R. v. Parshall

R. v. Parshall Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2018-01-24 Neutral citation 2018 ONCA 59 Docket numbers C63615 Judges Hoy, Alexandra; MacPherson, James C.; Rouleau, Paul S. Subject Criminal Decision Content COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. Parshall, 2018 ONCA 59 DATE: 20180124 DOCKET: C63615 Hoy A.C.J.O., MacPherson and Rouleau JJ.A. BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen Respondent and Adam Parshall Appellant Christian DesLauriers, for the appellant Caroline Carrasco, for the respondent Heard: January 23, 2018 On appeal from the conviction entered on November 2, 2016 by Justice Mitch Hoffman of the Ontario Court of Justice. REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant Adam Parshall was convicted of several drug related offences by Hoffman J. of the Ontario Court of Justice in Ottawa. He appeals the convictions. [2] Based on a search warrant, the police seized nearly two ounces of cocaine, approximately 23 ounces of marijuana and marijuana shake, crystal methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and more than $1,000 cash from the appellant’s apartment at unit 2-504 Bronson Ave. in Ottawa. [3] At his trial, the appellant applied under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to quash the search warrant for his residence and to exclude the drugs and money obtained pursuant to the search. [4] The trial judge dismissed the appellant’s application. He applied the criteria for evaluating an Information to Obtain a search warrant enunciated in R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140. He found that the information provided by the confidential police informant (“CI”) was compelling and credible. He also found that the corroboration of CI’s information was “not overwhelming” and “significant but limited”. He upheld the Justice of the Peace’s decision to issue the search warrant. [5] The appellant challenges the trial judge’s ruling on two grounds. [6] First, the appellant contends that the trial judge misstated the test for granting the search warrant when he framed the issue in this fashion: The issue boils down to whether there is some reliable information that might reasonably be believed upon which the issuing Justice of the Peace could have issued the search warrant. [Emphasis added.] [7] The appellant attacks the emphasized portion of this passage. He says that it sets the bar for judicial authorization of a search warrant too low because the accepted test is whether there is “sufficient credible and reliable evidence” to support the warrant: see R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, at para. 84. [8] We do not accept this submission, essentially for two reasons. [9] First, the appellant’s submission amounts to linguistic quibbling. In R. v. Araujo, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, Lebel J. said, at para. 51: In looking for reliable information on which the authorizing judge could have granted the authorization, the question is simply whether there was at least some evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued. [Emphasis in original.] [10] Second, a fair reading of the trial judge’s ruling establishes that he was very focussed on both the credibility and reliability of the CI and the information he/she provided. He did not look for “some” information in the air. Rather he explicitly linked the information he was examining to the concepts of credibility and reliability. [11] The appellant’s second basis for challenging the search warrant is that the trial judge misapplied the Debot factors. [12] We are not persuaded by this submission. In his factum, the appellant states that “[t]he information provided by the CI was somewhat compelling” and “[t]he appellant is not suggesting that the CI in the case at bar should not have been considered to be reliable, but only that his/her reliability is not as solid as the reviewing judge concludes it to be”. This strikes us as, at most, only an attack at the margins of the trial judge’s reasoning on these points. [13] On the corroboration factor, the appellant submits: [T]he information based on which the reviewing judge concluded that the information provided by the CI was corroborated is a few confirmed entries of individuals into unit 2-504 Bronson Avenue, and observations made by the police of [Bernard Jacobs]. The appellant submits that this was less than sufficient to corroborate the CI information. [14] We disagree. The trial judge explicitly recognized that, of the three Debot factors, the weakest in this case was corroboration. He said: “I find the information to be corroborated to a moderate degree.” With respect to Bernard Jacobs, he said: The ITO contains an opinion viewed through the lens of police experience, and drug investigation experience, that Jacobs is the supplier, or is a supplier of drugs to the accused. … As I indicated the observations of Jacobs are helpful because of his connection to unit 2 through his connection to the accused. [15] We do not see a problem with this analysis. The trial judge does not exaggerate the strength of the corroboration factor. Rather, he labels it as “somewhat significant, but limited”. He then combines it with his strong conclusion relating to the credibility of the CI and the compelling nature of the information he provided to reach the ultimate conclusion that it was appropriate to issue the search warrant. We agree with his analysis and conclusion. [16] The appeal is dismissed. “Alexandra Hoy A.C.J.O.” “J.C. MacPherson J.A.” “Paul Rouleau J.A.”