B.W.H. v. T.B.H.

2024 BCSC 1235 B.W.H. v. T.B.H. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: B.W.H. v. T.B.H., 2024 BCSC 1235 Date: 20240709 Docket: 172121 Registry: Victoria Between: B. W. H. Claimant And T.B.H. Respondent Before: The Honourable Justice Wolfe Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: V. Hemminger Counsel for Respondent: J. Fitzel Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Victoria, B.C. April 30, May 1-3, 2024 Place and Date of Judgment: Victoria, B.C. July 9, 2024 Table of Contents Introduction.. 3 Background facts. 5 Issues. 11 Analysis. 12 Preliminary Issue: Which statutory regime governs the applications?. 12 Issue 1: Relocation. 13 Is the proposed relocation made in good faith?. 17 Has the Father proposed reasonable and workable arrangements?. 20 Is the proposed relocation in the best interests of the children?. 22 Conclusion on Relocation. 40 Issue 2: Child Support 40 The parties' positions. 41 Overview of the legal framework. 44 Analysis. 45 Should the Minutes be replaced by an order for ongoing support?. 46 Conclusion on ongoing support and s. 148(3) 50 Should the Minutes be replaced by an order for retroactive support?. 52 Conclusion on child support and replacing the Minutes. 59 Summary and Orders. 60 Introduction [1] The parties brought competing family law applications before me in the context of a family law matter in which there is both a final order respecting certain issues and an agreement respecting others. [2] The claimant father, B.H.W. (the "Father"), wants to relocate the parties' two children, currently aged 13 and 11, to Salt Spring Island where he has lived with his new family since summer 2023. He also seeks to vary the existing final order for parenting time accordingly. The Father points to the younger child's clearly expressed desire to move and says the children will have better support and care with him and his new family, including with respect to their academics and health. [3] The respondent mother, T.B.H. (the "Mother"), with whom the children have lived during the week since September 2023, opposes the relocation and variation of parenting time, but acknowledges the final order has not reflected the parties' arrangements for some time. On relocation, the Mother says the children are well-established in Victoria and the current status quo should continue. The Mother says the older child, A.H., is excited to start high school in Victoria in September 2024 with her existing close-knit friend group. The Mother acknowledges the younger child, C.H., has expressed a clear desire to go to school on Salt Spring Island, but maintains C.H. does not truly appreciate what that would involve and, in any event, her particular needs are better served in a larger centre. [4] In her application, the Mother asks the Court to replace a previous agreement respecting child support with an order that both accounts for the children's living situation since September 2023 and makes retroactive adjustments. The Father opposes those orders, arguing the application is premature as parenting time may be varied again, the parties agreed not to pay child support after July 2019 and the retroactive adjustments would create hardship for the children and his new family. [5] I heard the two applications together over the course of four days in late April and early May 2024. Neither application was brought as a summary trial application, however, as part of his application, the Father sought cross-examination on affidavits to the extent it would be useful for the Court. Given certain conflicts in the affidavit evidence, and the Mother's consent because it would assist the Court, I exercised my discretion to allow cross-examination under R. 10-3(4)(a) of the Supreme Court Family Rules, B.C. Reg. 169/2009. I therefore heard viva voce evidence on cross-examination from the Father and Mother on matters relating to both relocation and child support. [6] The parties placed considerable affidavit evidence before the Court. It included materials filed for an application heard in July 2023 at which Justice G.C. Weatherill prohibited the Father from relocating the children to Salt Spring Island in the absence of an agreement or further order of the Court. I also had the benefit of a "Views of the Child" report, dated February 16, 2024 (the "Views of the Child Report"), prepared under s. 211 of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA]. The primary focus of the Views of Child Report is the proposed relocation. [7] When I raised the question of whether the matters ought to have been brought as summary trial applications, both counsel conceded that may have been preferable, but urged the Court to proceed citing the importance of obtaining a decision on issues the parties have been wrestling with for more than a year, the relative cost of the alternatives, and the availability of cross-examination to ensure the issues could be fully canvassed. I am satisfied that, between the affidavit evidence filed and the parties' testimony on cross-examination, I am able to find the necessary facts to decide these matters and the urgency and significance of the issues warranted proceeding. [8] This Court has, on numerous occasions, recognized that a relocation decision is "one of the most serious decisions the court is asked to make" including because it can have lifelong impacts on children and their relationships with their parents: for just one example, see Nolie v. Reece, 2016 BCSC 2201 at para. 27. I have kept that recognition, and my duty to consider the individual best interests of A.H. and C.H., forefront in my mind in reaching my decisions. [9] To protect the privacy and well-being of the two children, I have initialized the names of the parties in the style of cause. I have also used initials for the parties and their children, and have anonymized certain personal or identifying details in this judgment. Background facts [10] Partially because of the previous and competing applications, the parties provided a series of responding affidavits. In some cases, those affidavits describe events that are now several years old, and have little current bearing on the issues I must determine. I will address the critical background facts in this section, leaving discussion of other relevant evidence to my analysis of each of the issues below. [11] The parties began living together in about January 2008, and were married August 8, 2009. The parties have two children together. A.H., who was born in July 2010, will shortly turn 14 and start high school in September 2024. C.H., who was born in September 2012, will be 12 this coming fall and is going into Grade 7. [12] The parties separated on July 22, 2016, but continued to reside together until November 2016, when the Mother moved out. At the time, the family was living on Pender Island. [13] On April 6, 2017, following mediation, the parties signed Minutes of Settlement intended to be a full and final settlement of issues between them (the "Minutes"). The Minutes confirm the parties are the children's guardians and share parental responsibilities, with obligations to discuss and try to reach agreement on any significant decisions respecting the children, including their health and education. The Minutes provide that the Father will pay the Mother a set-off amount of $140 per month for child support, based on their incomes at the time. The parties were to exchange income tax information each July, to permit an annual review and adjustment by September. If the review and adjustment is not conducted, the most recent agreement or order is to prevail. The Minutes also address division of property and debt, and reflect that each party gave up all claims to spousal support. [14] At the time the Minutes were signed, the existing parenting schedule had the children with the Father from Monday morning through to Thursday after school and with the Mother from Thursday after school to the start of school on Monday. The Father wanted a week on / week off schedule. As the parties were unable to agree on a parenting schedule, the Minutes simply continued the status quo. Unfortunately, the inability to agree on a parenting schedule is a recurring problem, and this contributed to the Father filing a notice of family claim in June 2017. [15] On January 26, 2018, after a one-day summary trial, Justice Gaul granted the parties a divorce. At the same time, Gaul J. granted additional parenting orders by consent (collectively, the "Final Order"). The Final Order contemplated the Mother might relocate from Pender Island to Sidney, and, in that event, provided a parenting schedule where the children were with the Father on Pender Island from 5:00 p.m. on Sunday through school on Thursday, and with the Mother from after school on Thursday until 5:00 p.m. on Sunday. The order also made provision for professional development days, school breaks, holidays and birthdays, and permitted the parties to adjust the parenting schedule by agreement in writing. If the Mother did not relocate by April 1, 2018, the Final Order provided the parties would shift to a week on / week off schedule. On cross-examination, the Mother admitted that when she consented to that term of the Final Order, she had already secured housing in Sidney, so she knew she would be moving and the week on / week off schedule would not be implemented. [16] The Mother relocated to Sidney on April 1, 2018. The children continued to attend school on Pender Island (which has a 4-day school week) and were in the Father's care during the school week, spending weekends (including Friday) with the Mother. The Father moved to Vancouver Island around December 2018, partly for employment and partly to attempt to facilitate a week on / week off parenting schedule that he hoped would permit some regular weekend time with the children. The children changed to schools in Greater Victoria in January 2019. The Father provided general evidence during the 2018-2019 period of what he considered to be conscious attempts by the Mother to thwart his limited weekend parenting time. The Mother denies this. [17] The Mother moved several more times between 2019 and 2022; the Father also moved from rental accommodation into a purchased townhouse. While each of the moves kept the parties within the area of Greater Victoria and the Gulf Islands, there is no dispute that the parties did not regularly provide each other with formal advanced notice of these moves. [18] In 2019, the parties attended mediation through the Justice Access Centre to try to address various parenting schedule disputes as well as other issues. The Father says the parties reached an agreement in July 2019 to move to a week on / week off schedule, but the Mother refused to put it in writing. The Mother says the parties were still in the stages of testing the week on / week off arrangement. The parties have different perspectives on what transpired and I have some concerns about whether their discussions are subject to settlement privilege. In any event, it is not necessary for me to resolve that particular dispute as it relates to parenting time. Although it was not put in writing, it is common ground that a week on / week off schedule was established around July or August 2019. On cross-examination, the Mother admitted that it took at least three years after separation for the Father to secure regular weekend parenting time with the children. The Mother explained each party proposed many different schedules during that time but they could not agree. [19] Once established, the parties essentially followed a week on / week off schedule until August 2023. There were still some minor hiccups and disagreements in that period, including what the Father characterizes as the Mother "picking and choosing" pieces of previous parenting schedules that benefitted her. The Mother denies this and essentially says she was ensuring she received her full parenting time in accordance with the Final Order. It was during this timeframe as well that there was the only incident of physical family violence in May 2020, which is discussed further below. On the whole, however, the evidence confirms the week on / week off arrangement generally worked for the parties and children. [20] The Father is now re-married. He and his new partner, M, have a child together (born in 2021), who is the children's half-sibling. It is clear from the evidence that the children are bonded to both parents, and also have close ties to M and their half-sibling. The children also have a relationship with M's parents, who reside in the Greater Victoria area and occasionally provide after school-care for the children, including after September 2023, while the Mother is still at work. [21] Since 2019, the Mother has worked for Canada Post as a mail courier. She works five days a week and has access to benefits, including sick days. As she is not usually finished work by the time the children are done school, the Mother has had to make alternate arrangements for after-school care during her parenting time. Over the years, these arrangements included the children: going to their Father's residence after school (before he moved to Salt Spring Island) until the Mother finished work; being cared for by one of the Mother's friends; going to M's parents; and occasionally walking to the library by themselves. Several arrangements (including one potential option involving the public bus) have created additional tensions between the parties as the Father had concerns about the children's safety. [22] The Father has held several different jobs since separation, most recently in the area of facilities operations and maintenance. When the Father first moved from Pender Island around December 2018, he was working for the Greater Victoria School District. Unfortunately, despite the Father having been promoted in 2020, his position was dissolved in mid-2021, shortly before he and M were expecting their child. In November 2021, he took a position with the Cowichan School District that required him to commute over the Malahat every day and be on call 24/7. The Father's evidence, which I accept, is that the commute and position caused him considerable stress and he continued to look for alternate options - either for closer employment or to improve the commute. [23] The Father is the primary income-earner for his new family. He says housing and strata costs in the Greater Victoria area created financial difficulties. Given financial and employment stresses, as well as existing and previous connections to the Gulf Islands, the Father says that in May 2023, he and M began considering a possible move to the Gulf Islands. At the time, the Father was still employed with the Cowichan School District, but was on doctor-ordered stress leave due to the commute. The Father says the ferry options from the Gulf Islands would have improved his commute. The Father and M identified an opportunity to purchase a home on Salt Spring Island in late May 2023, and moved quickly to close the deal. [24] The Father admits he told the children about the impending move and took them to see the potential new home before he contacted the Mother. When he did contact the Mother five days later on June 2, 2023, his email presented his move as a fait accompli, and outlined possible adjustments to the parenting arrangements that had already been discussed with the children. All of them involved the children moving to Salt Spring Island for school. When the Father sent the June 2, 2023 email, the original closing date was August 25, 2023 - more than 60 days away. However, the closing date was subsequently moved up to July 25, 2023, which was less than 60-days from the date the Mother was notified. [25] The Mother sent the Father an objection to relocation by registered mail using the form set out under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3 (as it was not clear under which statute Gaul J. had made the corollary orders). The Father says he was shocked to receive the objection on June 15, 2023, since he understood, based on the Mother's previous resistance to moving to a week on / week off schedule, that she preferred to have the children on weekends, rather than during the school week. By the time he received the objection, the conditions had been removed for both the purchase of the Salt Spring Island home and the sale of the Father and M's townhouse. [26] The Father says he was not aware of the formal notice requirement under s. 66 of the FLA, and did not think to check, in part because the parties had never previously provided any formal notice to each other of their various moves and it had not been an issue. The Father also candidly admits he had a lapse in judgment when he read part of the Mother's objection notice to the children. He regrets having involved the children directly in the parties' dispute. He deposed it was the only time he had done so but admitted on cross-examination he also sent his June 2, 2023 email to the children. He explained this was so the children would know the Mother had been advised of his intended relocation and could then discuss it with her. [27] On June 29, 2023, after becoming concerned that an attempt had been made to de-register the children from their Victoria schools, the Mother filed an application to prohibit the Father from relocating the children to Salt Spring Island. The Father's responsive materials sought permission to move with the children. The application came on for hearing before Weatherill J. on July 20, 2023. Both parties provided affidavits speaking to, among other things, the children's views and best interests. The Mother was represented by counsel; the Father was self-represented. There are no reasons from that hearing, only the order mentioned above that precludes the Father from relocating the children to Salt Spring Island without an agreement or further court order. During the course of the hearing before me, both parties confirmed that Weatherill J. had significant concerns with the Father's failure to provide the requisite notice, and made it clear to the parties that while the children's views are one factor to be considered, they are not determinative. [28] As a result of Weatherill J.'s order, and the fact that the Father had already committed to moving to Salt Spring Island, the parties had to adjust the parenting arrangements. As before, the adjustments were not reduced to writing, but it is not disputed that the parties parented in a two-week rotating schedule over summer 2023 and the children spent some of that time on Salt Spring Island with the Father. In late July 2023, the Father obtained new employment with the Salt Spring Island School District. [29] As of September 2023, the parties have followed a temporary schedule under which the children attend school in Victoria and are with the Mother from Sunday evening until Friday after school and on every fourth weekend. The children are with the Father on Salt Spring Island from Friday after school until Sunday evening, or until Monday evening if it is a long weekend, except for the Mother's one weekend. Given the logistics of travel between Vancouver Island and Salt Spring Island, the Father's application raises questions not just of parenting time but of where the children will attend school in fall 2024. [30] With respect to child support, as noted, pursuant to the Minutes, the Father was to pay the Mother a set-off amount of $140 per month in child support beginning September 1, 2017. The parties did not exchange financial information annually as required; financial information was not exchanged until these proceedings began. The parties agree the amount was not adjusted and the Father paid support up until July 2019. There is a dispute about why he stopped paying. [31] The Father says the parties reached an agreement at the mediation in July 2019 for him to stop paying child support as the parties' incomes were virtually the same. He says, as with the parenting schedule, the Mother refused to put the agreement in writing. The Mother disputes there was any such agreement, maintains she requested financial information at mediation and says the Father's decision to cease paying was made unilaterally. In any event, the Mother says the Father's income increased beyond hers so he should have been paying regardless. Further, the Mother says support should be adjusted from September 2023 forward based on the children residing with her for more than 60% of the time since that point. This is the background to the Mother's application. Issues [32] There are two main issues for the court to determine: a) Should the Father be permitted to relocate the children to Salt Spring Island? b) What, if any, child support is payable from July 2019 to August 2023, and from August 2023 forward? [33] There are sub-issues under each of the above two categories that I will address in my analysis below. There is also a preliminary question about whether these applications are governed by the FLA or the Divorce Act. Both parties also sought costs of their respective applications. Analysis Preliminary Issue: Which statutory regime governs the applications? [34] The first question that must be determined is which statute to apply. The notice of family claim sought parenting orders under both the Divorce Act and the FLA. The response to family claim did not specify. Neither the notice of family claim nor the response sought orders respecting child support. [35] As might be expected, the Final Order expressly references the Divorce Act in granting the order for divorce. However, the corollary parenting orders state only that they were made by consent. They are silent on the statutory authority being invoked. That said, the language used in those orders is that of a "parenting schedule" and "parenting time" - which was exclusively the terminology of the FLA. Although it has since been amended, at the time of the Final Order in January 2018, the Divorce Act still used the terms "custody" and "access". [36] Where it is unclear which statute applies, a number of decisions have held that, with relocation applications in particular, it is preferable to apply the Divorce Act based on the doctrine of paramountcy: see, for example, S.Z. v. D.Z., 2015 BCSC 2157 at paras. 71-77 (and cases cited therein). Other decisions have held that despite some operational differences in the way the two statutes frame the test on relocation, since the ultimate question is still whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child, the Divorce Act does not preclude the application of the FLA: S.A.H. v. J.J.G.V., 2021 BCSC 2132 at para. 28, citing B.D.M. v. A.E.M., 2014 BCSC 453 at paras. 113-118. [37] In Khangura v. Rogalski, 2017 BCSC 1753, Justice Fleming (as she then was) applied the FLA despite the application having been brought under the Divorce Act. On considering the "objective indicia found in the pleadings, the wording of the order, and the circumstances in which it was made", Fleming J. concluded that the order in her case was properly "founded" in the FLA (at paras. 26-28). Justice Milman similarly found the objective indicia in J.M.W. v. B.R.P.W., 2019 BCSC 1395, provided a basis on which to apply the FLA (at paras. 61-69). [38] This issue was the subject of both exchanges with the Court and submissions from counsel during the hearing. Both counsel emphasized that the ultimate consideration is whether relocation is in the best interests of the child, which is a feature of both statutes. Counsel for the Father argued the Divorce Act should govern, while counsel for the Mother submitted the objective indicia support applying the FLA. Of note, both counsel focused on the statutory test under the FLA in their submissions on the merits of relocation. [39] I agree with counsel for the Mother that the objective indicia in this case provide a basis on which to apply the FLA. The notice of family claim sought parenting orders under both statutes, but the language of the Final Order used terminology that, at the time, was only used under the FLA. There are no references in the Final Order to "custody" or "access". Accordingly, I will apply the FLA to the relocation application. [40] Child support has only ever been addressed under the Minutes. The child support provisions do not reference any statutory authority. There are two references to "Divorce mate calculation[s]", suggesting the parties intended their obligations to be governed by the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [Guidelines]. In the circumstances, and given the submissions made, I will also apply the FLA framework for child support. Issue 1: Relocation [41] The Father's notice of application was, on its face, framed as a variation application under s. 47 of the FLA. As a result, the parties' submissions focused to some extent on whether there had been a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a variation of the Final Order. However, the background to this matter, the materials filed in support, and the hearing itself made it clear that the true core of what the Father seeks is relocation of the children. Relocation is defined in s. 65(1) of the FLA as "a change in the location of the residence of a child that can reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the child's relationship with" a guardian or other persons who have a significant role in the child's life. If the children were to attend school on Salt Spring Island, the parenting schedule would effectively reverse from what it has been since September 2023. After four years of week on / week off parenting, and then the Mother having primary care since September 2023, it is reasonable to expect the proposed move could have a significant impact on the children's relationship with the Mother. [42] If the Father is successful in what he seeks, a variation of the Final Order will be a necessary corollary and is expressly permitted by s. 70(1) of the FLA. Accordingly, I will focus on the legal test for relocation. In a practical sense, there can be little doubt that, as a result of the parties' various moves and the agreed change to a week on / week off schedule for almost four years, there has been at least one "material change" - if not more - since the Final Order, with the most recent being the Father's summer 2023 move to Salt Spring Island. [43] Where there is a parenting order or agreement in place, relocation applications are addressed under division 6 of the FLA, and in particular, s. 69. While the ultimate considerations are the same, the FLA imposes different obligations on the relocating parent based on whether the parties have substantially equal parenting time. Accordingly, the first question is whether the parties have substantially equal parenting time. [44] As counsel for the Mother acknowledged during the hearing, determining whether parties have "substantially equally parenting time" is not an exact science. It is clear that it does not require precisely equal time. In C.M.B. v. B.D.G., 2014 BCSC 780, Fleming J. (as she then was) noted multiple different approaches to the question, ranging from a straight hours-based calculation at the time of the hearing, to a more holistic approach, to analogies to the notion of shared parenting for purposes of child support (at paras. 142-146). In both H.D.M v. S.W.T., 2013 BCSC 1863 (at paras. 37-45) and M.A. v. E.O., 2018 BCSC 1269 (at paras. 106-108), the Court used a two-step analysis. [45] The first factor to consider is whether any order or agreement between the parties with respect to guardianship and parenting speaks to shared parenting responsibilities and / or time. The second aspect is a factual consideration of how the parties have actually exercised parenting time. The second consideration is not simply in the timeframe leading to the applications, but encompasses a longer-term view. In short, the jurisprudence supports a more holistic, contextual evaluation, rather than treating the question as an accounting exercise: see K.W. v. L.H., 2017 BCSC 1441 at paras. 14-16 (rev'd on other grounds 2018 BCCA 204, leave to appeal to SCC ref'd, 38253 (22 November 2018)). [46] Applying the two-step approach to the present case, the Minutes confirm the parties are to share guardianship and parental responsibilities, and the parenting schedule in place at the time contemplated substantial involvement by both parties in the lives and upbringing of the children. The Final Order contained a provision for the parties to move to week on / week off parenting if they both remained on Pender Island, and structured the alternative arrangement in an attempt to maximize time with both parties while allowing for the logistical challenges. The Minutes and the Final Order support a finding the parties shared substantially equal parenting time. [47] Turning to the factual aspect, I am conscious that for the period before the parties moved to week on / week off in July 2019, the parties agree there was a 60/40 split of parenting time, but disagree about in whose favour the split fell. The disagreement appears to stem from whether the division of time is calculated based on nights or days with the children. In my view this case warrants a holistic and longer-term view of the parenting arrangements. While there have been variations both ways over time, for the four years between July 2019 and August 2023 (which is the bulk of time since separation), parenting was split 50-50 under a week on / week off schedule. Before and after that period, there is no question both parties were significantly involved in the children's lives and played substantial roles. Neither party suggested otherwise. Accordingly, for purposes of the relocation analysis, I find the parents have substantially equal parenting time. [48] As a result, the analysis proceeds under s. 69(5) of the FLA, and the Father bears the burden to satisfy the Court that: a) the proposed relocation is made in good faith; b) the Father has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the relationship between the children and the Mother, other persons who are entitled to contact with the children, and other persons who have a significant role in the children's life, and c) the proposed relocation is in the best interests of the children. [49] To determine whether a proposed relocation is in good faith, s. 69(6) of the FLA requires the Court to consider "all relevant factors", including: a) the reasons for the proposed relocation; b) whether the proposed relocation is likely to enhance the general quality of life of the child and, if applicable, of the relocating guardian, including increasing emotional well-being or financial or educational opportunities; c) whether notice was given under s. 66; and d) any restrictions on relocation contained in a written agreement or an order. [50] In the present case, the Father has already relocated and is now applying to have the children move to join him. Does this change the analysis? In Scruton v. Wilson, 2020 BCSC 1850, Justice Saunders held that a parent's "fait accompli limits the Court's options, but does not change the analytical framework, which remains centred on the children's best interests" (at para. 8). In terms of timeframe for the analysis, it is clear that the best interests of the children and whether reasonable and workable arrangements have been proposed must be assessed at the time of the application. The good faith analysis, however, may require consideration both at the time the parent relocated and at the time of the application: see for example, L.J.R. v. S.W.R., 2013 BCSC 1344 and J.K.C. v. B.F.G.P., 2016 BCSC 2392. Is the proposed relocation made in good faith? [51] The four statutory factors listed in s. 69(6) of the FLA are not exhaustive. They are said to "establish a tone" for the concept of good faith as used in relocation proceedings that is consistent with common understanding. In many cases, good faith amounts to an absence of bad faith. It also bears mentioning that even where good faith (and reasonable and workable arrangements) is not made out, relocation will still be granted if it is in the best interests of the child: L.V.R.L. v. M.A.E.S., 2022 BCSC 2437 at paras. 31-32. 1. Reasons for relocation and quality of life [52] Turning to the first two of four factors, the Father provided evidence about his reasons for relocating in summer 2023 and about the enhancements to his own quality of life as well as those he anticipated for the children. While some of this evidence was before Weatherill J. in July 2023, the Father provided more detail before me. In particular, the Father explained that before the move, he and his new family were struggling financially in Victoria, including due to significant increases in mortgage rates and strata fees affecting their townhouse. The real estate market on Salt Spring Island offered better opportunities for housing. [53] The Father also explained that he had been placed on stress leave from his job due to the commute over the Malahat. Rather than continue that drive every day, moving to Salt Spring Island would permit him to take a ferry for part of the commute, meaning he would not be driving for the whole way and more specifically, he could avoid the Malahat. The Father also continued to look for different employment closer to home and was hopeful he could secure a new position as a result of additional qualifications he had obtained since separation. The Father's hopes materialized in late July 2023 when he was able to obtain a new job with the Salt Spring Island School District. [54] The Father also provided evidence of his and the children's continuing connection to the Gulf Islands. His brother has a place on Pender Island and he and his new family continued to spend time there. He gave evidence of C.H. in particular asking about returning to an island. [55] In his affidavit provided in July 2023, the Father deposed he wanted to relocate to enhance the quality of life for all of his children, his wife and himself by "increasing emotional well-being through a more nature based rural lifestyle, reducing financial strain with lower housing costs and to offer more diverse educational and extracurricular opportunities with the ability to access amenities in both Salt Spring and Greater Victoria". Before me, the Father added the relocation would enhance the children's lives by allowing them increased ability to connect with M and their half-sibling, who the children consider to be important people. It would allow them to return to their Gulf Island roots, offer more outdoor activities and the shorter, four-day school week would permit Fridays to be "catch-up days", better supporting their academics and emotional well-being. [56] While the Mother disputes whether there are actually more outdoor activities and more diverse educational and extra-curricular opportunities on Salt Spring Island, she did not seriously contest the other rationales offered. She also admitted she was not aware the Father had been on stress leave in summer 2023. [57] Having considered the evidence on this point, I am satisfied the Father's reasons for moving to Salt Spring Island were bona fide and included what he anticipated would be improvements to both his emotional and financial well-being, as well as the emotional well-being of his children. The jurisprudence recognizes the link between increased emotional well-being (of both child and parent) and improved quality of life: L.V.R.L. at para. 42, citing Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22 at paras. 169-173. 2. Notice and existence of constraints on relocation [58] The third and fourth factors address compliance with the FLA and existing constraints and I will deal with them together. The Mother placed a great deal of emphasis on the Father's failure to provide 60-days notice as required under s. 66 of the FLA. As noted, both parties submitted this failure was a significant factor in Weatherill J.'s July 20, 2023 order prohibiting the Father from relocating the children at that time. Before me, the Father submitted when he originally gave notice to the Mother on June 2, 2023, he was unaware of the notice requirement under the FLA but was trying to "do the right thing". He notes the moving date at that time was August 25, 2023, which was closer to 90-days' notice. He admits when the closing date was moved ahead to July, that shortened the notice to less than 60-days, but points out the Mother was still given more than 50-days' notice. In other words, this was not a case where there was either no notice, or a mere week or two of notice. [59] The parties' focus on whether notice was given in July 2023 has little bearing on my consideration of the present application. It was entirely appropriate for the Court to be concerned about notice in summer 2023 when the Father's proposal was to relocate the children for school in fall 2024. Those concerns clearly informed the Court's order prohibiting relocation of the children at that time. But the order also specifically contemplated that another application, like the present one, would be brought. The record before the Court on this application confirms the Father continues to believe relocation is in the best interests of the children. After the July 20, 2023 order, he took steps to support a further application, such as retaining counsel and pushing for the Views of the Child Report to be completed. The record shows there were exchanges between counsel about a possible further relocation application being required at least as far back as October 2023. The Father formally filed his application in early April 2024. The notice of application proposed to codify the existing parenting arrangements, with the earliest change to wait until the end of the 2023-24 school year - providing much more than 60-days notice when filed and served. There can be no realistic suggestion the Mother had insufficient notice of the Father's proposal or intentions leading up to this application. [60] I recognize the Mother pointed to other evidence in support of her argument of bad faith or non-compliance by the Father that should impact the relocation application. For example, the Mother referenced the Father's attempt in June 2023 to register the children for school on Salt Spring Island. The Father explained he did not appreciate that registering the children in school on Salt Spring Island would result in them being de-registered in Victoria. When he was informed that would be the effect, he retracted the registrations. When pressed in cross-examination, the Mother admitted the Father acted reasonably by fixing that issue once it came to light. Again, these are factors relevant to the Court's order precluding relocation in July 2023. There is no evidence that similar attempts have been made in 2024. Rather, the evidence is to the contrary - the Father brought the present application in an attempt to obtain the Court's permission under a further order. The July 20, 2023 order did not preclude him from bringing a further court application. [61] In light of the above, I find the present application was brought with sufficient notice and was not offside the July 20, 2023 order. I do not consider any non-compliance from last summer to be determinative or even relevant at this time. It follows I am satisfied the Father's proposed relocation is made in good faith. Has the Father proposed reasonable and workable arrangements? [62] As it crystallized during the hearing, the Father proposes to relocate the children to Salt Spring Island to live with him and his new family for the school week, returning to live with the Mother on all but one weekend of the month. As mentioned, the school week on Salt Spring Island is usually four days, Monday to Thursday. Occasionally, there are classes on Fridays. The Father says this schedule would permit the children to maximize time with both parents as they could usually return to the Mother on Thursday after school for a three-day weekend, coming back to Salt Spring Island on Sunday evening. [63] Recognizing the Mother works Monday to Friday, the Father proposes alternatively that the children could simply remain with him until the Mother finishes work on Friday. The Father also proposes the parties share holidays and school breaks equally, including a week on / week off alternating schedule over the summer, and be at liberty to adjust the arrangements by agreement in writing. [64] One parent being in Victoria while the other is on Salt Spring Island does pose some logistical challenges in terms of parenting arrangements, largely because there is ferry travel involved. This means it is not practically feasible to have a week on / week off arrangement or to have mid-week transitions when the children are in school. They will generally need to attend school where they primarily reside. However, the parties' experience since September 2023--where the children are with the Mother in Victoria during the week and with the Father on Salt Spring Island most weekends--demonstrates the logistics are not insurmountable. Both parties referenced the anecdotal experience of other "split families" whose children travel back and forth between Vancouver Island and the Gulf Islands by ferries for parenting transitions. The Mother also provided evidence on cross-examination that there are more ferry options and it is a shorter ferry trip to Salt Spring Island than when the parties lived on Pender Island. The jurisprudence is replete with examples where the parenting arrangements required much greater travel distances and times than travel between Victoria and Salt Spring Island. [65] Given the realities of the Mother's work schedule, were the relocation to be permitted as proposed, on most weeks the children would likely transition on Friday, rather than Thursday. While there might be occasional exceptions, the Mother reasonably says she cannot take every Friday off work if the children attend school 4 days per week on Salt Spring Island. The practical result is that if the children were both to relocate, the parenting schedule would be the reverse of what it is now. That would represent a significant reduction in the Mother's contact with the children since September 2023, and would even be a reduction from her contact with them when the parties had a week on / week off schedule. [66] The Father and his new family (with whom the children have important relationships) experienced a similar reduction in contact with the children when he moved to Salt Spring Island in summer 2023. While that reduction was the result of the Father's own choices, the evidence before me does not suggest the Father's relationship with the children has been jeopardized as a result. The children have, at various times, lived primarily with one parent during the school week and primarily with another on weekends. The parties agree, and the Views of the Child Report confirms, that despite this, the children are bonded to and have strong relationships with both parents. Further, the Views of the Child Report concludes that any expression of desire to spend time with one parent is not motivated by a desire to avoid spending time with the other. [67] As with many relocation scenarios, the reality is that the Father's proposal, if accepted, would reduce the Mother's parenting time, and increase the Father's parenting time. The children would continue to spend time with both parents, just in different quantities. The children would have more time with M and their half-sibling, both of whom the children identified as important people in their lives. While there was no specific evidence about the extent to which M's parents visit Salt Spring Island, there is no reason to believe that the children's relationship with M's parents would be negatively affected. [68] The FLA does not require the maintenance of the status quo parenting arrangement or of an arrangement that one party considers preferable or ideal. Rather, the test is whether the parent who seeks to relocate the children has proposed "reasonable and workable arrangements" that preserve relationships: Kowalchuk v. Dass, 2016 BCSC 1857 at para. 68; F.K.L. v. D.M.A.T., 2022 BCSC 2368 at para. 60. Given that focus, I am satisfied that the Father has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements. Is the proposed relocation in the best interests of the children? [69] The best interests of the child remains the overriding consideration in a relocation application: Baldus v. Lillow, 2020 BCSC 22 at para. 36. To determine what is in a child's best interests, s. 37(2) of the FLA requires the Court to consider all of the child's needs and circumstances, including: (a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (d) the history of the child's care; (e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise the person's responsibilities; (g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member; (h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in the person's ability to care for the child and meet the child's needs; (i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; (j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being. An order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child's physical, psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being (s. 37(3) of the FLA). Pursuant to s. 37(4), I must only take a person's conduct into account if it substantially affects the factors set out in s. 37(2) and only to the extent it affects that factor. [70] The factors for determining the best interests of the child under the Divorce Act are similar to those under the FLA, and courts often continue to reference the principles in Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, 1996 CanLII 191, including the desirability of maximizing contact between a child and both parents. I have considered this in my analysis below. [71] As there are no relevant civil or criminal proceedings in this case, it is not necessary to deal with s. 37(2)(j). However, before turning to the other factors, it is important to first address the nature of the best interests analysis. [72] The parties have generally approached these applications with a view to what is in the best interests of the children collectively. Although there was some recognition of the individual needs of A.H. and C.H., to a large extent, and perhaps because of the children's history, the parties proceeded on the assumption that the children's best interests are necessarily aligned. [73] While the Court may ultimately determine that the best interests of multiple children are aligned, the analysis must be an individual one, focused on the specific best interests of each child and open to idea that the evidence may reveal their best interests diverge from those of their siblings. In Forrest v. Forrest, 2019 BCSC 1323, rev'd on other grounds Forrest v. Aerin, 2022 BCCA 184, Justice Macintosh found an arbitrator erred when determining the best interests of twin siblings because she did not distinguish between their best interests and those of their older brother. While Macintosh J. concluded the best interests of the twins themselves could be considered together, that was only because all of the evidence and the parties' positions demonstrated their best interests were "in fact one and the same" (at para. 14). The Court held: [12] It was seen above in s. 37(3) of the FLA that an order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child's psychological and emotional well-being. "[C]hild" is in the singular throughout s. 37. Treating each child individually is essential in determining that child's best interests. If there are, for example, four children from a marriage, the legislature does not intend the adjudicator to somehow amalgamate their four respective interests into one. Not surprisingly, the best interests of an eight-year old boy may differ from those of a 14-year-old girl of the same parents. The best interests assessment therefore must examine each child's interests standing alone. [Emphasis added] [74] At paragraph 13, Forrest confirmed there is no legal presumption that keeping siblings together is in the best interests of a child, citing the Court of Appeal's decision in Poole v. Poole, 1999 BCCA 203. In Poole, the Court of Appeal endorsed the view that the breadth of the best interests test does not support treating certain factors--including sibling unity and preservation of the status quo --as presumptions or determinative. The Court of Appeal held that "keeping siblings together is but one of several relevant considerations" (at para. 22). [75] I have analyzed the best interests of A.H. and C.H. below in light of this guidance, treating them together or individually as the evidence required. 1. Health, emotional well-being, need for stability and nature and strength of relationships [76] Sections 37(2)(a), (c) and (e) of the FLA address a child's health, emotional well-being, nature and strength of their relationships, and need for stability (given their age and stage of development), respectively. As many of these factors are interrelated, I will consider them together. [77] The evidence demonstrates both children have strong relationships with each parent and with each other, although like most siblings, they occasionally fight or annoy each other. The children are also bonded to M and their half-sibling, and have a good relationship with M's parents. During the interviews for the Views of the Child Report, C.H. also mentioned her maternal and paternal grandparents, who live in Vancouver and Ontario respectively, as important to her. [78] On cross-examination, the Mother said if the children were on Salt Spring Island and her parenting time was reduced to three weekends a month with no instructional time, that would "seriously diminish [her] role". I do not doubt the sincerity of the Mother's views in this regard, but the focus of the best interests analysis is not on the impact on the parent. The best interests of a child in respect of a relocation are not necessarily aligned with those of a parent: D.D.R. v. K.T.R., 2019 BCSC 1805 at para. 139, citing Stav v. Stav, 2012 BCCA 154 at para. 90, leave to appeal to SCC ref'd, 34833 (6 September 2012). [79] Given the strength of the children's relationships, the children's ages, and the evidence that both parents recognize the importance of nurturing and maintaining the children's positive relationships with the important people in their lives, while the children's relationships may and likely will change over time, I do not anticipate they will diminish regardless of what order I make. [80] With respect to stability and emotional well-being, the parties have now been separated for the majority of the children's lives and transitions between households are the norm. The Father believes it is in the children's best interests that they remain together, on the same parenting schedule. He does not deny that a change to Salt Spring Island for school during the week would disrupt the children's established lives in Victoria, but says that would be more than balanced out by the stability and care he and M can provide. The Father submits the smaller class sizes and shorter school weeks on Salt Spring Island will provide a regular "catch-up" day for the children and greater opportunities for extra-curricular activities. [81] The evidence indicates that, having overcome some earlier struggles, A.H. is now a good student who takes pride in her school work, but does not necessarily like school. The Mother expressed concern that A.H. requires more time to complete school work, but there was no evidence from A.H.'s school or other professionals that this is an area of concern. The Father's evidence in summer 2023 was that A.H. expressed it was easier to prioritize her school work with him. But A.H. herself told the author of the Views of the Child Report in January 2024 that it is easy to do her homework at either home and both parents will help if asked. [82] Both parents indicated A.H. is artistic, caring, avoids conflicts and puts others' needs first. The Mother expressed concern that because A.H. is so easy-going, if she were to be relocated to Salt Spring Island, her needs would not be factored in. The Views of the Child Report confirms the consistent evidence about the importance of friends to A.H. and notes that as of January 2024, she did not yet have friends on Salt Spring Island. The Mother emphasized the close-knit nature of A.H.'s friend group who will attend the high school A.H. would attend if she remained in Victoria. She says those relationships are even more critical given A.H.'s transition to high school in fall 2024. A.H. likes music and wanted to stay at her middle school through the end of the 2023-24 school year so she could attend a band trip, which she did. She enjoys crafting, reading and playing video games. [83] Both parents agree that C.H. has and continues to struggle with school. She required therapy to assist with a speech impediment that has now been addressed. She struggled with reading initially. The Father says C.H.'s teachers noted her reading improved after M began assisting her. At the time of the hearing, and on the advice of professionals following some health challenges discussed below, a psychoeducational assessment had been scheduled for C.H. for early June. The Father says the elementary school on Salt Spring Island is smaller and will be better able to focus on C.H.'s needs, while the Mother maintains C.H.'s current school knows her and is much better equipped to provide support. There is no independent evidence before the Court from which to determine objectively if one school or the other would be better able to provide educational assistance. There is also no evidence to demonstrate that Salt Spring Island School District lacks the resources to support any students who have additional needs. [84] C.H. is very active and especially enjoys soccer. She was previously involved in cross-country running but quit that activity in the 2023-24 school year. The Father asserts C.H. quit because the Mother was unable to take her to races and she did not want to practice if she could not race. The Mother responds C.H. chose not to participate because the practices had become boring. On cross-examination, the Mother maintained she was able to take C.H. to races but allowed that C.H. might be providing a different explanation to each parent. C.H. also enjoys acting, baking and animals. The evidence suggests C.H. has a strong personality. [85] The Mother says the children are settled in Victoria, where they have friends and better opportunities for academics, health care and extra-curriculars as they get older and consider jobs and post-secondary options. She argues preservation of the status quo provides the best consistency and stability. I am mindful that s. 40(4) of the FLA says there is no presumption that a particular parenting arrangement is in the best interests of a child: see, for example, Sayer v. Karkabe, 2019 BCSC 569 at para. 51. [86] In my view, a move to Salt Spring Island during the week would disrupt certain long-standing patterns and networks for both A.H. and C.H. However, that is a reality in any relocation case. The question is whether the disruption will have a negative impact on the children's stability and emotional well-being. For A.H., the loss of her immediate school friends is likely to have a greater impact on her emotional well-being given her age and the impending transition to high school. While this might be a short-term impact, I am conscious this is already a period of significant change for A.H., making stability and consistency weightier factors. The evidence does not support the same concerns for C.H. at this point in time. [87] Lastly, with respect to health, while the Father raised a number of concerns about whether the Mother has sufficient ability to take sick time off with the children and has appropriately supported the children's attendance at counselling, both of which the Mother disputed, there are no significant health concerns with A.H. [88] On the other hand, C.H. was diagnosed with epilepsy in the past school year and was hospitalized for several weeks. The Father also has epilepsy and says he is better-equipped to respond and help C.H. manage her condition. He stressed that when C.H. had her first seizure while in his care, he recognized it and obtained medical care quickly. He admits she was transported from Salt Spring Island to Victoria but says that was to access larger diagnostic instruments, the implication being such a transfer would not be necessary in future. [89] The Father contrasts this with what happened when C.H. had her second seizure while with the Mother. The Father says the Mother did not respond appropriately, waiting more than an hour, possibly two, before taking C.H. to the hospital. The Mother does not deny she took A.H. to school while C.H. was seizing before going to the hospital, and says she would handle the situation differently the next time by administering certain medication sooner. However, the Mother says both parents discussed what happened with C.H.'s neurologist and in response to the Father's direct question, the doctor confirmed the Mother had not done anything wrong. The Father says the doctor was being compassionate in the moment. [90] Regardless, the Mother says she now has a much better understanding of the medication and steps required to deal with C.H.'s epilepsy, and she appreciates the seriousness. She says C.H.'s health care team, including her neurologist, are in Victoria and there is better medical support than on Salt Spring Island. The Father says Salt Spring Island is not a remote community that lacks adequate support, and in any event, is close enough to Victoria to accommodate appointments or if there is a significant problem. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest Salt Spring Island's medical resources are unable to serve people with epilepsy. [91] While health is a neutral factor for A.H., the situation is different for C.H. I am satisfied both parents will take steps to ensure C.H. is safe in the event of a seizure. The parties agree they communicate better about the children's health than they do about anything else, but their perspectives are very different. The Mother characterizes C.H. as having complex medical needs, primarily as a result of her epilepsy. The Father disagrees. He accepts it is a new diagnosis, but as a person with epilepsy himself, views it as a condition to be managed. Having heard and considered all of the evidence on this point, in my view, the Father's experience with epilepsy, his ability to recognize and deal with seizures quickly and calmly, and his approach to dealing with epilepsy support a finding that he is in a better position at present to assist C.H. with this new element of her life. 2. History of care and parents' ability to exercise their responsibilities and to cooperate [92] In this case, the evidence regarding the children's history of care (s. 37(2)(d)), the ability of each parent to exercise their responsibilities (s. 37(2)(f)) and the appropriateness of an arrangement that requires cooperation (s. 37(2)(i)) is interrelated. I will address these factors together. [93] The parties disagree about many of the details of their parenting of the children. The Father says he has always done the "heavy-lifting" for the children, including with respect to their personal care, academics, health appointments and extra-curricular activities. The Father admits the Mother has done more for the children in the past year, since September 2023, but suggests the change is more attributable to the background of the present litigation rather than any change in behaviour. The Mother disputes these assertions, says she has always been an active and involved parent, and points to specific steps she has taken to support the children at home and school, with extra-curriculars, and for health care. [94] It is apparent the parties have very different styles of parenting. I am not in a position to say one is better or worse than the other. The Views of the Child Report did not identify any concerns that the children are not, at the present time and on the whole, being appropriately cared for by either parent, nor did the children voice specific concerns about the time they spend with either parent, or identify behaviours they wish either parent to change. The children are of an age where, if there were significant concerns, it would be reasonable to expect them to have been reflected in the Views of the Child Report. [95] The Father placed a great deal of emphasis on concerns about the children not being appropriately cared for by the Mother in their earlier years, specifically referencing concerns about restrictive and ever-changing food diets for the children, dirty or ill-fitting clothes and a period of several years when C.H.'s hair was visibly unkempt when she returned from time with the Mother. The Mother denies the children were ever on diets and maintains that C.H.'s hair was as a result of a "hippy" phase. [96] Were I deciding this matter several years earlier, some of these concerns may have been relevant, but the children are now almost 14 and almost 12. Both parties admit the children have acquired the necessary skills and are largely responsible for their own personal care. I have no evidence of ongoing personal care needs or issues that suggest either child's best interests would be better served by a particular parent. [97] Both parties relied heavily on evidence of past disagreements about parenting time, joint decision-making and isolated minor incidents to dispute the other's ability to appropriately care and be responsible for, or cooperate in making decisions about, the children. There are too many examples of tense email communications and disputed versions of events or reactions on both sides to reference. Many of these incidents are quite dated and reflect more on the parties' inability to communicate effectively and respectfully with each other than on any objective ability to care for the children. This is particularly acute in the case of the parties' inability to reach agreement on parenting time schedules, or to engage productively in mediation. I do not accept the Mother's submission that the evidence demonstrates she is better able to cooperate in making decisions. In my view, the evidence is clear that both parties struggle equally with cooperation, and as a result, mediation has generally not been an effective tool. [98] The Father raised significant concerns about each child having missed a school assignment during the 2023-24 school year. He argues this has never previously happened and because the assignments were missed during the Mother's parenting time, it demonstrates the Mother is not paying close enough attention or providing enough support. The Father also asserted C.H. previously experienced homework regressions during the Mother's weeks, but those assertions were not particularized. The Mother does not deny the assignments were missed this past school year, but disputes the Father's characterization of what happened and how much support she provided, particularly to C.H. The evidence does, however, support that C.H. made more consistent progress towards completing the assignment while at the Father's home. That said, I do not consider this evidence to be determinative. There was no pattern of neglect of homework during the 2023-24 school year, and it does not strike me as productive for the Court to hold either parent to unrealistic standards. [99] Viewed cumulatively, the various incidents on each side do not satisfy me that either parent has shirked their parenting responsibilities, or prioritized their own needs above those of their children, in a manner that would make these factors significant. Having heard from both parents on cross-examination, I am satisfied both parents love their children very much and do their best to support and care for them in the ways each individually considers appropriate. They often do not agree or have the same approach. But there is nothing in the evidence that raises objective concerns for me about the history of the children's care in general, either parent's capacity to parent, or that supports one parent as being better able to engage in cooperative decision-making. 3. Family violence [100] Turning to ss. 37(2)(g) and (h), this is not a case that involves significant family violence. The main evidence before the Court relates to a single incident in May 2020. At a high-level, the incident occurred at the Father's home. The children were being cared for by M during the pandemic school closures because the parties were both essential workers. It was a day during the Mother's parenting time (not a changeover day) and the Mother attended to pick up the children around 3:00 p.m. The Father says the Mother arrived much earlier than expected (based on her usual patterns) and had not provided any courtesy notice she was coming. The Mother admitted on cross-examination she was probably not expected at that time. [101] It is common ground the parties argued at the front door and there was some form of physical altercation between them. They characterize it differently. The Mother says the Father pushed her out the door. The Father's position was that the Mother tried to force her way into his home while he had his arm braced against the doorframe, and was yelling at the children to get their things. The children did not see the incident directly. In the Views of the Child Report, A.H. did not recall any violence between her parents. C.H. recalls being scared of the argument and each parent later telling her the other had pushed them. [102] The Father admits partial responsibility and that he did not handle the situation well. On cross-examination, the Mother maintained she was not to blame as it was "her parenting time." When pressed, she reluctantly admitted she could have let the Father or M know and the failure to do so may have played at least some role. While the parties' have differing recollections of the details, their respective narratives are more similar than not. There was clearly a physical incident at the front door as a result of the Mother attempting to enter and the Father resisting. Both parties admit some responsibility and both recognize it was inappropriate to expose the children to this type of incident. It is not necessary to determine who was at fault. [103] The Mother suggested there might also be family violence from unreasonable restrictions on her financial means. She pointed to one dated instance of the Father not releasing certain child tax benefit funds to the Mother for a period of nine months when they first separated back in 2016, but admitted this was addressed in the Minutes and paid. She also suggested there could have been psychological impacts from the Father's cessation of child support, but there is no evidence before the Court to support that assertion. On the record before me, I do not accept there is evidence of family violence from financial restrictions. [104] In summary, this is not a case where there are multiple incidents of family violence or even one major instance. The Mother reasonably conceded that the one physical incident does not appear to have impacted either parents' ability to care for the children. In the circumstances, the family violence factors do not weigh significantly into my consideration of the best interests of the children. 4. Views of each child [105] I turn finally to the views of each child (s. 37(2)(b)), which are a significant factor in this case. The children are of an age where it would be inappropriate not to consider their views, which were presented to the Court in the Views of the Child Report as well as through the evidence of both parties. Under s. 202 of the FLA, the Court has discretion to admit hearsay evidence of a child if satisfied it is reliable. [106] The Father relied heavily on the Views of the Child Report. The facts in a s. 211 report are prima facie evidence of their truth, but a court retains discretion to review background information, carry out an independent assessment based on the evidence at trial and reach different conclusions: S.A.H. v. J.J.G.V., 2021 BCSC 2132 at para. 32. In this case, the Views of the Child Report reflects the children's views when interviewed in later January 2024. By the time of the hearing three months later, there was additional information respecting A.H.'s views, which I will address below. [107] As reflected very clearly in the Views of the Child Report and consistent with the Father's evidence since the application in 2023, C.H. has strongly and repeatedly expressed her wish to relocate to Salt Spring Island to attend school there and live with the Father and his family during the week. The Mother says that is not what C.H. wanted in the very beginning (which I took to be May/June 2023), but she appropriately concedes that C.H. has now consistently stated for some time that she wants to go to school on Salt Spring Island. The author of the Views of the Child Report noted C.H. clearly expressed this desire spontaneously and at multiple points through both interviews, including in response to questions about what, if any, changes C.H. would like to see from the current parenting schedule. The author reports C.H. told her "that [C.H.] feels very strongly that she wants to live with her Dad on Salt Spring Island during the weekdays and with her Mom in Victoria on weekends." When asked what her three wishes would be, C.H.'s first wish was to go to school on Salt Spring Island. [108] The author of the Views of the Child Report reported that, based on her interviews with C.H., it appeared her wish to live with the Father during the week "is more about trying the new school and the atmosphere of Salt Spring Island" than about any desire not to be with the Mother. This is consistent with C.H.'s statements to the author about liking the school because it has a garden and a drama program and liking the "nicer" Salt Spring Island environment. [109] The Mother expressed concern that C.H. did not really understand what the move would mean, pointing to one statement in the Views of the Child Report where C.H. expressed that if she moved, she could be in Victoria on the weekends and play soccer there and do "big city stuff". The Mother says this demonstrates C.H. does not appreciate it would be difficult to play soccer games on weekends if she has not attended practices during the week. However, the author of the Views of the Child Report indicates she talked to C.H. about what her choices would mean for her moving forward and C.H. repeated her desire to go to Salt Spring Island, understood what that would look like and was okay with that choice. The author notes C.H. is not shy about voicing her opinion. [110] There is no evidence before the Court that C.H.'s strongly expressed views have changed since the interviews were conducted. Both parties agree C.H. continues to express a steadfast desire to move to Salt Spring Island. [111] A.H.'s views have not been as consistent. In his affidavit filed for the July 2023 application, the Father's evidence was that A.H. originally expressed a desire to go to school on Salt Spring Island. The Mother disputes this was ever the case. The more recent evidence from both parties acknowledges A.H. then expressed a desire to stay at her current middle school until the end of the 2023-24 school year (and Grade 8). The Father says this was motivated by a desire to attend a band trip, which happened. The Mother says the band trip was only part of the rationale and A.H.'s desire to stay with her friends was another significant factor. [112] In the Views of the Child Report, A.H. did not express a strong preference about where she wished to live or attend school. When the author discussed the implications of certain schedules with A.H., she responded she was happy with the schedule at the time and would be equally happy if it was the exact opposite. When asked if there were changes she would like to see with the current parenting schedule, she responded "it doesn't really matter to me. A plus would be if we were with Dad during the week and saw the Island life and saw more of [their half-sibling], I think this would be good for [the half-sibling] But a plus to staying weekdays with Mom is that we get to see our friends at school." This response is consistent with other evidence--both that A.H. is caring and puts others' needs ahead of her own, and that her friends are very important to her. The latter theme in particular is repeated throughout the Views of the Child Report. [113] The Mother's evidence is that, subsequent to the interviews for the Views of the Child Report, A.H. has expressed a strong desire to stay in Victoria so that she can attend a particular high school with her close-knit friend group. The Mother says A.H. attended an open house at the high school in spring 2024 because her friends were going. After seeing the presentations, she was very excited by the prospect of a particular specialized program as well as the breadth of course selections. The Mother says A.H. took the initiative to apply for the program which required her to write a paragraph explaining her interest and have a teacher sign it to recommend her for the program. The Mother says A.H. did this on her own, and then they worked together on her course selection page which A.H. signed and which is in evidence before the Court. The Mother says A.H. took the course selection sheet with her when she went to the Father's home so she could discuss it with him. Many of A.H.'s close-knit friend group will be attending that high school. [114] The Father acknowledges that A.H. has "flip flopped" a couple of times in what she wants, but says A.H. has been pressured into a high school program the Mother wishes her to attend. The Mother strongly disagrees with this assertion and there is no objective evidence to support the Father's contention. While I generally did not find either witness to lack credibility, with respect to A.H.'s desire to attend the program, the Mother's evidence was clear, more recent and much more detailed than the Father's generalized assertions. The Father does not offer any evidence to directly contradict A.H.'s wishes in this regard. He simply provides his opinion that A.H. has been influenced. He also points out that the high school on Salt Spring Island focuses on international issues, environmental issues and the arts - all things in which A.H. excels. That may be so, but there is no evidence A.H. has expressed a recent and specific desire to attend that high school. In contrast, there is recent documentary evidence supporting the Mother's evidence of A.H.'s desire to attend a specific high school program in Victoria. [115] To the extent there has been any "influence", in my view, it is more likely the influence comes from A.H.'s friends. As noted, the importance of friends is reflected clearly throughout the evidence about A.H., including in the Views of the Child Report. A.H. advised its author in January 2024 that she is "scared talking to people other than her friends" and she did not yet have any friends on Salt Spring Island. Neither party provided subsequent information to suggest this situation has changed. A.H.'s only criticism of either parent is that they are both "far away" from her friends. In addition, when asked if there was anything more she would like to say to her parents, A.H. replied "I'd like to be closer to friends." She would be closer to her friends if she remained in Victoria than if she relocated to Salt Spring Island. [116] Based on the evidence before me, I find A.H.'s views have crystallized in the last few months to reflect a desire to stay in Victoria and attend her chosen program at a high school with her friends. Conclusion on best interests [117] Determining the best interests of each child is not a straightforward or mathematical exercise. It is contextual and fact-dependent, requiring the Court to consider and weigh the evidence of factors that are often inter-related. Ultimately, taking the best interests of a child into account is a discretionary decision: F.J.V. v. W.K.S., 2019 BCCA 67 at para. 25. [118] As many of the factors in the present case are neutral, I will summarize only those that are not, as they apply to each of A.H. and C.H. [119] A.H. is entering a significant period of transition as she heads to high school in September 2024. The evidence demonstrates A.H. will put others' needs above her own but my focus must be on what is in her best interests. A.H. needs stability at home given the other changes imminent in her world. I find there would likely be a negative impact on her emotional well-being if she were to be separated from her close-knit friend group and made to attend a high school where she does not yet have any friends. That negative impact would be compounded if she were living on Salt Spring Island and only able to access the support of her friends in Victoria on weekends, during the same time she would be spending with the Mother. Over the past several months, A.H.'s desire to attend a particular high school program in Victoria has become clear, and she is of an age where it is important and appropriate to give significant weight to her wishes in this regard. On the whole, I find A.H.'s best interests are served by remaining in Victoria with the Mother. [120] C.H. is not facing the same type of school transition as her older sibling. Rather than expressing concerns about leaving her friends in Victoria, C.H. seems genuinely excited about the prospect of a change and has consistently and repeatedly expressed her strong desire to attend school on Salt Spring Island and to live with the Father during the week. While the Court does not have the results of the psychoeducational assessment for C.H., given the history, it is not unreasonable to assume that consistency will be key to supporting her learning journey. Given the past experience with C.H.'s reading and more recently, the completion of the missed homework assignment, I am satisfied that between them, the Father and M have greater capacity to support C.H. to focus on her academics. [121] In addition, I have found the Father is better placed at this time to help C.H. manage her epilepsy. There is no evidence to suggest C.H. cannot continue to access her specialists in Victoria if she relocates to Salt Spring Island. Lastly, while the views of the child are not themselves determinative, I have some concerns that not giving adequate weight to C.H.'s consistently expressed views could have negative repercussions for her emotional well-being. There is evidence of C.H. expressing concern that she was not being listened to. On the whole, I find C.H.'s best interests are served by relocating to Salt Spring Island. [122] I am very conscious these conclusions contradict the views of both parties that the children should be kept together. These are inherently challenging decisions and I did not reach this one lightly. I recognize the children have always been together. The possibility of separation does not appear to have been broached explicitly with the children, although they are no doubt aware that their views diverge. In the Views of the Child Report, the Father expressed concern that C.H. may resent A.H. for not backing up C.H.'s strongly expressed desire to relocate to Salt Spring Island. Given her easy-going nature, the Mother expressed concern that A.H.'s needs would not be factored in. [123] As noted above, whether siblings should be kept together is a relevant but not determinative consideration. There are examples in the jurisprudence where the circumstances of the case warranted separating siblings. That includes where the siblings ended up residing in different cities: see Poole and Bennett v. Bennett, [1983] B.C.J. No. 14 (C.A.). In Larden v. Larden, 2016 BCSC 2664, Justice Fisher (as she then was) granted an application to vary an order regarding the residence of the parties' 13-year old son, despite the fact that it meant being separated from his younger brother. The older child had been clearly expressing his desire to live with his father for two years (at para. 6). [124] Under the best interests analysis in Larden, Fisher J. noted that while the younger child might be saddened, there was nothing in the evidence to suggest separation would be harmful in a significant way (at para. 40). The Court noted the two boys would be living in the same metro area within commuting distance (one in Richmond, one in New Westminster) and would see each other regularly (at paras. 3, 40). The Court also considered it relevant that the older child had completed elementary school and would be attending a new school regardless of the move, so there would be a "natural break from some day-to-day contact in any event" (at para. 40). [125] There are parallels here. A.H. is entering high school so there will be a natural break between her and C.H. regardless. It is likely that even if they were to remain together, some practical separation would occur simply as a result of A.H.'s age and stage of development. While Salt Spring Island and Victoria are not as close as Richmond and New Westminster, they are within commuting distance. There are a greater number of ferries that service Salt Spring Island than other Gulf Islands. Further, there is evidence that A.H. and C.H. connect regularly by phone with their half-sibling to maintain their relationship with her. With the prevalence of technology in most children's lives at present, it is reasonable to expect A.H. and C.H. will be able to do the same. Lastly, it is both possible and appropriate, in my view, to craft a parenting schedule that ensures A.H. and C.H. will see each other every weekend, as well as for holidays, to maintain their relationship and to permit the parties to spend time with them together. [126] Taking into account the above considerations, I remain of the view that the best interests of A.H. and C.H. are not aligned. To require them to remain together in these circumstances would not adequately respect their individualized needs. Conclusion on Relocation [127] The Father has satisfied me that his application to relocate the children was brought in good faith and that he proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the children's relationships with the Mother and other important people in their lives. The overriding consideration, however, remains the best interests of each child. As it is in C.H.'s best interests for her to relocate to Salt Spring Island to attend school and live with the Father during the week, I am granting the Father's application with respect to C.H. In contrast, I am refusing the Father's application with respect to A.H., based on it being in her best interests to remain in Victoria with the Mother. It is in the best interests of both children that they be together during weekends and on holidays. [128] This conclusion requires a variation of the Final Order in relation to the parenting schedule, as permitted under s. 70(1) of the FLA. The detailed parenting time orders I am making, which establish a new schedule beginning July 1, 2024, are set out at the end of this judgment. Issue 2: Child Support [129] The parties do not have a pre-existing order with respect to child support. Rather, child support was addressed by agreement under the Minutes, which made provision for both an initial set-off amount and an annual readjustment based on an exchange of the previous year's income tax information. It is common ground that no financial information was exchanged before these applications were filed and no support adjustments were ever made. It is also common ground that the Father ceased paying the set-off amount of child support as of July 2019. [130] The Mother applies for child support over two distinct periods: a) a retroactive adjustment of child support for July 1, 2019 to August 31, 2023, when there was shared parenting and no support was paid; and b) a prospective variation of child support from September 1, 2023 forward based on the Mother having primary care of the children (more than 60%). [131] In seeking to vary support, the Mother also asks the Court to replace the provisions respecting child support in the Minutes with an order, pursuant to s. 148 of the FLA. No orders are sought respecting s. 7 expenses. The Mother's notice of application did seek an order for the Father to provide tax returns and notices of assessment from 2019 to present, as well as a sworn F8 Financial Statement. As the Father provided that information in response to and during these proceedings, I will not address that request. [132] I note that the prospective variation sought for the second period assumed the children would continue to be in the Mother's primary care going forward. As I have reached a different conclusion on the Father's relocation application which requires a new parenting schedule as of July 1, 2024, there are now three periods in which to consider child support. The first remains the same and requires consideration of whether a retroactive award is appropriate. The second period is from September 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024, and the third period is from July 1, 2024 forward. Given when the application was filed and heard, I consider the latter two periods to be prospective or ongoing awards. The parties were obviously not able to provide specific submissions on the third period but their positions respecting the second period are sufficient to allow me to decide the issues. The parties' positions [133] The Father opposes the orders sought respecting child support on several bases. With respect to the first period of time, he argues the parties reached an agreement at mediation in July 2019 not to pay child support as parenting was shared and the parties' incomes were almost the same. He admits there was no written agreement to that effect. The Father also says the Mother did not ask for support or financial information until October 2023, when the topic was broached through counsel, so that was the date of effective notice, and he was entitled to rely on the verbal agreement made until that point. Further, he says an order for retroactive support would create a significant hardship, prejudicing his ability to support his family as a whole. [134] For the second period, the Father says, again, the Mother did not ask until October 2023, and if considered on the basis of the 2023 calendar year, the parties still had shared parenting as the children were with him 41% of the time. In addition, the Father argues any adjustment would have been premature before his relocation application was decided. During submissions, the Father proposed that if his relocation application were to be granted, he would be willing to work with the Mother to creatively achieve a schedule approximating shared parenting for child support purposes. The specifics of the proposal were not entirely clear, including if the suggestion was for the parties to agree to a set-off amount, or if a different arrangement was envisioned. In essence, the Father submitted the parties should await the outcome of the relocation application and then see if an agreement on support could be reached. I expressed some reservations during the hearing given the parties' track record where agreements are concerned. [135] Finally, the Father says in respect of both periods for which the Mother seeks child support, the Court should find he met his support obligations in other ways because he continued to pay for the majority of the health, school and extra-curricular expenses. In her affidavit evidence, the Mother provided examples of expenses she had paid since September 2023 (such as yoga, camps and medications) to counter any suggestion the Father paid for everything. However, on cross-examination, the Mother admitted the children were enrolled in many extra-curricular activities for which she did not pay, and that she did not pay for things like the children's counselling sessions. [136] In respect to the first period, the Mother says she did not agree to a cessation of child support at the July 2019 mediation. She says that in response to the Father's assertion their incomes were the same, she requested financial information which the Father did not provide, either then or afterwards. On that basis, the Mother says there could not have been any agreement. The Mother says in any event, the Father's income subsequently surpassed hers, which required that he pay according to his increased income. But without the Father having provided financial disclosure, as required by the Minutes, she had insufficient information to bring an application for support earlier. [137] The Mother says she asked for the Father's financial information again at mediation in fall 2023 and it was not provided. There is no dispute the Mother's counsel requested financial information through the Father's counsel in mid-October 2023. The Father provided some financial information in an affidavit at the end of April 2024; financial information for the last two tax years, as well as a Form F8 Financial Statement was provided during the course of these hearings. [138] Further, the Mother says she finds the court process overwhelming and did not have the financial means to pay for counsel to assist earlier. The Mother also says she was concerned that if she raised the issue of support, the Father would retaliate by refusing to agree to extra-curricular activities or by not communicating openly. On this last point, the Father counters, and I accept, that there is no evidence the Father has previously refused to pay or withdrawn agreement for extra-curricular activities or other items directly for the children. [139] With respect to the second period, the Mother says it is clear the children have been in her primary care since September 2023, and the Father should pay child support based on that change. She says that despite budgeting for years to ensure the children have what they need and she does not go into debt, most months she is "scraping by". It has been a challenge on a single income and means she must look for activities for the children that are affordable and she does not expect to be able to purchase a home. Overview of the legal framework [140] I determined above that I should apply the FLA framework to the child support issues in this case. Before addressing the analysis for an application under s. 148(3) of the FLA, including where there is a request for retroactive support, the facts of this case suggest it would be helpful to review some of the fundamental principles of child support. [141] Child support is the right of the child. That right imposes a legal obligation on both parents to support their children in a way that is commensurate to their income. As a result, when a parent's income increases, a child generally has a right to increased support payments: D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37 at paras. 48, 131. Since neither the child nor the recipient parent can waive the child's right to support, delay in enforcing the child's right to support is generally irrelevant: Boyko v. Fitzgerald, 2022 BCSC 614 at para. 84, citing D.B.S. at para. 38. [142] For its part, the Court has and maintains both a jurisdiction and a duty to ensure the child's best interests are being met and adequate provision is made for support. This jurisdiction continues despite any agreement between the parties: Kneale v. Yausie, 2022 BCSC 1038 at para. 34, citing D.B.S. at paras. 60, 77-78. [143] Section 148(3) of the FLA provides the Court with both prospective and retroactive authority to set aside all or part of an agreement respecting child support and replace it with an order if the Court would have made a different order after considering the matters in s. 150. Section 150 in turn starts from the presumption that child support is payable based on the amount set out in the Guidelines subject to the Court's discretion to order otherwise: Hinz v. Davey, 2022 BCCA 232 at paras. 51-52. The parties do not dispute that their respective Guidelines' incomes should be the starting point. [144] In G.J.L. v. M.J.L., 2017 BCSC 688, Justice Schultes held that in considering an application under s. 148(3) of the FLA, the Court's first step is to determine the support amount payable under the Guidelines in order to decide whether the Court would make a different order. As a second step, it is open to the responding party to argue that the agreement should not be set aside or replaced because "reasonable arrangements" have been made for the children (at para. 122). Where raised, and after considering if any agreement makes reasonable arrangements, s. 150(4) of the FLA also allows the Court to consider any special provisions made for the benefit the child that would mean applying the Guidelines amount is inequitable: Boyko at paras. 53-54. [145] If the request is also to replace the agreement's support provisions retroactively, the Court must then consider whether a retroactive award is appropriate based on the four analytical factors established in D.B.S. (discussed further below). If a retroactive award is appropriate, the Court then determines the date from which it must be paid and the quantum. [146] Several decisions have concluded the applicant need not establish a "material change in circumstances" as a pre-requisite to a court revisiting the terms of a written agreement. Where there is no pre-existing court order, an application to replace an agreement with an order is essentially an original application for support: Worsfold v. Worsfold, 2018 BCSC 45 at paras. 35-38; A.V. v. L.A.M.S.M., 2022 BCSC 1840 at para. 30. It is clear, however, that a material change in circumstances since entering into the agreement could be a basis for the Court to reconsider child support obligations: Hinz at paras. 53-62. Analysis [147] Both G.J.L. and Boyko suggest I must first consider, for any ongoing or prospective periods of support, if I would make a different order for child support than provided for in the Minutes based on the factors in s. 150 of the FLA. This applies to the second and third periods of time. I must then consider if a retroactive award for the first period is appropriate based on the D.B.S. factors. [148] Under the Guidelines, the parties' incomes are the starting point for any child support analysis, whether prospective or retroactive. There was no real dispute about the parties' incomes; the Mother's counsel provided a table summarizing the relevant income information. Based on that table and the evidence provided, the parties' incomes for all three relevant periods, as reported on line 15000 of their tax assessments, are as follows: Tax Year Father's Income Mother's Income 2018 20,950 17,790 2019 58,382 31,346 2020 87,511 49,855 2021 86,443 53,018 2022 93,219 53,981 2023 86,708 59,282 Should the Minutes be replaced by an order for ongoing support? 1. What support would be payable under the Guidelines? [149] The first step is to determine, under s. 150(1) of the FLA, what support would be payable under the Guidelines for the second and third periods described above. [150] For most of the second period from September 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024, the children were primarily in the care of the Mother (Sunday evening to Friday after school). Under s. 3 of the Guidelines, the Father, as the parent with the higher income for that period, would be required to pay monthly child support to the Mother based on the table amount for two children and taking into account that no s. 7 expenses are claimed. [151] The parties had previously agreed under the Minutes to adjust their support obligations as of September 1st, based on the previous year's income. This kind of staggering is common, as Guidelines incomes are based on tax assessments, which are not known until mid-way through the following year. On that basis, I consider it appropriate to calculate the Father's support obligations for the second period based on his 2022 income of $93,219. The table amount the Father would presumptively pay for two children is $1,431 per month. [152] There are two possible exceptions to this calculation. In December and March, because the two weeks of holidays over both winter and spring breaks were split equally between the parties, the Father had greater parenting time. There is at least an argument for shared parenting in those two months, which would make support payable under s. 9 of the Guidelines. While the analysis under s. 9 of the Guidelines involves more than a straight set-off of each parent's table amount (as addressed in Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63), for present purposes, and because the parties did not provide the kind of detailed evidence needed to determine if any adjustments were required, I find it sufficient to rely on the simple set-off amounts. Again, using the parties' 2022 incomes from the table above, the set-off amount for any shared parenting during this second period would presumptively require the Father to pay the Mother $593 per month. [153] For the third period, from July 1, 2024 forward, the parties will be in a split parenting situation, with each party having the majority of time with one of the children. Section 8 of the Guidelines provides that child support in a split parenting situation is payable on an offset basis. Using the parties' 2023 incomes from the table above, and calculating the support owing for one child each, the offset amount under s. 8 would require the Father to pay the Mother $269 per month. 2. Does an agreement make reasonable support arrangements? [154] The next step is to consider, under s. 150(2) of the FLA, if the Minutes or any other agreement make "reasonable arrangements" for the support of the children. Section 150(3) of the FLA states the Court must not consider arrangements to be unreasonable only because the Guidelines amounts are different. [155] In this case, the Minutes required the Father to pay the Mother a set-off amount of $140 per month in child support. Schedule B to the Minutes is a DivorceMate calculation prepared April 6, 2017, based on shared parenting and the parties' anticipated gross annual incomes at the time ($30,000 for the Father and $20,000 for the Mother). The Mother maintains the Minutes are the only agreement between the parties respecting child support. [156] As noted, the Father says the parties reached a further agreement at mediation in July 2019 not to pay any further child support because their respective incomes were quite close at that time. He maintains he is entitled to rely on that most recent agreement, and admits he has not paid any child support after June 2019. The Mother disputes any agreement was reached, saying she requested financial information from the Father to consider his proposal and it was not provided. [157] I accept the Mother's evidence that, given her own financial circumstances, she would not have agreed to a cessation of child support without first being presented with the Father's financial information. Her evidence in this regard was unequivocal. The Father does not deny he failed to provide financials and it is common ground there was no written record of the agreement. Unlike with many other details the parties discussed regarding the children, there are also no contemporaneous emails in evidence confirming or discussing any such agreement. In my view, an agreement to cease receiving child support would have been a significant enough change for the Mother as a single parent, and without the benefit of a new partner to share expenses, that if it had been agreed to, there would have been a written record of some sort. It is also different from the change to the parenting schedule which arose from the same mediation. While the Mother says she resisted putting the new parenting schedule in writing because it was still in a trial phase for the family, she does not deny the parenting schedule in fact changed with her consent. [158] Having rejected the Father's argument that there was a subsequent verbal agreement, I must consider if I am satisfied the Minutes make "reasonable arrangements for the support of the children". The $140 per month set-off is clearly different than what the Father would be required to pay under the Guidelines for both the second period (under either s. 3 or s. 9) and the third period (under s. 8). While that fact alone does not make the arrangements unreasonable, there is nothing else in the Minutes that could realistically be considered an off-setting benefit for the children. Although the parties also agreed to share special and extraordinary expenses proportionate to their incomes, which would require the Father to pay a greater share, they defined such expenses very narrowly: they only include "medial and dental expenses net of insurance coverage." [159] Further, while the agreement is presumed to have been "reasonable" at the time, it was based on respective incomes for both parties that have increased considerably in the intervening period. As noted above, a child has a right to support commensurate with the parent's income, which means a child's right increases as their parent's income rises. Despite the Minutes providing for annual reviews and adjustments, any such changes are contingent on the exchange of financial information, failing which, the previous agreed amount prevails. Both parents' incomes have more than doubled since the Minutes were entered into, but there was no corresponding adjustment from $140 per month for two children. [160] Taken as a whole, I am not satisfied the Minutes make reasonable arrangements for child support. Further, had I accepted the Father's evidence of a July 2019 agreement not to pay child support, my conclusion in this regard would have been stronger. It is trite law that "parents cannot waive or bargain away the rights of their children to appropriate child support": Greene v. Greene, 2010 BCCA 595 at para. 49. An agreement not to pay any child support that continues despite sizeable increases in the parties' incomes is not consistent with the fundamental principles of child support set out above. 3. Are there special provisions for the benefit of the children that would make applying the Guidelines inequitable? [161] Lastly, I must consider whether, under s. 150(4), any other provision has been made for the benefit of the children that would make it inequitable to apply the Guidelines amount. In other words, have the support obligations been met in a different way? [162] The Father says he has consistently paid for all of the children's extra-curricular activities, counselling and other out of pocket expenses. The Father's evidence is that the children have, at various times, been enrolled in soccer, gymnastics, archery, badminton, and home-alone and babysitting courses. The Mother admits the children have been involved in extra-curricular activities for which she has not paid, including activities she did not know they were involved in. The Mother also does not deny the Father paid for counselling and other expenses. She says she has paid for camps during her parenting time (at a cost of approximately $185 to $240 per week per child, depending on whether extended after-camp care is required), but the Minutes make it clear each party is responsible for any child care required while the children are in that party's care. The Mother has also paid for certain extra-curriculars since September 2023 (for example, yoga and dance, the latter of which costs about $80 per month). [163] On the evidence before me, including what is set out in the Father's affidavits and Form 8 Financial Statement and the Mother's admissions, I accept the Father should be credited a certain amount per month for expenses related to the children for which he has been primarily responsible. In the absence of a detailed accounting, I conclude it would be appropriate to credit the Father with $200 per month for such expenses, based on the volume of activities the children have participated in and my conclusion that the $100 per month for activities and lessons set out in the Father's Form 8 Financial Statement likely does not adequately capture fees for two children's multiple extra-curriculars each month, as well as other expenses. [164] However, this is not a case where the parties have carefully established a process to balance any potentially negative impact of the relatively nominal amount of support payable under the Minutes. In the circumstances, it is not inequitable to apply the Guidelines amount in place of the Minutes. Conclusion on ongoing support and s. 148(3) [165] Based on the considerations under s. 150 of the FLA, I conclude that I would make a different order for child support than what is set out in the Minutes for the second and third periods of time. Accordingly, I allow the prospective portion of the Mother's application and replace the child support provisions of the Minutes with orders requiring child support to be paid as follows: a) For the period from September 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024, i. eight months of Guidelines table support payable from the Father to the Mother under s. 3 of the Guidelines, based on the Father's 2022 income, less credit for monthly expenses of $200 per month (September to November, January, February and April to June); ii. two months of Guidelines table support payable from the Father to the Mother on an offset basis under s. 9 of the Guidelines, based on the parties' 2022 incomes, less credit for monthly expenses of $200 per month (December and March); and b) For the period from July 1, 2024 forward, child support is payable as a set-off amount under s. 8 of the Guidelines, based on split parenting and each party's Guidelines income from the previous tax year. [166] As the new split parenting schedule is likely to require some adjustment to previous patterns, I do not consider it appropriate to credit the Father with set monthly expenses on a go-forward basis. Rather, beginning July 1, 2024, I order the parties to share the cost of extra-curricular expenses for both children in proportion to their incomes, so long as agreed to in advance and subject to further agreement by the parties in writing. [167] I also find it appropriate to modify the timeframes for annual review and adjustment of support amounts to better align with the start of the new parenting schedule on July 1, 2024. These orders are addressed in more detail at the end of this judgment. Should the Minutes be replaced by an order for retroactive support? 1. Is a retroactive award appropriate for the first period? [168] I turn finally to the Mother's request for retroactive support for the first period from July 1, 2019 to August 31, 2023. Justice Forth recently provided a succinct summary of the applicable principles in Berlando v. Berlando, 2024 BCSC 11: [43] The Supreme Court of Canada recognized in [D.B.S.] that retroactive child support orders are neither "rare" nor "exceptional": at paras. 5, 37. An assessment of retroactive child support is based on an analysis of four factors: the reasonable excuse for why support was not sought earlier, the conduct of the payor parent, the circumstances of the child, and the potential hardship occasioned by a retroactive award: D.B.S. at paras. 94-116. However, "none of these factors is decisive" and the court maintains significant discretion in determining retroactive child support: D.B.S. at para. 99. [44] The Court in D.B.S. also provided that if a recipient is entitled to a retroactive award, the general rule is that the award should go back to the date that the recipient party provided effective notice to the payor, but no more than three years prior to formal notice being given, unless the payor had engaged in blameworthy conduct: at paras. 118-132. Notice does not require the recipient to take legal action; all that is required is that the topic be broached: at para. 121. [ ] [46] The Guidelines and s. 17 of the Divorce Act are clear that payor parents must pay more support as income rises and that this obligation can be enforced after the fact: Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 at para. 44. [Emphasis added] [169] In Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed certain fundamental principles with respect to child support generally and retroactive support in particular. Those with specific application to the case at bar include: a) retroactive or historical child support orders hold payors to the legal obligation they always had to pay support commensurate with their income (at para. 10, citing D.B.S. at para. 2); b) courts have accepted a wide range of reasons as justifying a delayed application for child support, including fear of reprisal, prohibitive costs of litigation, and a lack of information about the payor parent's income (at para. 85, per Martin J. and Wagner CJ., concurring); c) retroactive support awards will commonly be appropriate where payor parents fail to disclose increases in their income (at para. 32); d) failure to disclose material changes in income constitutes blameworthy conduct (at para. 34); and e) the date of effective notice is not relevant when a payor parent has engaged in blameworthy conduct (at para. 36). [170] As most of the facts have already been canvassed above, I will briefly address my findings on each of the four D.B.S. factors in turn. Reasons for delay in seeking support [171] With respect to the Mother's reasons for delay in seeking support, the Father ceased paying any child support in July 2019. The Mother admitted on cross-examination that she asked for financial information in July 2019 and then did not ask again until fall 2023. Her application was filed in April 2024, although during the hearing, counsel for both parties agreed some of the delay was due to challenges obtaining chambers hearing dates. The Mother says she finds the court process overwhelming and she did not have the resources to retain counsel. I do not doubt either of those statements. However, I previously found there was no evidence to support the Mother's stated fear that the Father would retaliate by withdrawing support or agreement for extra-curricular activities. [172] I accept the Mother did not have adequate information about the Father's income. However, it is unclear why there was no attempt to broach the subject, including by seeking the mutual exchange of income information contemplated by the Minutes, at any point between July 2019 and fall 2023. I am not convinced the Mother has provided reasonable explanations for a delay of more than four years. Conduct of the payor parent [173] On the other hand, the Father's conduct is blameworthy in several respects. In each of D.B.S., Michel and Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that blameworthy conduct is not limited to "egregious cases of deception or intentional evasion", "but may also extend to cases of mere passivity" (Colucci at para. 41). In other words, courts take an expansive view and the threshold is low (D.B.S. at para. 106). Failure to disclose an increase in income has repeatedly been held to be blameworthy conduct justifying variation to the date of the change in income (D.B.S. at para. 124; Colucci at paras. 40-42). [174] The Father does not deny he failed to provide any income information between when the Minutes were signed in April 2017 and his filing of materials for these proceedings in April 2024. I recognize the Mother also failed to provide income information until February 2024, which is blameworthy conduct on her part, but that does not somehow negate the Father's conduct (Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2013 BCSC 2350 at para. 24). [175] The Father's failure in this regard is more concerning because he ceased paying support at a time when he ought to have been aware that his income for 2019 would be higher than it had been the previous year. Since child support is a legal obligation owed to the children, a payor parent has a duty to increase support commensurate with an increase in their income, even if not requested. As in Greene, given the substantial increases in the Father's income between 2018 and 2022, it became less and less tenable for the Father to believe that either no support or the minimal support required under the Minutes reflected his proper share of child support (Greene at para. 50). A finding of blameworthy conduct weighs in favour of an award of retroactive support and may also serve to expand the temporal scope of the retroactive award (Michel at para. 119 per Martin J. and Wagner C.J., concurring). Circumstances of the children [176] With respect to the circumstances of the children, there is no concrete evidence of any real disparity in the standards of living experienced by the children in each home. I recognize the Mother has not been able to afford to purchase a home post-separation. She continues to rent and at least once, has been forced to move rather than the move being her choice. In contrast, the Father was able to purchase a townhouse in Victoria after leaving Pender Island, and has since sold the townhouse and purchased a home on Salt Spring Island. While a recipient parent's hardship may well weigh in favour of a retroactive child support award (Michel at para. 123), in this case, I do not find that it does. Potential for hardship [177] Finally, the Father says a retroactive award would cause him and his new family significant hardship. He is the primary income-earner for himself, M and their child together, and when A.H. and C.H. are with them, he supports a family of five on his income alone. The Father's Form 8 Financial Statement indicates annual expenses of more than $103,000, compared to an income of approximately $87,000. The Father's most significant asset is the house on Salt Spring Island, on which he (and likely M) are carrying a sizeable mortgage and making substantial monthly payments. That said, hardship must be assessed taking into account the totality of the circumstances. This includes any hardship to the children and recipient parent from not ordering the payment of sums owing and the benefit the payor parent received by not paying support: Michel at para. 125. Further, the Mother argues hardship at this point should not be allowed to negate the Father's obligations to children for whom support was not previously paid. [178] I accept a retroactive child support award is likely to cause the Father difficulty, if not hardship, but the Father has substantial equity in his home. I also accept that while the Mother has been able to save some funds and avoid being in debt, she lacks any significant net assets and does not anticipate being able to purchase a home. I am mindful the D.B.S. factors do not require that there be no hardship, especially where there has been blameworthy conduct, and that hardship may be addressed by the form of payment: Michel at para. 124; D.B.S. at para. 116. I find the presence of difficulty or possibly hardship does not weigh against a retroactive support award in this case. Conclusion on D.B.S. factors [179] Balancing all four of the D.B.S. factors, I find the nature of the Father's blameworthy conduct to be the overriding factor in this case. While the Mother did not provide satisfactory reasons for the delay, and there is no concrete evidence the children had unmet needs, it appears the Father derived some benefit as a result of not having had to pay child support, and it is appropriate to grant an order of retroactive child support in this case. Practically, the order will replace the child support provisions of the Minutes for the relevant timeframe. To the extent the Father faces challenges as a result of the retroactive award, they can be addressed through form of payment. 2. Period and quantum of retroactive support [180] The general rule is that retroactive support is payable from the date of effective notice, with a presumption that the award will generally not extend further back than three years before the date of formal notice: Colucci at para. 39. However, as previously stated, where there is blameworthy conduct, irrespective of the degree of blameworthiness, the date of effective notice is not relevant and the Court may also extend the temporal scope of the retroactive award beyond three years if it considers appropriate: Michel at paras. 36, 119. [181] In the present case, the Father ceased paying child support altogether and did not take any steps to revisit his support obligations despite significant increases in his income. The Father ought to have been aware of, or ought to have taken steps to determine, his child support obligations in light of the rises in his income. As well, the Father's failure to disclose his financial information deprived the Mother of information she required to pursue the present application. In the circumstances, I exercise my discretion to depart from the presumptive retroactivity date and to extend the retroactive support award back to July 1, 2019, when the Mother requested financial information and the Father ceased paying support. As noted above, by that point, and regardless of how close the parties' incomes for 2018 might have been, the Father ought to have realized his 2019 income would reflect an increase that could change his child support obligations. [182] Having determined the period for which retroactive support is payable, it is necessary to consider the quantum for the retroactive award, consistent with the provisions for awarding child support under the FLA. As previously noted, under s. 150(1), the Court must determine the amount of child support payable in accordance with the Guidelines. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in D.B.S., the Guidelines themselves provide some discretion to ensure the amount of a retroactive award fits the circumstances. For example, in D.B.S., the Court recognized that undue hardship under s. 10 may permit an award different from the table amounts. As well, ss. 3(2), 4 and 9 of the Guidelines permit the consideration of individual circumstances: D.B.S. at paras. 128-129. Courts may also have some flexibility in determining the time period the retroactive award is to capture. The key is that "a court should not order a retroactive award in any amount that it considers unfair, having regard to all the circumstances of the case": D.B.S. at para. 130. [183] In the present case, one of the relevant circumstances is the existence of the Minutes which provided both a mechanism and a timeline on which support adjustments were to be made. As noted in Kopp v. Kopp, 2012 BCCA 140 at paras. 37-38, while the Court owes less deference to child support agreements, they are not wholly irrelevant to the issues the Court must determine. In my view, when fashioning the periods in relation to which support is to be adjusted, it is appropriate to consider that the parties intended financial information to be exchanged by July 31st, with any corresponding adjustment to be effective by September 1st. Had the parties exchanged financial information as contemplated under the Minutes, any necessary income-based adjustments would have been implemented by September 1st of a given year, based on the previous year's tax assessments. If no adjustments were made, the previously agreed amount would govern. [184] The Minutes required the Father to pay a set-off amount of $140 per month in child support. The Father ceased paying as of July 2019, and I have determined it is appropriate to adjust child support beginning July 1, 2019. This is around the same time the parties began a week on / week off parenting schedule, which makes child support payable under s. 9 of the Guidelines. The shared parenting schedule continued until September 1, 2023. [185] If the parties had followed the adjustment process in the Minutes, they would have exchanged financial information in July 2019, and adjusted the support payable as of September 1, 2019 based on their 2018 incomes. The amounts payable for July and August 2019 would have remained at the previous level of $140 per month. The same adjustment process would then have continued through to August 31, 2023. Accordingly, I find the Mother entitled to retroactive support payable by the Father as follows: a) for July and August 2019: $140 per month (as the previously agreed set-off amount would have continued); b) for September 1, 2019 to August 31, 2020: a set-off amount based on shared parenting and the parties' 2018 incomes; c) for September 1, 2020 to August 31, 2021: a set-off amount based on shared parenting and the parties' 2019 incomes; d) for September 1, 2021 to August 31, 2022: a set-off amount based on shared parenting and the parties' 2020 incomes; and e) for September 1, 2022 to August 31, 2023: a set-off amount based on shared parenting and the parties' 2021 incomes. [186] In addition, for each of the above periods, and as I did with the prospective award for the past school year above, I find it appropriate to credit the Father with an amount of $200 per month based on the evidence that he paid for the bulk of the children's extra-curricular expenses, counselling and out of pocket expenses. To be clear, the $200 per month figure is an approximation, in the absence of detailed expenditure records. It is based on the evidence of the number of extra-curriculars the children were enrolled in, the evidence of costs paid by the Mother for various activities this past school year, and my view that it is not unreasonable to anticipate a parent could spend $100 per month per child on the types of expenses for which I find the Father paid. [187] Justice Melnick followed a similar approach in Greenwood, where it was agreed Mr. Greenwood had made certain regular payments to the child directly, but there was insufficient evidence of the exact amounts. While Mr. Greenwood claimed he paid somewhere between $300-400 per month, Melnick J. held it was appropriate to credit Mr. Greenwood $250 per month for the period of time for which retroactive support was payable (at paras. 31-32). In my view, making these slight adjustments is within my discretion under s. 9 of the Guidelines, which permits the Court to consider the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and any child for whom support is sought. If the parties consider the $200 per month amount to be substantially unreasonable in light of actual expenses, they have liberty to request a further brief appearance before me to address this point. Conclusion on child support and replacing the Minutes [188] I have determined it is appropriate to set aside the provisions of the Minutes addressing child support effective July 1, 2019 and to replace them with child support orders as follows: a) for retroactive support from July 1, 2019 to August 31, 2023, based on a shared parenting schedule and the adjustment mechanism previously established in the Minutes; b) for prospective support from September 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024, based on the Mother having primary care during this period with the exception of December and March; and c) for ongoing support from July 1, 2024, based on the new split parenting schedule I have established. [189] Attached as Appendix A to this judgment is a table showing the calculations for the various periods for which I have ordered child support. The calculations of table amounts and off-set amounts were performed using DivorceMate. [190] It is also appropriate to replace the adjustment provisions of the Minutes to better align with the new parenting schedule. Accordingly, I order the parties to exchange income tax information by the end of May each year and to make any necessary child support adjustments for July 1st each year, based on the previous year's income. Summary and Orders [191] As noted at the outset, relocation applications are among the most challenging decisions the Court must make. I considered the evidence, submissions and case law carefully before reaching my decision. As is often the case, there was no perfect solution, but this decision reflects my commitment to centring the individual best interests of C.H. and A.H. respectively. With respect to the Father's application, I conclude relocation to Salt Spring Island is in the best interests of C.H., but it is not in the best interests of A.H. [192] With respect to child support, I conclude the provisions of the Minutes respecting child support should be set aside and replaced with orders granting the Mother retroactive child support for the period July 1, 2019 to August 31, 2023, as well as prospective and ongoing support from September 1, 2023 to present. [193] Accordingly, I make the following orders respecting relocation under the FLA: a) The Father's application to relocate C.H. to Salt Spring Island, including to attend school on Salt Spring Island beginning in September 2024, is granted; and b) The Father's application to relocate A.H. to Salt Spring Island is dismissed and A.H. is to remain in the primary care of the Mother in Victoria and continue to attend school in Victoria in September 2024. [194] Given the relocation order made above, the Final Order of Justice Gaul, made January 26, 2018, is varied to replace all parenting time orders with the following parenting time orders made under the FLA: a) The Father will have parenting time of C.H. from Sunday evening to Friday after the end of a normal school day; b) The Mother will have parenting time of A.H. from Sunday evening to Friday after the end of a normal school day; c) For weekends during the school year, C.H. and A.H. will be together and will alternate one weekend with the Mother and next weekend with the Father, from Friday after the end of a normal school day until Sunday evening, commencing the first Friday after school begins each September; d) If the day preceding or following the weekend is a statutory holiday or professional development day, the weekend parenting time will include that extra day; e) The Mother and the Father will have the following parenting time during the children's summer holidays, with the children to be together: either alternating week on/week off, or two weeks on/two weeks off, as agreed in writing between the parties, commencing the Sunday after school finishes in June, with the exception that for 2024, the schedule will commence Sunday, July 14, 2024; f) By May 1st of each year, the parties will exchange their proposed summer holiday schedule for the coming year in writing; g) The Mother and the Father will have the following parenting time during the winter school holidays, with the children to be together: the children will spend the first week with the Father and the second week with the Mother, with the parties splitting the winter school holidays equally, beginning the Sunday after the children finish school. In the following year, the schedule will be reversed and the parties will alternate parenting time during the winter school holidays in each subsequent year. For clarity, when Christmas Eve and Christmas Day fall wholly within one parent's scheduled week, the children will spend both days with that parent for that year. In the following year, the schedule will be reversed and the parties will alternate parenting time on those two days in each subsequent year; h) The Mother and the Father will have the following parenting time during the spring school break, with the children to be together: the children will spend the first week of spring break with the Mother and the second week with the Father, with the parties splitting the spring school break equally, beginning the Sunday after the children finish school. In the following year, the schedule will be reversed and the parties will alternate parenting time during the spring school break in each subsequent year; i) Despite the regular parenting schedule, the Mother will have parenting time with the children on Mother's Day from 5:00 p.m. the night before to 5:00 p.m. on Mother's Day and the Father will have parenting time with the children on Father's Day from 5:00 p.m. the night before to 5:00 p.m. on Father's Day; j) The parent who is exercising parenting time on the day of each child's birthday will celebrate the child's birthday with the child. The other parent will have reasonable telephone and / or electronic communication with the child on their birthday; k) On any changeover days, the parties will exchange the children as close to the 5:00 p.m. ferry as possible; l) Each child may call the other parent at any and all reasonable times; m) The parties are each at liberty to attend school events, parent teacher interviews and similar events on days when the child is not in their care, but must provide at least one weeks' written notice to the other parent of any intention to attend such events; n) If either party is planning to travel with either or both children within the province during their parenting time, they will notify the other parent with respect to their location; o) If either party is planning to travel with either or both children outside the province on their parenting time, they will notify the other parent in writing of their plan at least one week prior and will provide information including the travel itinerary, flight or other travel information, and contact information, and must receive written consent from the other party; p) The parties may make any adjustments to the parenting time schedule by agreement in writing; q) The parties will conduct a review of the parenting time schedule in two years' time (July 2026). The parties are at liberty to apply to the Court to vary the parenting time schedule in advance of the two-year review if there are material changes and best efforts to reach agreement have been unsuccessful. [195] The Mother's application respecting child support is granted in part. Paragraphs 15 to 17 and 23 to 25 of the April 6, 2017 Minutes of Settlement between the parties are set aside and replaced with the following child support orders made under the FLA: a) The Father will pay the Mother retroactive child support for the period of July 1, 2019 to August 31, 2023 fixed in the amount of $8,832 (the "Arrears"); b) The Father will pay the Mother prospective child support for the period of September 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024 fixed in the amount of $10,634 (the "Prospective Award"); c) Commencing on September 1, 2024 and on the first day of each month thereafter, the Father will make a minimum payment of $150 towards the Arrears and the Prospective Award, in addition to regular monthly support payments, until the Arrears and Prospective Award are paid in full or until further agreement of the parties or Court order; d) Based on each party's Guidelines income, beginning July 1, 2024 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter, the Father will pay the Mother monthly child support of $829 for the support of A.H. and the Mother will pay the Father monthly child support of $560 for the support of C.H. To satisfy each party's obligations to pay child support, the Father will pay to the Mother the net sum of $269 per month. These payments will continue for as long as the children are eligible for support under the FLA or until further agreement of the parties or Court order. For clarity, the Father's payment for July 1, 2024 is to be made on or before July 19, 2024; e) Beginning July 1, 2024, the parties will share the cost of extra-curricular expenses for both A.H. and C.H. in proportion to their incomes, so long as the expenses are agreed to in advance and subject to further agreement or adjustment by the parties in writing; f) For as long as the children are eligible to receive child support, the parties will exchange: i. copies of their respective income tax returns for the previous year, including all attachments, not later than May 31st each year; and ii. copies of any notice of assessment or reassessment provided to them by Canada Revenue Agency immediately upon receipt; g) The parties will conduct a review of ongoing child support on an annual basis and payment will be adjusted as necessary by July 1st each year based on the previous year's income tax information. [196] Both parties have enjoyed partial success in relation to their respective applications. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate for each party to bear their own costs. "K. Wolfe, J." Appendix A Period for which child support is payable Income Father* Table Amt† Income Mother* Table Amt† Parenting Time Monthly Offset Amt payable by Father† Interim Total for each period Total after $200/mth expenses credit to Father Retroactive Child Support July 2019 and August 2019 Payable by Father to Mother based on $140/mth offset amount in Minutes (not adjusted until Sept. 2019) 280 -120 Sept. 1, 2019 - Aug. 31, 2020 20,950 334 17,790 275 Shared (12 mths) 59 708 -1,692 Sept. 1, 2020 - Aug. 31, 2021 58,382 906 31,346 504 Shared (12 mths) 402 4,824 2,424 Sept. 1, 2021 - Aug. 31, 2022 87,511 1,351 49,855 778 Shared (12 mths) 573 6,876 4,476 Sept. 1, 2022 - Aug. 31, 2023 86,443 1,335 53,018 824 Shared (12 mths) 512 6,144 3,744 Total of retroactive support to August 31, 2023: 8,832 Prospective Child Support Sept. 1, 2023 - June 30, 2024 93,219 1431 53,981 838 Shared (2 mths - Dec and March) 593 1,186 786 Mother (8 mths) 1431 11,448 9848 Total of prospective support Sept 1/23 to June 30/24: 10,634 Ongoing Child Support July 1, 2024 - 86,708 829 59,282 560 Split 269 ongoing N/A * Consistent with the adjustment formula set out in the Minutes, and the new adjustment formula set out in the Court's order, the parties' incomes for each period in which child support is payable are based on the previous year's line 15000 total income, as reported on tax returns (e.g. the support payable for Sept 1, 2019 to August 31, 2020 is based on the parties' 2018 reported income). † The table amounts and monthly offset amounts represent calculations performed using DivorceMate software.