R. v. Dadmand

R. v. Dadmand

The court held that the Jordan 30-month presumptive ceiling applies to charge-to-verdict timing and does not automatically include the sentencing phase; post-verdict delay must be assessed independently using a tempered application of Morin/MacDougall principles informed by Jordan/Cody. Applying that analysis, the 16 months from verdict to the anticipated sentencing decision (of which approximately 3 months and one week were attributable to Crown scheduling and the remainder to inherent requirements of a complex dangerous offender hearing) was not unreasonable; the s.11(b) application for a stay was dismissed.

Citation
2017 BCSC 1644
Parties
Crown: Regina; Accused: Novid Dadmand
Court
Supreme Court of British Columbia
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
15 September 2017
Procedural Posture
Criminal Sexual Assault With Dangerous Offender Proceedings / Post Conviction Sentencing Phase S.11(b) Stay Application
Outcome
Application dismissed; no stay of proceedings granted.
Legal Topics
Section 11(b) Delay, Stay of Proceedings, Dangerous Offender Proceedings, Disclosure Obligations, Prejudice Assessment, Jordan Framework, Mac Dougall/morin Framework
Source Language
English

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Parties

Regina

Crown

Novid Dadmand

Accused

Procedural Posture

Criminal Sexual Assault With Dangerous Offender Proceedings / Post Conviction Sentencing Phase S.11(b) Stay Application

  1. 1 Whether the Jordan 30-month presumptive ceiling applies to the sentencing phase
  2. 2 How delay between conviction and sentencing should be assessed
  3. 3 Whether the delay in sentencing violated s.11(b) of the Charter

Ratio Decidendi

The court held that the Jordan 30-month presumptive ceiling applies to charge-to-verdict timing and does not automatically include the sentencing phase; post-verdict delay must be assessed independently using a tempered application of Morin/MacDougall principles informed by Jordan/Cody. Applying that analysis, the 16 months from verdict to the anticipated sentencing decision (of which approximately 3 months and one week were attributable to Crown scheduling and the remainder to inherent requirements of a complex dangerous offender hearing) was not unreasonable; the s.11(b) application for a stay was dismissed.

Court Disposition

Application dismissed; no stay of proceedings granted.

Orders

  • Stay of proceedings denied
  • Dangerous offender hearing to proceed as scheduled September 25 to November 24, 2017; decision expected by December 22, 2017