Rioux v. Saint Lawrence Terminal Co.

Rioux v. Saint Lawrence Terminal Co.

The clause in the deed operated as a resolutive condition and a prohibitory restriction, not as an express reservation of ownership of all timber; therefore title to the land and standing timber passed to the purchaser subject only to the limited personal-use exceptions in the deed and the vendor's right to seek rescission on breach; vendors had no free right to re-enter and remove stumps or second-growth timber without rescission; cutting by respondents' agent was trespass and appellant entitled to damages.

Citation
(1908) 40 SCR 98
Parties
Appellant / Plaintiff: Alphonse Rioux; Intervenant / Respondent: The Saint Lawrence Terminal Company; Defendant / Respondent: Alphonse Lauzier
Court
Supreme Court of Canada
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
23 March 1908
Procedural Posture
Appeal (property Law) / Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Appeal From the Court of King's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec
Outcome
Appeal allowed; judgments of the Superior Court and Court of King's Bench reversed; plaintiff's action maintained
Legal Topics
Sale of Land, Reservation of Timber, Construction of Deed, Resolutive Condition, Trespass, Contract Interpretation
Source Language
English
Property Law Sale of Land Reservation of Timber Construction of Deed Resolutive Condition Trespass Contract Interpretation

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

More case intelligence is available

Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.

Full judgment text Legal principles 5 Authorities cited 15 Party arguments 2 Amounts and remedies 3
Sign in to unlock

Parties

Alphonse Rioux

Appellant / Plaintiff

The Saint Lawrence Terminal Company

Intervenant / Respondent

Alphonse Lauzier

Defendant / Respondent

Procedural Posture

Appeal (property Law) / Supreme Court of Canada Decision on Appeal From the Court of King's Bench, Appeal Side, Province of Quebec

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the deed reserved ownership of all standing and subsequently arising timber to the vendor rather than creating a prohibitory/resolutive condition
  2. 2 Whether the vendor retained a right to re-enter to remove stumps or second growth absent rescission
  3. 3 Whether the defendant's cutting was a trespass giving rise to damages

Ratio Decidendi

The clause in the deed operated as a resolutive condition and a prohibitory restriction, not as an express reservation of ownership of all timber; therefore title to the land and standing timber passed to the purchaser subject only to the limited personal-use exceptions in the deed and the vendor's right to seek rescission on breach; vendors had no free right to re-enter and remove stumps or second-growth timber without rescission; cutting by respondents' agent was trespass and appellant entitled to damages.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; judgments of the Superior Court and Court of King's Bench reversed; plaintiff's action maintained

Orders

  • Appeal allowed
  • Judgments of Superior Court and Court of King's Bench reversed