R. v. Downey

2026 BCSC 322 R. v. Downey IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Downey, 2026 BCSC 322 Date: 20260213 Docket: 34381 Registry: Vancouver Rex v. Everton Javaun Downey Before: The Honourable Associate Chief Justice H. Holmes Oral Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown: B. McCabe, K.C. M. Myhre Counsel for the Accused: C.S. Johnson, K.C. A. Cochrane A. Tubinshlak Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. February 11, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. February 13, 2026 INTRODUCTION [1] Everton Javaun Downey is to be sentenced for second degree murder. He killed Melissa Blimkie, his intimate partner, by stabbing her 15 times in a stairwell at the Metrotown Shopping Centre on December 19, 2021. He was convicted on August 21, 2025 after a trial by judge alone. [2] For second degree murder, the sentence must be imprisonment for life. The issue for determination is the length of the period for which Mr. Downey will not be eligible to apply for parole. The period must be ten years unless the sentencing judge increases it to no more than 25 years, after considering the general sentencing principles and the factors set out in s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code. [3] The Crown submits that the period of ineligibility to apply for parole should be between 13 and 15 years. The defence submits that the period should be 12 years. THE SENTENCING PRINCIPLES [4] The general sentencing principles are well known. Most of them are set out in sections 718 through 718.2 of the Code. Within the broad framework those principles establish, and taking into account the particular offender and the particular offence, the judge finds the appropriate balance for all of the relevant factors that best achieves the objectives of sentencing. Fundamental is ensuring that the sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender's responsibility. [5] For homicide offences, the primary objectives of sentencing are denouncing the offending conduct and deterring the offender and others from similar conduct in the future; protection of the public is key. But rehabilitation of the offender also plays a part. [6] Section 745.4 of the Code sets out several considerations the sentencing judge is to take into account in determining the length of the parole ineligibility period during life sentences for second degree murder. The relevant considerations in this case are: the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, and the circumstances surrounding its commission. [7] I will first discuss the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission. I will include in this the effects of the offence. THE NATURE, CIRCUMSTANCES, AND EFFECTS OF THE OFFENCE The Nature and Circumstances of the Offence [8] Mr. Downey and Ms. Blimkie lived in an intimate relationship in Ms. Blimkie's apartment in North Vancouver. During the morning of December 19, 2021, they drove from the apartment to the Metrotown Shopping Centre in Burnaby, left the vehicle on the upper level of the east parkade, and walked the short distance toward the shopping centre. In a stairwell near the entrance to the shopping centre, Mr. Downey stabbed Ms. Blimkie fifteen times with a folding knife, and immediately left the scene, abandoning his distinctive and blood-stained jacket not far away. People responding to Ms. Blimkie's cries from the stairwell found her clutching her bleeding abdomen and expecting to die. She quickly lost consciousness, and, despite prompt medical intervention, did not survive. [9] After he left Ms. Blimkie dying in the stairwell, Mr. Downey made his way through the shopping centre parking lot and the nearby neighbourhood, asking people he met to drive him away or to let him into their homes, and breaking in to other homes. In the laundry and storage area of an apartment building he broke into, he hid the knife he had used to kill Ms. Blimkie. He also left his shoes and items of clothing, and dressed himself in boots and clothing that he took from that area. In the end, Mr. Downey stopped a person near Central Park who was walking with her grandmother and a dog, and asked her to call the police. When they arrived he told them that he was turning himself in. [10] In the trial, Mr. Downey admitted that he killed Ms. Blimkie. However, he maintained that he was guilty of manslaughter, not murder, because he lacked the specific intent to kill Ms. Blimkie. He testified that during the days or weeks before the offence, he experienced disturbing and frightening perceptions, and that, as he and Ms. Blimkie approached the shopping centre, she threw a white powder at him that caused him to become intoxicated and lose control of his actions: see R. v. Downey, 2025 BCSC 1641 at paras. 2, 81, 85. This was evidence that I found to be unreliable and untruthful. I concluded that it did not reflect Mr. Downey's actual mental state at the time of the offence: trial reasons at paras. 129-130, 194. [11] Ultimately, I concluded that neither intoxication nor mental disturbance displaced the common sense inference that Mr. Downey intended to kill Ms. Blimkie when he stabbed her 15 times. [12] Counsel agree that by its nature the offence gives rise to a high level of moral blameworthiness. The Effects of the Offence [13] The offence had very significant and lasting effects for many people. [14] Ms. Blimkie's mother, father, and older sister, Ms. Blimkie's only sibling, each wrote victim impact statements, as did three close friends and Ms. Blimkie's former acrobatics coach and choreographer. One of the close friends presented her statement in the courtroom. Many of these victims attended court through most or all of the trial. [15] The victims have suffered an almost unbearable loss that affects them all profoundly, and, for some, in almost every aspect of their lives. [16] The family members feel the loss all the more deeply because they had no opportunity to say goodbye to Ms. Blimkie or to give her comfort in her final moments. They also feel betrayed by Mr. Downey who they welcomed into their home. Many of the victims now have difficulty trusting others; some avoid social occasions. [17] Several of the victims are consumed by regret or remorse that they did not protect Ms. Blimkie from the terrible harm Mr. Downey inflicted. Some feel the guilt of the survivor, knowing that they have lives ahead of them while Ms. Blimkie abruptly lost her future. The Court respects these feelings but hopes that these victims will come to accept that Ms. Blimkie's death was in no way their doing. It seems clear from the descriptions of Ms. Blimkie in the statements that she would have wanted those she loved to continue living their lives as fully as possible. [18] Any murder has a profoundly unsettling effect on the community. The effects of this murder must have been particularly acute because the murder took place near the middle of the day at a busy public shopping centre. MR. DOWNEY'S BACKGROUND AND CHARACTER Criminal Record [19] I will discuss Mr. Downey's criminal record at the outset because the subsequent discussion of his background and character, considered from a broader perspective, casts some light upon it. [20] Mr. Downey has a significant criminal record that includes serious offences of violence, many involving weapons. [21] Most of his offences were in Ontario where Mr. Downey grew up, as I will discuss shortly. His first convictions were in 2007, when he was 18, for weapons offences and a breach, and resulted in a long period of probation. In 2010 he was convicted for armed robbery, forcible confinement, two firearms offences, and failing to comply offences, and received concurrent prison sentences the longest of which took account of the equivalent of three years pre-sentencing custody and added one year of imprisonment, and another of which was two years' imprisonment. His longest sentence came in 2013, with three robbery offences, and several related offences including possession of a firearm or ammunition contrary to a prohibition order. Most of those offences resulted in seven year concurrent prison sentences. Mr. Downey was convicted in 2017 for possession of a weapon and sentenced to 60 days' imprisonment concurrent to the sentences he was then serving. [22] Mr. Downey's first offence in British Columbia was the murder of Ms. Blimkie. However, he committed a bank robbery here on December 20, 2021, immediately after he was released after his first arrest for the murder. The circumstances of the robbery are described in my reasons after the trial (at paras. 63-4). He pleaded guilty to the robbery and on September 21, 2023 was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment, then reduced for 934 days' credit for pre-sentencing custody. Background and Character More Generally [23] An understanding of Mr. Downey's character necessarily takes account of his background, which is described in considerable detail in an Impact of Race and Culture Assessment (IRCA). The IRCA is authored by Dr. Patrina Duhaney, whose field is social work. The IRCA aims to help the Court understand the systemic, historical, and social factors shaping the experiences of Black and other racialized individuals involved in the justice system, and those of Mr. Downey in particular. [24] The following summary draws heavily from the IRCA. [25] Mr. Downey is currently 35 years old, and was 31 at the time of the offence. He is a Black man of African Nova Scotian, African American, and Jamaican ancestry. He grew up in Toronto in predominantly Black and racially diverse neighbourhoods and attended racially diverse schools, and felt that he did not experience overt racism. Mr. Downey explained to Dr. Duhaney that his experience living in communities which normalized racial diversity shaped his early sense of identity and belonging. [26] However, his experience changed, from his point of view, when he moved to British Columbia in 2016. Here, he found a much smaller Black population, and the cultural norms among Black communities felt unfamiliar to him, and contributed to feelings of disconnection and isolation. He also experienced racism in ways he had not previously encountered, both in the community and in the institutional setting. [27] The Crown submits that there must be some connection between systemic and background factors and the circumstances that are said to explain or mitigate the offending behaviour: R. v. Abbas, 2025 BCCA 236 at paras. 34-35; R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at paras. 56, 91-93, 96-97. The Crown questions whether any connection is shown between Mr. Downey's experience as a Black person in Canada and his offence against Ms. Blimkie.. The Crown notes that most of Mr. Downey's criminal offences were in Ontario where, by his own account to Dr. Duhaney, he felt settled in a racially diverse community and did not experience overt racism. [28] However, in my view other aspects of the IRCA make clear that broader systemic, structural, and community factors relating to Mr. Downey's experience as a Black person have played a part in his life experience, bringing various types of trauma, negative peer influences, and mental health challenges. [29] Mr. Downey's parents were very young when he was born -- in their mid-teens. His father was largely absent and unreliable. Mr. Downey's early years were also marked by poverty, housing instability, and instability in his caregiving and schooling. His mother, who Mr. Downey described -- and continues to describe -- as loving, supportive and attentive, worked long hours to support the four children, but had difficulty meeting their basic needs for food and housing. Mr. Downey's mother, who was consulted for the IRCA, estimates that Mr. Downey had 30 changes of residence between the ages of one and 10. Mr. Downey was also exposed to violence within in the home, as well as to the knowledge that his father was the victim of violence outside the home. As the housing insecurity and family stress intensified, Mr. Downey's school instability did as well, contributing to a general disengagement on his part. [30] The IRCA reports that Mr. Downey described violence and the frequent presence of the police in his community. He witnessed shootings, and he lost a close friend at a young age. He became aware that his father was shot on two different occasions. [31] The IRCA reports that Mr. Downey attributes his criminal offences in Ontario to financial necessity as well as to the environment that shaped him. Having read the IRCA as a whole, I take these comments to refer mainly to Mr. Downey's sense of responsibility, albeit misdirected, to help support his family, and to the anti-social influence of peers involved in crime. Substance Use [32] The IRCA notes that Mr. Downey has used cannabis and alcohol but has never used other illicit drugs or smoked cigarettes. It reports that he began using cannabis at around age 13 after being introduced by peers, and used it with varying frequency over time, usually to cope with anxiety and stress. Mr. Downey told Dr. Duhaney that he uses alcohol only infrequently, mainly at family gatherings or holidays, and it has never caused him problems. [33] Overall, the IRCA characterizes Mr. Downey's substance use as limited and controlled, reflecting his stated decision to avoid the heavier drug use he observed in his community. I note that this final comment, at least, must be considered in light of the absence from the IRCA of any indication that Mr. Downey told Dr. Duhaney that he had been running an illicit drug-dealing business in BC and in other provinces in the months or years before the offence against Ms. Blimkie. Mental Health [34] The IRCA reports that Mr. Downey believes he suffers from major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, ADD, and ADHD. He has no medical diagnosis for any of these conditions, but he explains that he feels he knows himself best. [35] While I do not accept Mr. Downey's self-diagnoses as accurate, I do recognize that some of them may have some foundation in reality. My reasons after the trial included these findings: [198] Mr. Downey undoubtedly suffered from ADHD and anxiety. He also displayed some paranoia in his dealings with the police that I accept was genuine. I refer for example to his refusal of food and drink, and to his comments to the effect that he knew what the police were doing. I do not interpret the latter comment to refer to the drug-flicking Mr. Downey described in the trial, which I conclude was not truthful evidence, but rather to a general accusation that the police were out to incriminate him, even while appearing to be concerned about his welfare. [199] I also accept that Mr. Downey used marihuana frequently, as he testified and as the analysis of his blood tended to confirm. This too may have had some effect on his perception, his conduct, or both. [36] Consistently with these findings, in my view, the IRCA notes that Mr. Downey "has trust issues," which he links to his life experiences and the difficulty of finding trustworthy connections in the neighbourhoods he came from. More broadly, the IRCA connects Mr. Downey's history of early instability and violence to "a lasting sense of danger and mistrust". It notes research that finds links between neighbourhood violence and anxiety, hypervigilance, and psychological distress. [37] It is also noteworthy that, in speaking to Dr. Duhaney, Mr. Downey described his periods of incarceration as psychologically damaging, particularly a 46-day placement in segregation. He stated that the isolation during this period significantly worsened his anxiety and hypervigilance. [38] More generally, the IRCA notes that incarceration and geographic distance from home (including being moved to British Columbia) deepened Mr. Downey's feelings of disconnection from his family, and his distress about family relationships worsening while he was incarcerated or physically distant. [39] In my view, some or all of these factors may help explain the hypervigilance and distrust Mr. Downey displayed in his post offence dealings with the police and medical personnel. Custodial Status [40] Mr. Downey has been in custody since his arrest on December 25, 2021. [41] On September 21, 2023, he began serving the four-year robbery sentence I referred to earlier. DISCUSSION Aggravating Circumstances [42] There are a number of aggravating circumstances relating to the offence and the offender: · Ms. Blimkie was Mr. Downey's intimate partner. Section 718.2(a)(ii) recognizes this as an aggravating circumstance. I am not persuaded by the Crown that an additional aggravating circumstance arises under s. 718.2(a)(iii) from a position of trust or authority. I share the view of Justice Ker in R. v. Poepl, 2021 BCSC 725 at para. 117, that s. 718.2(a)(iii) appears to be directed at adult offences against children, or offences where the offender holds a special position, such as lawyer in respect of client funds. The Crown's position appears to risk "double counting" the intimate partner relationship in the tally of aggravating circumstances. · Mr. Downey used a weapon in committing the offence. · Mr. Downey fled the scene, leaving Ms. Blimkie very seriously injured in the stairwell and her future entirely uncertain. As it happened, people came along and were with her at the end, but she might have died alone. When Mr. Downey left Ms. Blimkie, he cannot have been certain that she would die, and yet he did nothing to summon help for her or to call attention to her plight. · The offence had a significant impact on many people. As I have discussed, these included Ms. Blimkie's family members, her friends, and members of her community, as well as, I would add, those who responded to her cries for help. · Mr. Downey has a substantial record of serious offences involving violence and weapons, as well as other offences. Mitigating Circumstances [43] There are also some mitigating circumstances: · Mr. Downey made a number of significant admissions that shortened the trial and relieved many witnesses from testifying. These included the admission that he killed Ms. Blimkie. · Mr. Downey's background, as described in the IRCA, included early exposure to violence, chronic instability, poverty, systemic anti-Black racism, and untreated mental health symptoms, such as hypervigilance, that may be trauma related. · Also, in his personal statement to the Court, Mr. Downey apologized to Ms. Blimkie's family and friends, and said that every day he regrets what took place. This was an expression of remorse. Case Authorities [44] In R. v. Bennight, 2012 BCCA 461 at para. 18, leave to appeal to SCC ref'd, 34996 (20 December 2012), Justice MacKenzie succinctly summarized the principles that apply in the decision whether to extend the parole ineligibility period beyond ten years: [18] The following principles apply to the decision to impose an extended period of parole ineligibility: · Under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code, the sentencing judge must consider the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, and the recommendation of the jury (if any). · The general sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence and the judge's assessment of the offender's future dangerousness are relevant factors: R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, 102 C.C.C. (3d) 193. · Parole ineligibility greater than 10 years is justified when there is some particularly aggravating feature: Cerra, at para. 17 (per Donald J.A.). · There are two broad groupings of cases where parole ineligibility is extended beyond 10 years: parole ineligibility periods from 12 to 15 years and parole ineligibility periods from 15 to 20 years. The latter group of cases relates to cases at the highest order of moral culpability or dangerousness: Cerra, at para. 26 (per Donald J.A.). · The possibility of a parole ineligibility period greater than 20 years remains in exceptional circumstances: Cerra, at para. 36 (per Ryan J.A.). · Orders extending the period of parole ineligibility are highly discretionary and are part of the sentence pursuant to s. 673 of the Criminal Code. Such orders are therefore appealed pursuant to s. 687(1). An appellant court should only interfere with a trial judge's sentencing order if the court is convinced it is not fit or it is clearly unreasonable: Shropshire, at paras. 47-48. · The wide discretion granted to sentencing judges is fettered by the case law and general ranges of sentences for particular offences. However, while courts must consider ranges, they are guidelines rather than strict rules. A sentence outside the regular range is not necessarily unfit, if it is in accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 at para. 44. · Similarly, the two groups of parole ineligibility cases described in Cerra are intended as guidelines, not as binding categories within which a particular case must be placed: R. v. White, 2011 BCCA 328 at para. 24. [45] Crown and defence counsel agree that this case falls into the first of the two broad groupings of cases where some particularly aggravating feature warrants extending parole ineligibility to between 12 and 15 years. Generally, second degree murders in the context of intimate partner violence attract parole ineligibility periods within that range, absent particularly egregious facts that take them to the higher range: R. v. Danjou, 2020 BCSC 1820; Poepl. [46] No case is identical to this one, but other similar cases provide guidance as to where this case should fall within the 12 to 15 year range. Crown and defence counsel each provided the Court with useful examples, which they summarized in their written submissions; the written submissions are marked as exhibits. Most of the cases on which Crown and the defence, respectively, rely involved the killing of an intimate partner. [47] The Crown submits that the period of ineligibility should be toward the upper end of the 12 to 15 year range because of the serious and shocking nature of the offence, as reflected in some of its aggravating features, and Mr. Downey's high degree of moral culpability. The Crown notes further that there is no evidence before the Court, apart from Mr. Downey's criminal record and the seemingly inexplicable killing of Ms. Blimkie, to inform the question of whether Mr. Downey will pose a risk to the public once he is released. [48] The defence submits that an ineligibility period of 12 years would accord with other decisions setting the period at that length despite highly aggravated features that were, variously, present in most or all of the cases on which the defence relies. The defence notes that, by contrast, the Court in this case made no findings of motive, advance preparation, or an escalating pattern of domestic violence. [49] The defence notes, in addition, that the IRCA situates Mr. Downey's conduct within a life history marked by early exposure to violence, chronic instability, poverty, systemic anti-Black racism, and untreated trauma-related symptoms such as hypervigilance, factors relevant to Mr. Downey's moral blameworthiness. [50] It is true that, as the defence submits, some of the cases where the ineligibility period was set at 12 years involved domestic killings and aggravating features at least or more serious than those in this case, including entrenched domestic abuse and prolonged brutality: R. v. Benham, 2009 BCSC 1863; Danjou. One case involved the use of a firearm and forethought that was close to planning: R. v. Neumann, 2010 BCCA 446. Another involved extreme and sustained knife violence in the presence of the victim's child: R. v. Wu, 2017 BCSC 2271. [51] However, in several of the cases on which the defence relies, the offender had no criminal record and benefitted from that mitigating circumstance: Benham; Danjou; Neumann; R. v. Waraich, 2008 BCSC 919; Wu. As I have indicated, Mr. Downey has a substantial criminal record involving violence and firearms. I recognize, however, that the aggravating effect of his criminal record is offset in part by the mitigating circumstances of his background, as detailed in the IRCA. [52] It is also true that Mr. Downey's attack on Ms. Blimkie, while savage, was not lengthy or prolonged or committed in the presence of a child, as were the killings in some of the cases where the ineligibility period was set at 12 years: Benham; Danjou; Wu. However, as I have noted, after the attack Mr. Downey showed callous disregard for Ms. Blimkie in leaving her severely injured and alone in the stairwell, while he spent the next 40 minutes trying to avoid responsibility by discarding and concealing evidence and evading the police. [53] Of the Crown's cases, I find most similar to this case those in which the ineligibility period was set at the lower end of the 12 to 15 year range. Most of the cases where the period was set higher in the range involved more aggravated facts (Poepl; R. v. O.V., 2016 BCCA 454; R. v. Boden, 2021 BCSC 2677 (unreported)) or previous violence against the victim (R. v. Daigle, 2017 BCCA 86; O.V.; Boden). [54] In my view, the appropriate period of ineligibility to apply for parole is 12 years. [55] I will now impose sentence. SENTENCE [56] Mr. Downey, for the second degree murder of Melissa Blimkie, you are sentenced to imprisonment for life. [57] You will not be eligible to apply for parole for a period of 12 years. [58] There are some ancillary orders to make. [59] I make an order under s. 109(1)(a) of the Code prohibiting you from possessing any type of firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition or explosive substance for a period of ten years following your release on parole. Also, under s. 109(1)(b) I make an order that you are prohibited from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, or prohibited ammunition for the rest of your life. [60] I also order you to provide a sample of bodily substance that is suitable for DNA analysis. That order is made under s. 487.051(1) of the Code. [61] Under s. 743.21(1) of the Code, I make an order that during the custodial portion of your sentence, you are not to communicate directly or indirectly with Ms. Blimkie's mother, father, or sister - you know their names. [62] As agreed, the victim surcharge is waived. [63] And, as requested by Crown counsel, I direct that copies of my reasons after the trial and well as these reasons be sent to the Correctional Service of Canada, along with the IRCA. [64] Finally, I would like to thank all counsel for their work during the trial and the sentencing proceedings. Your work was of the highest quality. "The Honourable Associate Chief Justice H. Holmes"