Granger v. Brydon-Jack

Granger v. Brydon-Jack

The trial judge's finding that the mortgage was taken only as security (not as payment) must stand because parol evidence admissibly established the true bargain without contradicting the instruments, the absence of a personal covenant was immaterial, the creditor's acceptance of interest supported the security characterization, and the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the trial judge's credibility-based factual finding; where time for payment was not fixed, the price was payable within a reasonable time which had expired.

Citation
(1919) 58 SCR 491
Parties
Appellant Plaintiff: Robert Granger; Respondent Defendant: Arthur Brydon-Jack
Court
Supreme Court of Canada
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
19 May 1919
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal Sale/mortgage Dispute / On Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada From the Court of Appeal for British Columbia
Outcome
Appeal allowed; judgment of the trial judge restored; judgment of the Court of Appeal reversed
Legal Topics
Parol Evidence, Findings of Fact, Reasonable Time for Payment, Absence of Personal Covenant, Mortgage as Security Vs Payment, Credibility of Witnesses
Source Language
English
Evidence Property Mortgage Contract Civil Procedure Appeal Parol Evidence Findings of Fact +4 more

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Parties

Robert Granger

Appellant Plaintiff

Arthur Brydon-Jack

Respondent Defendant

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal Sale/mortgage Dispute / On Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada From the Court of Appeal for British Columbia

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the mortgage was given as payment in satisfaction of the purchase-price or accepted merely as security
  2. 2 Whether parol evidence was admissible to show the true bargain
  3. 3 Whether absence of a personal covenant in the mortgage discharged the debt

Ratio Decidendi

The trial judge's finding that the mortgage was taken only as security (not as payment) must stand because parol evidence admissibly established the true bargain without contradicting the instruments, the absence of a personal covenant was immaterial, the creditor's acceptance of interest supported the security characterization, and the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the trial judge's credibility-based factual finding; where time for payment was not fixed, the price was payable within a reasonable time which had expired.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; judgment of the trial judge restored; judgment of the Court of Appeal reversed

Orders

  • Appeal allowed with costs
  • Judgment of Grant J. (trial judge) restored