Cameron v. Haszard / In re Roberson

Cameron v. Haszard / In re Roberson

The grandchild, born in 1885, took a vested interest at birth in the disputed one half of the residue and in funds A and B; vesting was not contingent on surviving to the date of distribution and the words "then living" where used relate only to the immediately antecedent event; accordingly there was no intestacy and the lower courts' decisions were reversed.

Citation
[1937] SCR 354
Parties
Appellants: Stanley Cameron and another; Respondents: Francis Longworth Haszard (Trustee) and other respondents
Court
Supreme Court of Canada
Jurisdiction
Canada
Judgment Date
19 March 1937
Procedural Posture
Appeal / Decision on Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada From Court of Appeal in Equity of Prince Edward Island
Outcome
Appeal allowed; judgments of the Court of Appeal in Equity and Court of Chancery reversed; declaration of rights entered in favour of those taking through the grandchild's vested interest.
Legal Topics
Vested Remainder, Contingent Remainder, Interpretation of Wills, Life Interest Vs. Remainder
Source Language
English

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Parties

Stanley Cameron and another

Appellants

Francis Longworth Haszard (Trustee) and other respondents

Respondents

Procedural Posture

Appeal / Decision on Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada From Court of Appeal in Equity of Prince Edward Island

  1. 1 Whether the grandchild took a vested interest at birth in one half of the residue (fund D)
  2. 2 Whether the grandchild took a vested interest at birth in specific funds A and B
  3. 3 Whether gifts were contingent on being "then living" at distribution causing intestacy

Ratio Decidendi

The grandchild, born in 1885, took a vested interest at birth in the disputed one half of the residue and in funds A and B; vesting was not contingent on surviving to the date of distribution and the words "then living" where used relate only to the immediately antecedent event; accordingly there was no intestacy and the lower courts' decisions were reversed.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed; judgments of the Court of Appeal in Equity and Court of Chancery reversed; declaration of rights entered in favour of those taking through the grandchild's vested interest.

Orders

  • Set aside judgments of the Courts below and enter declaration that the grandchild took a vested interest at birth in fund D (the one half of the residue) and in funds A and B as described
  • Fund A (subject to its specific "then living" clause) fell into the residue where no issue of Georgianna was living at Lucy's death and half passed under widow's appointment and half to those entitled through the grandchild's vested interest