technique. He states that some deaths may occur from carotid sinus massage but that it is extremely rare unless there was evidence of underlying heart disease. [31] Dr. Lee does agree that vaso-vagal stimulation can play a role in the mechanism of death but that it is only likely to happen where somebody suffers from or is prone to suffer from a cardiac condition or disease. [32] Dr. Lee agreed that reflex cardiac arrest could have played a role in the death of Kim-Dung Doan but that it was probably not the only one. [33] Dr. Rice testified that the findings of Dr. Lee are consistent with the phenomenon of vagal inhibition. Dr. Rice stated that vagal inhibition is an explanation for the mechanism of death in this case. [34] Dr. Rice testified that there is disagreement among forensic pathologists as to the frequency of vagal inhibition occurring. Generally speaking, North American pathologists do not believe that it occurs as frequently as European pathologists. Specifically, Dr. Bernard Knight suggests that vagal inhibition may be a mechanism of death in as many as half of the cases of neck compression. Dr. Rice testified that of the 50 or so autopsies that she has performed, she has seen one case, prior to this one, where she is comfortable that the mechanism of death was vagal inhibition. [35] Dr. Rice says that she is comfortable in making this assessment because of three criteria that she follows. First, is the absence of typical findings of fatal compression on the neck, for example, that is usually found in manual strangulation. Second, is the absence of the typical findings of asphyxia, for example, petechial haemorrhages. Third, and most essential for her is the presence of a descriptor. This descriptor would describe a very sudden collapse, with no pulse, and death. [36] Of some interest in the assessment of the evidence of the two doctors was the evidence of Dr. Lee, the person who actually did the autopsy, on re-examination. In re-examination, Dr. Lee testified that the injury that he noticed was nowhere near to the carotid body that was being suggested as being stimulated in this case and that the injury was lower down on the neck. [37] It was certainly up to the jury to reject that piece of testimony from Dr. Lee. [38] I have reviewed the evidence that was led at the trial because in sentencing this accused, I have determined that this was a case of near murder. It is difficult to decide whether the jury accepted the defence of intoxication by drugs or the defence of accidental killing during the unlawful act of assaulting Ms. Doan. D. POSITION OF THE CROWN [39] The Crown takes the position that this was a callous killing of the victim. The Crown submits that the scenario which was found on the accused's computer and the jokes and rants that were made by the accused five days before the killing of Ms. Doan are a clear indication of the accused's propensity for violence. The Crown submits that the behaviour of the accused both before and after the killing was callous and inhumane in the extreme. They point to the fact that after Ms. Doan appeared to be dead, no effort was made to resuscitate her and no effort was made to call for help. [40] Crown counsel submits that taking into consideration the fact that the accused has already served 19½ months in custody, the accused should be sentenced to a further four to seven years of incarceration for this crime. [41] In support of his submission he drew my attention to the following cases: Regina v. Nowacki (1988), 104 B.C.A.C. 312; R. v. Metcalfe (1997), 99 B.C.A.C. 15; R. v. Weir-Jones, [1994] B.C.J. No. 2391 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Woods, [1997] B.C.J. No. 663 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Widen, [2001] B.C.J. no. 316 (B.C.S.C.); and R. v. Green, [2001] B.C.J. No. 661 (B.C.S.C.) and [2001] B.C.J. No. 2434 (B.C.C.A.). E. POSITION OF THE ACCUSED [42] Defence counsel takes the position that the accused should be sentenced to the low end of the range of sentences for manslaughter. In support of this position, defence counsel drew my attention to the relative youth of the accused, the fact that he has no criminal record, that prior to this incident he had a good work history and no history of violence, aggression or anti-social behaviour. [43] Defence counsel argues that at the time of the killing, the accused's judgment was impaired by drugs. He also drew my attention to the fact that the victim's death was not accompanied by any serious injuries. He also pointed out that it is significant that no weapon was used. [44] Defence counsel also drew attention to the fact that the cases which the Crown referred to were much more serious than the case at bar. [45] The defence submits that any additional time which the accused is sentenced to should be no greater than two years less a day. [46] In support of his submissions, defence counsel drew my attention to the following cases: R. v. Proulx (2000), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey (2000), 148 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Owens, [1986] B.C.J. No. 401 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Johnny (20 June 1994) Vancouver CA018845 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Bruce (29 Jan. 1992) Vancouver CC910660 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Khanh Ly (15 June 1994) Vancouver CA018059 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Ly & Nguyen (27 Oct. 1994) Vancouver CA018058, CA018060 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Archibald (23 June 1992) Vancouver CA014594 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Fujimori (10 Nov. 1995) Vancouver CA020355 (B.C.C.A.); and R. v. Gilles (1998), 107 B.C.A.C. 157, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused. F. Law of Sentencing after a Jury Verdict [47] After a jury trial, where there is an ambiguous verdict, the trial judge is entitled to make up his or her own mind regarding which disputed facts are relevant to sentence: R. v. Brown, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 518; R. v. Braun (1995), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Man.C.A.); R. v. Cooney (1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 196 (Ont.C.A.); Findings of Fact for Sentencing in Jury Trials by Philip Downes (1995), 37 C.R. (4th) 93. [48] This issue is now covered by s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code. Under that section the court shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury's finding of guilt and may find other relevant facts disclosed by the evidence. [49] After this lengthy review of the evidence, I now turn to the principles laid down by the higher courts with respect to the sentencing for manslaughter offences. 1) Manslaughter [50] Manslaughter can range from the situation of a near murder down to the situation of a near accident. Thus the sentence for manslaughter can range from life imprisonment, at one end of the spectrum, to a suspended sentence at the other: R. v. Pettigrew (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 390 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Vaudreuil (1995), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 316 (B.C.C.A.). [51] In R. v. Archibald, supra, the Court held that in British Columbia the range of sentence for manslaughter is from a suspended sentence to eight years. In R. v. Gillies, supra, McEachern C.J.B.C. described the upper range of sentences for manslaughter (which he referred to as 8 to 10 years or more) as usually involving "torture, long records of violent offences, violence against a spouse, woman or child, and killing in the course of a robbery." In other cases, the B.C. Court of Appeal has referred to the upper end of sentences as including circumstances which have been described as "near murder." [52] In R. v. Laberge (1995), 165 A.R. 375 (C.A.), Fraser C.J.A. stated at p. 382: Therefore, the court must look not only at the physical characterization of the act itself, but must assess a range of other considerations. These include the choice of weapon used to effect the unlawful act, the degree of force the offender used in perpetrating the act, the extent of the victim's injuries, the degree of violence or brutality, the existence of any additional gratuitous violence, the degree of the deliberation involved in the act, the extent to which the act reflected forethought of action or planning, the complexity of the act, what, if anything, provoked the act, the time taken to perpetrate the act and the element of chance involved in the resulting death. [53] In his submissions, Crown Counsel drew my attention to the authorities to which I have already referred. One of the authorities to which he referred was the case of R. v. Green, supra. Although the circumstances were more egregious than in the case at bar, some of the comments of Thackray J. (as he then was) and Low J.A. are very helpful. At trial, Thackray J. stated at paras. 64-66: Mr. Conroy submitted, as noted earlier in these reasons, that sentences at the higher end of the range are unlikely to deter others from such offences. He may well be correct if he is directing his contention only to the events at the time of the killing. However, I cannot accept that sentences at the high end of the range might not have some impact upon those who are giving thought to intoxicating themselves on illegal drugs. The sentence must buttress society's efforts to make known the potential dire results of illicit drug use and to dissuade persons from entertaining the potentially fatal results thereof. If it were not for the psychosis the conviction would be for an intended killing, i.e. murder. The sentence would be life imprisonment. The grounding of the crime is the use of cocaine, but it was a voluntary consumption and led directly to a brutal killing. This is not, in my opinion, simply gross negligence. The crime, in my opinion, is closer to murder than to accident in spite of the conclusion of Dr. Lohrasbe that Mr. Green did not form "the intent to harm or kill the victim." Regardless of semantics, a life has been lost. The preciousness of life is a concept that has not recently attracted significant comment in court judgments. I am of the opinion that social values do not and should not undervalue the taking of a life and the nature of that taking. [54] I find this excerpt to be very compelling and helpful. In addition, Low J.A., in the Court of Appeal decision, stated at para. 16: ...The appellant went on a reckless binge. He used a mind-altering substance known to be capable of bringing about uncontrolled, violent conduct. In that state, he attacked the victim. He is criminally responsible for the degree of violence that caused the death of the victim and for the post-mortem indignity to the body of the victim. Those circumstances weigh heavily in this case in considering denunciation and deterrence. In my opinion, the sentencing judge properly considered the aggravating and the mitigating factors in relation to each other. [55] He continued at paras. 18-19: In Hicks, this court agreed that the circumstances of the killings put the case "high on the relative scale of severity of manslaughter offences," Hicks, at para. 11. The trial judge emphasized the proper sentencing principles. In the present case, general deterrence and denunciation are the most important factors in determining the proper sentence. I do not accept the argument that deterrence is not a significant factor because people on cocaine binges are unaware of their conduct and cannot be deterred. In my opinion, deterrence is not aimed at violence per se, but is aimed at the highly irresponsible conduct that leads to the violence. Those who might emulate the lifestyle of the appellant that led to the killings must know that serious crimes done while under the influence of self-administered, mind-altering substances will attract substantial terms of imprisonment: the more horrific the circumstances of the crime, the higher the sentence. [56] In dealing with the decision of R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290, Low J.A. stated at paras. 22-24: I also note that in Stone, at para. 249, Bastarache, J. stated that he "may have been inclined to impose a slightly more onerous sentence". Thackray, J. at para. 61 quoted from Stone as follows: [61] In Stone, supra, the Court said that the law with respect to sentencing must be in harmony with prevailing social values. It adopted the comments of Lamer C.J. in R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 at para. 81: The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of that particular offender's conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender's conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. ... Our criminal law is also a system of values. A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated. In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instils the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal Code. The barbaric violence perpetrated by the appellant in this case "encroached on our society's basic code of values" in the extreme. The sentencing judge was correct in determining, notwithstanding the mitigating factors that were present, that the brutality of the killing put the appropriate sentence in the higher end of the range. G. Sentence [57] In the case at bar, I have considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case and the sage words of Low J.A. and Thackray J. (as he then was) in R. v. Green, supra. I also find that the manslaughter in this case was near murder. In the result, I sentence the accused to a period of six years in jail. The accused has however, already spent some time in pre-trial custody. It is therefore necessary for me to decide the effect of this pre-trial custody on this sentence of six years. [58] In addition to the sentence of six years, there will be an order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code prohibiting the accused from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance for a period of ten years from today. [59] In addition, pursuant to s. 487.052(1) of the Criminal Code, there will be an order authorizing the taking of a sample of the accused's bodily substance for DNA analysis. 1) The Effect of Pre-Trial Custody [60] Time spent in custody as a result of an offence may be taken into account in determining the sentence to be imposed upon a person convicted of the offence: s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code. In R. v. Wust (2000), 143 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), Arbour J., for the Court, prefers to refer to this period of time spent in pre-trial custody as "pre-sentencing custody". [61] In R. v. McDonald (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d) 57 (Ont.C.A.), Rosenberg J.A. wrote at p. 83: There is one final issue of interpretation: the amount of credit permitted by s. 719(3). Under s. 719(3), it is left to the sentencing court to "take into account" any pre-sentence custody "in determining the sentence". The subsection does not provide any fixed rule as to how much credit should be taken into account. For the reasons expressed by Professor Friedland, Mr. Trotter and Laskin J.A. in R. v. Reazie, trial judges generally give double credit for pre-sentence custody. I see no reason to depart from this practice, where appropriate, in cases of minimum punishment, although the sentence imposed would be less than four years. [62] In R. v. Wust, supra, Arbour J. wrote at para. 45: In the past, many judges have given more or less two months credit for each month spent in pre-sentencing detention. This is entirely appropriate even though a different ratio could also be applied, for example if the accused has been detained prior to trial in an institution where he or she has had full access to educational, vocational and rehabilitation programs. The often applied ratio of 2:1 reflects not only the harshness of the detention due to the absence of programs, which may be more severe in some cases than in others, but reflects also the fact that none of the remission mechanisms contained in the Conditional and Conditional Release Act apply to that period of detention. "Dead time" is "real" time. The credit cannot and need not be determined by a rigid formula and is thus best left to the sentencing judge, who remains in the best position to carefully weigh all the factors which go toward the determination of the appropriate sentence, including the decision to credit the offender for any time spent in pre-sentencing custody. [63] On the basis of the above jurisprudence, the accused in this case will be credited for double the time he has already spent in pre-sentencing custody. H. CONCLUSION [64] While the jury found the accused guilty of manslaughter, in my discretion I have found this to be a case of near murder. For this reason I sentence the accused to a period of six years in the penitentiary. As there shall be a credit of two days for each day the accused has spent in pre-trial custody, the balance of the sentence that he will have to serve for this offence will be two years and nine months. "S.R. Romilly, J." The Honourable Mr. Justice S.R. Romilly