A.B. v. C.D.

2025 BCSC 1821 A.B. v. C.D.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: A.B. v. C.D., 2025 BCSC 1821 Date: 20250613 Docket: 232132 Registry: Victoria Between: A.B. Claimant And: C.D. Respondent Corrected Judgment: The judgment was further anonymized throughout on February 19, 2026 Before: The Honourable Justice K. Wolfe Oral Reasons for Judgment re: Interim Orders sought at Trial Counsel for the Claimant: T.T. Luchies Z. Burrill N. Daisley, Articled Student (March 5-7, 10-14, April 14-17 and 22-25, 2025) N. Urquhart, Law Student (May 12-16, 26-30 and June 5 and 13, 2025) Counsel for the Respondent: K.M. Gale J.S.C. Faber D.F. Tracy Place and Dates of Trial: Victoria, B.C. March 5-7 and 10-14, April 14-17 and 22-25, May 12-16 and 26-30, and June 5 and 13, 2025 Place and Date of Judgment: Victoria, B.C. June 13, 2025 Table of Contents Introduction.. 3 Discussion and analysis. 4 Parenting time for the younger child. 5 Counselling, family reunification and related orders. 7 Medical and other supports, provision of information and recording of children's appointments. 9 Interim payment of special expenses incurred before February 8, 2025. 12 Family property issues. 13 Conclusion and summary of interim orders. 17 [1] These oral reasons for judgment have been edited for publication. [2] THE COURT: These are my oral reasons for judgment respecting certain interim orders sought by both parties at the

conclusion of the trial in this family law matter. Should either party order a transcript of these reasons, or should I decide to publish them, I reserve the right to edit for clarity, grammar, style and case citations or references, but the substance of my judgment will not change. Introduction [3] The claimant mother and the respondent father were married for 16 years. While the date of separation is disputed, it is common ground they have lived separate and apart since at least mid-June 2023. The parties have two children together: the older child is 14 and the younger child is 8. The older child resides exclusively with the claimant and has essentially not seen or had any parenting time with the respondent since June 2023. The respondent has had various parenting time with the younger child since the summer of 2023. Most recently, pursuant to a consent order granted January 28, 2025, the parties have shared parenting of the younger child on a 2-2-3 schedule. [4] Beginning March 5, 2025, I heard 27, non-consecutive days of trial in this high-conflict matter. Closing submissions finished June 5, 2025. There are significant issues to be determined regarding parenting time, parental responsibilities and decision-making, and family reunification, all of which are made more complex as a result of disputed allegations of family violence and the older child's ongoing mental health

challenges. There are also complex family property issues, including questions about the validity and enforceability of a marriage agreement entered into before the enactment of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA]. Depending on my determination regarding the marriage agreement, it may be necessary to deal with multiple, interwoven corporate assets with which the respondent is involved. [5] Given the length of the trial and the number and nature of the issues involved, before closing submissions began, I advised counsel and the parties that it will take some time for me to render my final decision. As a result, both parties sought certain interim orders as part of their closing submissions. Those interim orders fall into the following categories: a) parenting time for the younger child; b) various orders respecting counselling and family reunification programs; c) orders respecting the medical and educational supports to be provided to the older child, restrictions on recording of the children's appointments and the provision of information by the claimant to the respondent regarding the older child; d) payment for special expenses incurred by the claimant for the children up to February 8, 2025; and e) various orders regarding family property including: a preservation or asset protection order, clarification regarding additional mortgage costs resulting from efforts to

realize the first $400,000 interim distribution to the claimant for legal fees, and the claimant's request for a further $500,000 interim distribution of family property. [6] On the last day of trial, I set this appearance to provide the parties my decision regarding the interim orders sought. I cautioned the parties that in the interests of providing them a prompt decision on the interim relief, my reasons would necessarily be brief. They are maybe not as brief as I had hoped. To the extent I consider further elaboration to be required, it will be provided as part of my final decision in this matter. Discussion and analysis [7] I will deal with each category of interim orders in turn. However, by way of overview, in my view, many of the orders sought are not orders that could appropriately be granted on an interim basis. They engage the very issues that must await my final decision in the trial. Rendering an interim decision, in advance of having completed my analysis of the evidence and the law, would create a risk that the interim decision would need to be changed in a substantial way in the final order. This is particularly so where many of the legal and factual issues are intertwined. While I appreciate this has already been a long process for the parties and the children, and there is some anxiety to move forward, I must be guided by the best interests of the children and

my responsibility to apply the law to the facts as I will determine them. I have not yet done so. Parenting time for the younger child [8] As noted, the parties have been sharing parenting time for the younger child on a 2-2-3 schedule since January 28, 2025, pursuant to a consent order. That order was extended several times over the course of the trial, with the last order having been granted June 5, 2025, maintaining the current schedule until June 27, 2025, unless varied by further court order or agreement of the parties. Both parties seek a variation of the current 2-2-3 schedule on an interim basis. [9] The claimant asks for an interim order that the younger child reside primarily with her, and the respondent's parenting time be reduced from the current shared 2-2-3 schedule to a new schedule where the respondent has parenting time every second weekend from after school on Thursday to school drop off on Monday. The claimant proposes that where exchanges occur on holidays, during the summer or on other days where school is closed, the exchanges should occur at 9:00 a.m. on the Thursday or Monday. As the rationale for the requested change, the claimant points to concerns regarding behavioural issues the younger child has exhibited this spring, primarily at school, after the implementation of the current schedule. Although not sought as an interim order, the claimant supports

eventually moving back towards shared parenting of the younger child based on the parties' engagement with, and the recommendations of, counsellors she proposes the parties retain to oversee a therapeutic and restorative process. [10] The respondent objects to any reduction in his current parenting time. He seeks an interim order to maintain the shared parenting schedule but adjust the frequency of transitions, which he acknowledges can be hard for the younger child. The respondent seeks a week-on, week-off schedule, with exchanges to occur mid-week. Alternatively, the respondent seeks a move to a 3-4-4-3 schedule, or in the further alternative, continuation of the current 2-2-3 schedule. The respondent says there is no evidence the behavioural issues are connected to his increased parenting time with the younger child, and in fact, the evidence at trial supports the parties continuing to share parenting. [11] The issue of interim parenting time for the younger child is a challenging one. Both parties have concerns about the impact on the younger child of the transitions and the stress of being the only family member who spends time and energy at both households, but they take vastly different views about what would be in the child's best interests to address those concerns. This has also been a year of other stressors for the younger child. The evidence indicates he is aware

of the trial process and there have been changes at school. As a result of what I consider to be a positive step forward, the parties have agreed to the younger child recommencing counselling with Ms. Wright-Donaldson and it has been clarified that he is supported by both parties in accessing counselling resources through the school system. We are now two weeks away from the end of school. Summer is a different time and after today's decision, there are no further dates scheduled in this matter. I am optimistic that all of this will allow the parties and the children some space to breathe, and the younger child will have some external support with navigating his current role, away from the pressures of school. [12] I consider it premature, on a preliminary basis, to draw the conclusion the claimant urges that the recent behaviour issues should be attributed to increased parenting time with the respondent. I also consider it premature, on a preliminary basis, to move to the different models of shared parenting sought by the respondent. Instead, I will order that on an interim basis, the parties will continue the current 2-2-3 parenting schedule for the younger child until October 1, 2025, unless varied by further Order of the Court or agreement of the parties. Under the terms of this order, the parties are at liberty to agree to a different parenting time schedule, including a

temporary adjustment to allow each parent to spend extended periods of time with the younger child for summer holidays, provided each parent receives equal extended periods if desired. The claimant had requested July 19-27, 2025 inclusive. I am not going to make a specific order in that regard, but will convey my view that the claimant's request appears reasonable and the parties should use best efforts to facilitate each other's summer holiday plans. I remain seized of all issues regarding parenting in this matter. Counselling, family reunification and related orders [13] The claimant and respondent both seek orders respecting some form of counselling for the family as a whole, and both parties broadly support retaining Ms. Leanne Toews and her associates for counselling purposes. But their agreement stops there. On a final, rather than interim, basis, the claimant seeks orders respecting counselling and other related measures. Specifically, she seeks orders for a "therapeutic and restorative process", with defined benchmarks, including the potential involvement of other professionals. As part of the final orders sought, the claimant seeks to compel the parties to address family violence issues as part of their counselling, and suggests the completion of progress assessments at four months, as well as a further "views of the child" report regarding the younger child. The

claimant asks that the older child only be included in the therapeutic and restorative process when and as recommended by his professional team (the composition of which is the subject of another proposed final order). [14] The respondent seeks an interim order that the older child be enrolled forthwith in "Child & Youth Counselling for Court-Involved Families" with Ms. Toews and asks that he be entitled to receive information about the older child and the status of the child's counselling from Ms. Toews. The respondent seeks a second interim order that the parties and both children enrol in "family reunification counselling" with Ms. Toews, with the claimant, the respondent and the younger child to begin immediately and the older child to be integrated once Ms. Toews deems it appropriate. The respondent seeks an order that neither party attend any of the older child's counselling sessions with Ms. Toews unless she specifically directs. Finally, the respondent seeks an interim order requiring the claimant to tell the older child that the Court has ordered Ms. Toews' involvement, that the parents agree the process is in the child's best interests and that the child's good faith participation in the counselling process is required. [15] I can appreciate the respondent's desire to compel some form of forward movement with respect to the older child. He has been seeking that since

last summer. Both parties agree that some form of counselling is necessary and will be beneficial, but both approach this issue with their own motivations, not all of which appear focused or centred on the best interests of the children. The claimant seeks to circumscribe the content of counselling before the Court has addressed the allegations of family violence. The respondent seeks to compel reunification and other counselling for the older child in circumstances where the evidence at trial suggests it would currently be premature. I am not prepared to make an interim order requiring participation in counselling on the terms sought by either party. I anticipate my final reasons will provide guidance to the counsellors regarding some of the issues to be addressed, and they will use their professional judgment as well. [16] I am not prepared to order the enrolment of the older child in any counselling on an interim basis. Accordingly, there is no basis for the other interim orders respecting entitlement to information from counsellors or restrictions on the parties' attendance at such counselling sessions. As noted, there are complex issues regarding the older child's mental health journey. I understand the respondent has concerns regarding the care team supporting the older child, but the consistent evidence from all professionals who appeared before me is that he is not

currently ready, nor should he be forced to participate in matters related to this court process. The child's best interests are the paramount consideration. As difficult as it must be for the respondent, I am not persuaded the specific orders sought are in the older child's best interests at this time. [17] The parties remain at liberty to agree to retain Ms. Toews absent a court order, if they can agree on the specific terms of her engagement with the family, and provided those terms do not require the participation of the older child. I encourage the parties to attempt to find some common ground that would allow them to begin healing together, even if it requires initial compromise on each party's behalf with respect to what they believe any counselling program should address. If the parties are able to agree to begin work with Ms. Toews and her associates, counsel are to advise the Court of the nature of that work and its terms by way of letter directed to my attention through Supreme Court Scheduling. [18] I am aware certain counsellors have specific terms of orders they ask the Court to include if the Court is contemplating a final order that the parties engage with them for counselling. I appreciate the materials the parties have provided yesterday and this morning with respect to Ms. Toews. I have not yet had an opportunity to review that material. To the extent the

parties are able to assist, including potentially through further communications with Ms. Toews, I ask that by no later than the end of July 2025, counsel advise by way of letter to my attention through Supreme Court Scheduling, if Ms. Toews requires any such terms and if yes, what they are. Medical and other supports, provision of information and recording of children's appointments [19] The respondent seeks an interim order defining the persons or organizations who are to continue to support the older child in terms of his healthcare. Specifically, he seeks an interim order that, in addition to Ms. Toews, the older child continue to be supported by the Integrated Mobile Crisis Response Team (IMCRT), as necessary, and by the school advocate with whom the older child has engaged (or another person in that same role). This contrasts with the final order sought by the claimant, namely, that she encourage and support the older child to work with: his existing family doctor, Dr. Johnson (including consultations with Dr. Strauss and other referrals); IMCRT as necessary; Child and Youth Mental Health and its assignees for counselling; and the school advocate or other school support. Absent from the interim order sought by the respondent is the older child's family doctor and Child and Youth Mental Health. [20] The respondent's interim request appears directly tied to other final

orders he seeks respecting parental responsibilities and decision-making. In my view, the order sought is not an appropriate interim order. The issues respecting the older child's health care and the parties' involvement, to the extent they are even legal issues, are ones that require a careful assessment of all of the relevant evidence adduced at trial. I decline to make any such orders on an interim basis, before I have had a sufficient opportunity to consider the substantial body of evidence as a whole in the context of the applicable legal framework. [21] Given some of the background to this file, the respondent seeks an interim order prohibiting the recording of counselling and other healthcare appointments for either child without the consent of all adults involved. The claimant does not oppose such an order. In the circumstances, I agree it is an appropriate order to make on an interim basis and I will grant it. [22] Lastly, the respondent seeks an interim order requiring the claimant to provide him with at least one email update per week respecting the older child, which is to include information about the older child's mental and physical health, general and education-related progress and photographs. The claimant proposed a more limited order on a final basis, which sought to exclude from any such updates healthcare or counselling information from providers that the

older child has expressly directed not to share information with the respondent. The claimant's proposed form of order includes other safeguards, including to attempt to avoid putting either party or the children in a position of conflict. [23] The existing order of Justice Doyle, granted January 15, 2025, provides that the parties are to share all parental responsibilities for the children and that each party is entitled to "request medical, counselling, health care and education records and information regarding the Children from those providers and institutions." Under paragraph 3 of the order, the parties were to instruct their counsel to provide a joint letter advising healthcare and other providers and institutions of their entitlement to "request and promptly receive" records and information about the children. I do not know the status of that letter. The order of Justice Doyle was made applicable to all records and information regarding the children until further order of this Court. Neither party has asked me to vary the information provisions of that order, either on an interim or final basis. As it remains in place, both parties are entitled to "request and promptly receive" records and information regarding the children from healthcare and other providers. [24] The evidence indicates the respondent has experienced challenges obtaining information about the older

child, including because of directions the older child has given to certain healthcare providers. There is evidence the older child has severed at least one professional relationship with a healthcare provider after that provider did not respect his expressed wishes regarding the sharing of his information. I have received legal submissions from the parties respecting the intersection of the FLA, the Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 223 and the authority of a "mature minor". Those issues cannot be determined on an interim basis. In addition, as the history of this file already demonstrates, the Court cannot make orders compelling the actions of third parties without them being provided notice and an opportunity to appear before the Court. [25] On the other hand, the respondent is a guardian of both children and under Justice Doyle's order, shares all parental responsibilities for both children. To properly exercise those roles and be able to meaningfully participate, the respondent requires at least some information. There is precedent in other family law matters for this Court ordering the provision of "newsletter-type" updates between guardians, to address similar concerns, while respecting the need to find an appropriate balance. [26] In my view, it is appropriate to grant an interim order requiring the claimant to provide at least weekly email updates to the respondent

regarding the older child on the following specific terms: a) The weekly update is to include information about the older child's general well-being and progress, as well as at least one photograph. b) Where the older child has expressly directed his healthcare or counselling providers not to share information with the respondent, the claimant is not to share that information with the respondent. c) The claimant's updates will otherwise provide information regarding the older child's healthcare, counselling, education and activities. d) Neither party is permitted to disclose this term of order, or any information provided or received under it, to either child, directly or indirectly. e) Both parties will make reasonable efforts to protect the privacy interests of the older child and to prevent third parties from disclosing to the children the nature of this order or the information exchanged under its terms. [27] I recognize this is not a perfect solution. However, in my view, it is an appropriate interim step that centres the best interests of the older child, while permitting his parents to share information in order to put both of them in a position to support him in the future. Interim payment of special expenses incurred before February 8, 2025 [28] The claimant seeks an interim order requiring the respondent to submit to the health and welfare trust that exists through

one of the respondent's companies all special expenses she has incurred for the children up to February 8, 2025. The respondent agrees that the Court's final order should, on a go-forward basis, require the parties to contribute to special expenses for the children in proportion to their incomes. However, he opposes the request that he pay retroactive special expenses for two reasons. First, he was excluded from all medical decision-making that led to those expenses being incurred so cannot verify their necessity. Second, the health and welfare trust is not like a medical benefits plan, where a third party reimburses at least partial costs of certain health-related expenses. Rather, he says expenses put on the health and welfare trust are attributed to his shareholder's loan with the company, which he must then reconcile, with resulting implications for his income. [29] In the circumstances, I do not consider the issue of retroactive special expenses to be amenable to an interim order and I decline to make the order sought by the claimant. Since there is agreement to proportionally share special expenses on a go-forward basis, now that the formal trial has concluded, I encourage the parties to communicate with each other regarding special expenses to be incurred for the children and to share them in approximate proportion to their anticipated incomes, pending determination of

those incomes in my final decision. Family property issues [30] The parties agree the family property issues in this matter are governed by the now-repealed Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 [FRA]. The claimant seeks two interim orders respecting family property. The first is essentially an asset protection or preservation order to ensure the property at issue in this proceeding is preserved pending judgment unless she provides her written consent otherwise. The second is an order for a further interim advance of $500,000 on her interest in the family property, to be paid within four weeks, to allow her to purchase a home. This would be in addition to the $400,000 interim distribution agreed to by the parties and granted by consent order dated February 26, 2025. The respondent seeks an interim order requiring the claimant to be solely responsible for all additional costs to the mortgage on the former family home that have resulted from delays in implementing the interim distribution order and the confluence of the parties' mortgage renewal date. The Court was advised the interest rate on the mortgage has increased from 2.4% to 9.95%, as the mortgage was renewed on a six-month flexible term due to a lack of agreement from the parties about next steps. [31] With respect to the respondent's request for an interim order respecting the increased mortgage costs, the

February 26, 2025 consent order required the respondent to cooperate with the claimant in borrowing and securing up to $400,000 against the former family residence, which was defined as the "Interim Distribution Mortgage" in the order. The February 26, 2025 consent order also required the claimant to make all payments in connection with the Interim Distribution Mortgage in full and on time, without prejudice to her ability to seek reimbursement for the cost of borrowing at trial. At the time the February 26, 2025 consent order was granted, both parties appeared to expect the Interim Distribution Mortgage could be provided to the claimant in fairly short order. Unfortunately, that did not occur, and as of the conclusion of trial, the Interim Distribution Mortgage had still not been provided. It does not appear either party or their counsel anticipated the timing for the renewal of the parties' existing mortgage, which was independent of these proceedings. [32] The Court was provided with periodic updates during trial regarding the Interim Distribution Mortgage, including respecting information and other requests from the parties' financial institution. In my view, there were failings on both sides in terms of moving the Interim Distribution Mortgage forward in a timely fashion. It is not a matter that can be laid at one party's feet to the exclusion of the other. The timing for

the parties' renewal of their existing mortgage was unfortunate, in that it added a further complication, but again, based on the most recent information, while there has been some delay by the claimant in responding, it also appears that the respondent is required to provide further information before the parties could move out of the high-rate flexible mortgage into which they have been placed. In the circumstances, I do not consider it appropriate to order the claimant to solely bear the burden of the increased interest rate on the mortgage, and I will not make the interim order sought by the respondent. [33] On the final day of trial, the claimant's counsel suggested that since the parties appear to agree the respondent should buy-out the claimant's interest in the former family residence, this would be an opportune time to do so. It would allow the respondent to lock in a new mortgage solely in his name, at a more beneficial rate, and would simultaneously provide the claimant with the funds she seeks as a further interim distribution. The parties were unable to reach a resolution on that issue that day; I appreciate there were likely many factors at play. [34] In response to my memorandum of June 11, 2025, both parties provided further positions and proposals respecting how the family residence and any increased costs of borrowing for the interim distribution should be

addressed. In my view, those proposals go beyond the scope of what I requested in my memorandum and I am not in a position to grant any interim orders respecting those positions. However, I do consider the exchange of proposals to be useful for the parties themselves. Given their positions respecting the former family residence, and the fact that the current very high interest rate on the parties' mortgage is not benefitting anyone, nor am I willing to make an interim decision about how those increased costs are to be allocated, I encourage the parties to work towards some form of agreed resolution regarding the former family residence that will avoid six full months of interest at that rate. It seems to me there is ample room for discussion on this point. To the extent the parties are able to reach an agreement in this regard, I ask that counsel advise me, through Supreme Court Scheduling, of the terms of any such agreement. [35] It is not uncommon for the Court to grant interim asset protection or preservation orders, as a way of ensuring a party's family property claims are not defeated because assets have been disposed of while a family law claim remains before the courts. Section s. 67 of the FRA provides the Court authority to make such interim orders. The claimant seeks the order against the respondent, perhaps because of his admission at trial that he had sold a small

trailer in order to purchase a more functional one and perhaps because there are concerns about other instances. My impression was that the respondent did not understand the implications at the time of that sale, but now appreciates his responsibility not to dispose of or convert assets that are at issue in these proceedings. [36] In my memorandum of June 11, 2025, I asked counsel their positions on whether the order should be made reciprocal and whether it could be made by consent. Both parties have indicated their consent to a mutual order restraining their disposal of property at issue in these proceedings on particular terms. The respondent asks that the order exempt personal day-to-day living expenses including payment of legal fees, as well as his corporate interests, including the company of which he is only a part shareholder. Pursuant to s. 67 of the FRA, I will grant an interim reciprocal order restraining both parties from disposing of any property that is at issue in these proceeding without the written consent of the other party, pending my final decision in this matter. To be clear, under the terms of this order, both parties are permitted reasonable day to day living expenses, including payment of legal fees, and the respondent is not constrained from carrying on the regular business operation of [C.] and [Numbered Company] (and through that company, [Company

C.C.]). This order also does not constrain the parties' ability to reach an agreement respecting a buy-out of the former family residence if they are able to do so. [37] With respect to the claimant's request for a further interim distribution or advance of $500,000 from her interest in the family property, I note again, that family property issues in this matter are subject to the FRA property division scheme. [38] Under the FRA, there was no express provision for interim distributions. There was no parallel to s. 89 of the FLA. The jurisprudence indicates that there was initially some uncertainty about whether the Court even had jurisdiction to grant an interim distribution order. Eventually, the jurisprudence evolved to the point where the Court held there was a limited jurisdiction to grant an interim distribution under s. 66 of the FRA. The test for such an interim distribution was articulated in the case of Jiwa v. Jiwa, [1992] B.C.J. No. 3024 at para. 8 (S.C.). As set out in Jiwa, there are two aspects to the test: a. Is the advance required to mount a challenge to the other spouse's position at trial? b. Will an advance or a payment of an interim distribution jeopardize the other spouse's position at the trial? See also Ostro v. Kotyk, 2019 BCSC 2382 at paras. 8-12 and Cao v. Chen, 2018 BCSC 831 at paras. 83-89. [39] There is no evidence before me that the further

interim advance is being sought by the claimant for purposes related to funding of the litigation. In fact, counsel for the claimant was clear that the purpose or motivation for the request for a further interim advance was related to the claimant's desire to purchase a home for herself and the children rather than continuing to rent. There was no evidence that her current living situation is unstable. Even under the current s. 89 of the FLA, that is not one of the purposes for which an interim distribution can be granted, and the jurisprudence confirms that the test for interim distributions was more restrictive under s. 66 of the FRA. In my view, the claimant has not met the test for a further interim distribution and I am unable to grant her request in that regard. Conclusion and summary of interim orders [40] In summary, I am prepared to make the following interim orders pending release of my final judgment in this matter: a) Under the FLA, on an interim basis, the parties will continue the current 2-2-3 parenting schedule for the younger child until October 1, 2025, unless varied by further order of the Court or agreement of the parties. The parties are at liberty to agree to a different parenting time schedule, including temporary adjustments to allow extended time for summer holidays, provided each parent receives equal extended time if desired. b) Under the FLA, no

counselling sessions or other healthcare appointments regarding either child will be recorded without the consent of all adults who are involved. c) Under the FLA, the claimant is to provide at least weekly email updates to the respondent regarding the older child on the following terms: i. The weekly update is to include information about the older child's well-being and progress, as well as at least one photograph. ii. Where the older child has expressly directed his healthcare or counselling providers not to share information with the respondent, the claimant is not to share that information with the respondent. iii. The claimant's updates will otherwise provide information regarding the older child's healthcare, counselling, education and activities. iv. Neither party is permitted to disclose this term of order, or any information provided or received under it, to either child, directly or indirectly. v. Both parties will make reasonable efforts to protect the privacy interests of the older child and to prevent third parties from disclosing to the children the existence of this order or the information exchanged under its terms. d) Pursuant to s. 67 of the FRA, and by consent, on an interim basis pending the Court's final decision, neither party will dispose of, transfer, encumber or convert any property at issue in these proceedings without prior written consent of the

other party, except that both parties are permitted reasonable day to day living expenses, including payment of legal fees, and the respondent is not constrained from carrying on the regular business operations of [C.] and [Numbered Company] (and through that company, [C.C.]). [41] I decline to make the remaining interim orders sought by either party. I remain seized of all issues regarding parenting in this matter. [42] Subject to any questions, that is my decision on the interim orders. "K. Wolfe J."