Canada (Attorney General) v. Campeau

Canada (Attorney General) v. Campeau Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2006-11-17 Neutral citation 2006 FCA 376 File numbers A-57-06 Decision Content Date: 20061117 Docket: A-57-06 Citation: 2006 FCA 376 CORAM: DESJARDINS J.A. LÉTOURNEAU J.A. PELLETIER J.A. BETWEEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Applicant and JOHANNE CAMPEAU Respondent Hearing held at Montréal, Quebec, November 9, 2006. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, November 17, 2006. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LÉTOURNEAU J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: DESJARDINS J.A. PELLETIER J.A. Date: 20061117 Docket: A-57-06 Citation: 2006 FCA 376 CORAM: DESJARDINS J.A. LÉTOURNEAU J.A. PELLETIER J.A. BETWEEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Applicant and JOHANNE CAMPEAU Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT LÉTOURNEAU J.A. [1] Were the Umpire and the Board of Referees correct in determining that the respondent, Ms. Campeau, left her employment without just cause because it was not suitable? Under the circumstances, the response must be in the negative since their respective conclusions reflect an error in interpreting sections 29 and 30 of the Employment Assurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 (the Act) and confusion in applying sections 27, 29 and 30 of this Act. [2] Sections 27 to 30 of the Act are set out below: 27. (1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits under this Part if, without good cause since the interruption of earnings giving rise to the claim, the claimant 27. (1) Le prestataire est exclu du bénéfice des prestations prévues par la présente partie si, sans motif valable, depuis l’arrêt de rémunération qui est à l’origine de sa demande, selon le cas: (a) has not applied for a suitable employment that is vacant after becoming aware that it is vacant or becoming vacant, or has failed to accept the employment after it has been offered to the claimant; a) il n’a pas postulé un emploi convenable qui était vacant, après avoir appris que cet emploi était vacant ou sur le point de le devenir, ou a refusé un tel emploi lorsqu’il lui a été offert; (b) has not taken advantage of an opportunity for suitable employment; b) il n’a pas profité d’une occasion d’obtenir un emploi convenable; (c) has not carried out a written direction given to the claimant by the Commission with a view to assisting the claimant to find suitable employment, if the direction was reasonable having regard both to the claimant’s circumstances and to the usual means of obtaining that employment; or c) il n’a pas suivi toutes les instructions écrites que lui avait données la Commission en vue de l’aider à trouver un emploi convenable, si ces instructions étaient raisonnables eu égard à la fois à sa situation et aux moyens usuels d’obtenir cet emploi; (d) has not attended an interview that the Commission has directed the claimant to attend to enable the Commission or another appropriate agency (i) to provide information and instruction to help the claimant find employment, or (ii) to identify whether the claimant might be assisted by job training or other employment assistance. d) il ne s’est pas présenté à une entrevue à laquelle la Commission lui avait ordonné de se présenter afin de permettre à celle‑ci ou à tout autre organisme approprié, selon le cas: (i) de fournir des renseignements et instructions visant à l’aider à trouver un emploi, (ii) de décider si des cours de formation professionnelle ou toute autre forme d’aide à l’emploi pourraient lui être utiles. (1.1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits under this Part if (1.1) Il y a également exclusion du bénéfice des prestations prévues par la présente partie si: (a) the Commission or an authority that the Commission designates has, with the agreement of the claimant, referred the claimant to a course or program of instruction or training or to any other employment activity for which assistance has been provided under employment benefits; and a) la Commission ou l’autorité qu’elle désigne a dirigé le prestataire, avec son accord, vers un cours ou programme d’instruction ou de formation ou une autre activité d’emploi à l’égard de laquelle de l’aide lui était fournie dans le cadre d’une prestation d’emploi; (b) the Commission has terminated the referral because (i) without good cause, the claimant has not attended or participated in the course, program or employment activity and, in the opinion of the Commission, it is unlikely that the claimant will successfully complete the course, program or employment activity, (ii) without good cause, the claimant has withdrawn from the course, program or employment activity, or (iii) the organization providing the course, program or employment activity has expelled the claimant. b) la Commission a mis fin à l’affectation du prestataire parce que, selon le cas: (i) le prestataire, sans motif valable, n’a pas suivi le cours ou programme ou n’a pas participé à l’activité et elle estime qu’il est peu probable qu’il les termine avec succès, (ii) le prestataire, sans motif valable, a abandonné le cours, le programme ou l’activité, (iii) le prestataire a fait l’objet d’une expulsion par l’organisme responsable du cours, du programme ou de l’activité en cause. (2) For the purposes of this section, employment is not suitable employment for a claimant if (2) Pour l’application du présent article, un emploi n’est pas un emploi convenable pour un prestataire s’il s’agit: (a) it arises in consequence of a stoppage of work attributable to a labour dispute; a) soit d’un emploi inoccupé du fait d’un arrêt de travail dû à un conflit collectif; (b) it is in the claimant’s usual occupation either at a lower rate of earnings or on conditions less favourable than those observed by agreement between employers and employees, or in the absence of any such agreement, than those recognized by good employers; or b) soit d’un emploi dans le cadre de son occupation ordinaire à un taux de rémunération plus bas ou à des conditions moins favorables que le taux ou les conditions appliqués par convention entre employeurs et employés ou, à défaut de convention, admis par les bons employeurs; (c) it is not in the claimant’s usual occupation and is either at a lower rate of earnings or on conditions less favourable than those that the claimant might reasonably expect to obtain, having regard to the conditions that the claimant usually obtained in the claimant’s usual occupation, or would have obtained if the claimant had continued to be so employed. c) soit d’un emploi d’un genre différent de celui qu’il exerce dans le cadre de son occupation ordinaire, à un taux de rémunération plus bas ou à des conditions moins favorables que le taux ou les conditions qu’il pourrait raisonnablement s’attendre à obtenir, eu égard aux conditions qui lui étaient habituellement faites dans l’exercice de son occupation ordinaire ou qui lui auraient été faites s’il avait continué à exercer un tel emploi. (3) After a lapse of a reasonable interval from the date on which an insured person becomes unemployed, paragraph (2)(c) does not apply to the employment described in that paragraph if it is employment at a rate of earnings not lower and on conditions not less favourable than those observed by agreement between employers and employees or, in the absence of any such agreement, than those recognized by good employers. (3) Après un délai raisonnable à partir de la date à laquelle un assuré s’est trouvé en chômage, l’alinéa (2)c) ne s’applique pas à l’emploi qui y est visé s’il s’agit d’un emploi à un taux de rémunération qui n’est pas plus bas et à des conditions qui ne sont pas moins favorables que le taux ou les conditions appliqués par convention entre employeurs et employés ou, à défaut de convention, admis par les bons employeurs. 28. (1) A disqualification under section 27 is for the number of weeks that the Commission may determine, but 28. (1) Lorsque le prestataire est exclu du bénéfice des prestations en vertu de l’article 27, il l’est pour le nombre de semaines que la Commission détermine. Toutefois, le nombre de semaines d’exclusion dans les cas visés: (a) the number of weeks of a disqualification arising under paragraph 27(1)(a) or (b) shall be not fewer than 7 or more than 12; and a) aux alinéas 27(1)a) et b) est d’au moins sept et ne peut dépasser douze; (b) the number of weeks of a disqualification arising under paragraph 27(1)(c) or (d) or subsection 27(1.1) shall be not more than 6. b) aux alinéas 27(1)c) et d) et au paragraphe 27(1.1) ne peut dépasser six. (2) Subject to subsections (3) to (5), the weeks of disqualification are to be served during the weeks following the waiting period for which benefits would otherwise be payable if the disqualification had not been imposed and, for greater certainty, the length of the disqualification is not affected by any subsequent loss of employment by the claimant during the benefit period. (2) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3) à (5), l’exclusion doit être purgée au cours des semaines de la période de prestations du prestataire qui suivent le délai de carence pour lesquelles il aurait sans cela droit à des prestations. Il demeure par ailleurs entendu que la durée de cette exclusion n’est pas touchée par la perte subséquente d’un emploi au cours de la période de prestations. (3) Any portion of the disqualification that has not been served when the claimant’s benefit period ends shall, subject to subsections (4) and (5), be served in any benefit period subsequently established within two years after the event giving rise to the disqualification. (3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), la partie de l’exclusion qui n’a pas été purgée au moment où prend fin la période de prestations l’est au cours de toute période de prestations établie dans les deux ans suivant la date de l’événement à l’origine de l’exclusion. (4) No weeks of disqualification shall be carried forward against a claimant who has had 700 or more hours of insurable employment since the event giving rise to the disqualification. (4) Aucune semaine d’exclusion ne peut être reportée à une période ultérieure à l’encontre du prestataire si, depuis la date de l’événement à l’origine de l’exclusion, il a exercé un emploi assurable durant au moins sept cents heures. (5) The Commission shall defer the serving of the disqualification if the claimant is otherwise entitled to special benefits or benefits by virtue of section 25. (5) La Commission est tenue de reporter l’obligation de purger l’exclusion dans les cas où le prestataire a droit à des prestations spéciales ou à des prestations en raison de l’article 25. (6) For the purposes of this Part, benefits are deemed to be paid for the weeks of disqualification. (6) Pour l’application de la présente partie, des prestations sont réputées avoir été versées pour les semaines d’exclusion. (7) Subsection (6) does not apply to prevent a claimant from requesting that a benefit period established for the claimant as a minor attachment claimant be cancelled under subsection 10(6) and that a benefit period be established for the claimant as a major attachment claimant to enable the claimant to receive special benefits. (7) Le paragraphe (6) n’a pas pour effet d’empêcher le prestataire de demander qu’une période de prestations établie à son profit à titre de prestataire de la deuxième catégorie soit annulée en vertu du paragraphe 10(6) et qu’une période de prestations soit établie à son profit à titre de prestataire de la première catégorie de façon à lui permettre de recevoir des prestations spéciales. 29. For the purposes of sections 30 to 33, 29. Pour l’application des articles 30 à 33: (a) “employment” refers to any employment of the claimant within their qualifying period or their benefit period; a) « emploi » s’entend de tout emploi exercé par le prestataire au cours de sa période de référence ou de sa période de prestations; (b) loss of employment includes a suspension from employment, but does not include loss of, or suspension from, employment on account of membership in, or lawful activity connected with, an association, organization or union of workers; b) la suspension est assimilée à la perte d’emploi, mais n’est pas assimilée à la perte d’emploi la suspension ou la perte d’emploi résultant de l’affiliation à une association, une organisation ou un syndicat de travailleurs ou de l’exercice d’une activité licite s’y rattachant; (b.1) voluntarily leaving an employment includes (i) the refusal of employment offered as an alternative to an anticipated loss of employment, in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the loss of employment occurs, (ii) the refusal to resume an employment, in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the employment is supposed to be resumed, and (iii) the refusal to continue in an employment after the work, undertaking or business of the employer is transferred to another employer, in which case the voluntary leaving occurs when the work, undertaking or business is transferred; and b.1) sont assimilés à un départ volontaire le refus: (i) d’accepter un emploi offert comme solution de rechange à la perte prévisible de son emploi, auquel cas le départ volontaire a lieu au moment où son emploi prend fin, (ii) de reprendre son emploi, auquel cas le départ volontaire a lieu au moment où il est censé le reprendre, (iii) de continuer d’exercer son emploi lorsque celui‑ci est visé par le transfert d’une activité, d’une entreprise ou d’un secteur à un autre employeur, auquel cas le départ volontaire a lieu au moment du transfert; (c) just cause for voluntarily leaving an employment or taking leave from an employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving or taking leave, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the following: (i) sexual or other harassment, (ii) obligation to accompany a spouse, common-law partner or dependent child to another residence, (iii) discrimination on a prohibited ground of discrimination within the meaning of the Canadian Human Rights Act, (iv) working conditions that constitute a danger to health or safety, (v) obligation to care for a child or a member of the immediate family, (vi) reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future, (vii) significant modification of terms and conditions respecting wages or salary, (viii) excessive overtime work or refusal to pay for overtime work, (ix) significant changes in work duties, (x) antagonism with a supervisor if the claimant is not primarily responsible for the antagonism, (xi) practices of an employer that are contrary to law, (xii) discrimination with regard to employment because of membership in an association, organization or union of workers, (xiii) undue pressure by an employer on the claimant to leave their employment, and (xiv) any other reasonable circumstances that are prescribed. c) le prestataire est fondé à quitter volontairement son emploi ou à prendre congé si, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, notamment de celles qui sont énumérées ci‑après, son départ ou son congé constitue la seule solution raisonnable dans son cas: (i) harcèlement, de nature sexuelle ou autre, (ii) nécessité d’accompagner son époux ou conjoint de fait ou un enfant à charge vers un autre lieu de résidence, (iii) discrimination fondée sur des motifs de distinction illicite, au sens de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne, (iv) conditions de travail dangereuses pour sa santé ou sa sécurité, (v) nécessité de prendre soin d’un enfant ou d’un proche parent, (vi) assurance raisonnable d’un autre emploi dans un avenir immédiat, (vii) modification importante de ses conditions de rémunération, (viii) excès d’heures supplémentaires ou non‑rémunération de celles‑ci, (ix) modification importante des fonctions, (x) relations conflictuelles, dont la cause ne lui est pas essentiellement imputable, avec un supérieur, (xi) pratiques de l’employeur contraires au droit, (xii) discrimination relative à l’emploi en raison de l’appartenance à une association, une organisation ou un syndicat de travailleurs, (xiii) incitation indue par l’employeur à l’égard du prestataire à quitter son emploi, (xiv) toute autre circonstance raisonnable prévue par règlement. 30. (1) A claimant is disqualified from receiving any benefits if the claimant lost any employment because of their misconduct or voluntarily left any employment without just cause, unless 30. (1) Le prestataire est exclu du bénéfice des prestations s’il perd un emploi en raison de son inconduite ou s’il quitte volontairement un emploi sans justification, à moins, selon le cas: (a) the claimant has, since losing or leaving the employment, been employed in insurable employment for the number of hours required by section 7 or 7.1 to qualify to receive benefits; or a) que, depuis qu’il a perdu ou quitté cet emploi, il ait exercé un emploi assurable pendant le nombre d’heures requis, au titre de l’article 7 ou 7.1, pour recevoir des prestations de chômage; (b) the claimant is disentitled under sections 31 to 33 in relation to the employment. b) qu’il ne soit inadmissible, à l’égard de cet emploi, pour l’une des raisons prévues aux articles 31 à 33. (2) The disqualification is for each week of the claimant’s benefit period following the waiting period and, for greater certainty, the length of the disqualification is not affected by any subsequent loss of employment by the claimant during the benefit period. (2) L’exclusion vaut pour toutes les semaines de la période de prestations du prestataire qui suivent son délai de carence. Il demeure par ailleurs entendu que la durée de cette exclusion n’est pas affectée par la perte subséquente d’un emploi au cours de la période de prestations. (3) If the event giving rise to the disqualification occurs during a benefit period of the claimant, the disqualification does not include any week in that benefit period before the week in which the event occurs. (3) Dans les cas où l’événement à l’origine de l’exclusion survient au cours de sa période de prestations, l’exclusion du prestataire ne comprend pas les semaines de la période de prestations qui précèdent celle où survient l’événement. (4) Notwithstanding subsection (6), the disqualification is suspended during any week for which the claimant is otherwise entitled to special benefits. (4) Malgré le paragraphe (6), l’exclusion est suspendue pendant les semaines pour lesquelles le prestataire a autrement droit à des prestations spéciales. (5) If a claimant who has lost or left an employment as described in subsection (1) makes an initial claim for benefits, the following hours may not be used to qualify under section 7 or 7.1 to receive benefits: (a) hours of insurable employment from that or any other employment before the employment was lost or left; and (b) hours of insurable employment in any employment that the claimant subsequently loses or leaves, as described in subsection (1). (5) Dans les cas où le prestataire qui a perdu ou quitté un emploi dans les circonstances visées au paragraphe (1) formule une demande initiale de prestations, les heures d’emploi assurable provenant de cet emploi ou de tout autre emploi qui précèdent la perte de cet emploi ou le départ volontaire et les heures d’emploi assurable dans tout emploi que le prestataire perd ou quitte par la suite, dans les mêmes circonstances, n’entrent pas en ligne de compte pour l’application de l’article 7 ou 7.1. (6) No hours of insurable employment in any employment that a claimant loses or leaves, as described in subsection (1), may be used for the purpose of determining the maximum number of weeks of benefits under subsection 12(2) or the claimant’s rate of weekly benefits under section 14. (6) Les heures d’emploi assurable dans un emploi que le prestataire perd ou quitte dans les circonstances visées au paragraphe (1) n’entrent pas en ligne de compte pour déterminer le nombre maximal de semaines pendant lesquelles des prestations peuvent être versées, au titre du paragraphe 12(2), ou le taux de prestations, au titre de l’article 14. (7) For greater certainty, but subject to paragraph (1)(a), a claimant may be disqualified under subsection (1) even if the claimant’s last employment before their claim for benefits was not lost or left as described in that subsection and regardless of whether their claim is an initial claim for benefits. (7) Sous réserve de l’alinéa (1)a), il demeure entendu qu’une exclusion peut être imposée pour une raison visée au paragraphe (1) même si l’emploi qui précède immédiatement la demande de prestations — qu’elle soit initiale ou non — n’est pas l’emploi perdu ou quitté au titre de ce paragraphe. THE FACTS AND THE PROCEEDING [3] The Court is not unsympathetic to the respondent’s situation. She had worked as a cook’s helper at the Centre de jeunesse de Montréal for over 22 years before leaving her employment to accompany her husband with whom she had just reconciled. They moved to the Outaouais. [4] The respondent immediately started looking for employment. She accepted housekeeping work at the rate of $8.50 an hour. Once she began working there, she realized two things: first, she was replacing a person and was temporarily serving that person’s clients and second, despite the employer’s promises, she was only called upon to work for a few hours, which generated little income. The first week, her gross pay was $75.17, the second, $141.97. [5] The respondent went to a local employment centre, where she learned there were daycare jobs available at the Centres de la petite enfance in Papineauville. It was then, she says, that she discovered she was probably entitled to Employment Insurance benefits, and filed a claim. [6] There is a difference of opinion as to when this claim was made. According to the Board of Referees, the respondent left her employment in the Outaouais before filing her Employment Insurance claim. However, the documentary evidence in the file clearly shows that the claim was made on October 27, 2003, and that the respondent’s second week of employment ended on November 6, 2003: see the respondent’s record at pages 11, 31 and 33. [7] The respondent stated in her Employment Insurance claim that she had not worked during the previous 52 weeks, thus failing to mention the employment in the Outaouais that she had held briefly. She was declared eligible for benefits as of October 26, 2003. [8] In June 2004, the Employment Insurance Commission (the Commission) discovered that the respondent had left her employment in the Outaouais. The Commission reviewed the respondent’s file and concluded that she had left this employment without just cause, which disqualified her from receiving benefits under section 30 of the Act. This resulted in an overpayment of $5,408. [9] The respondent successfully appealed this decision to the Board of Referees (the Board). On the other hand, the appeal by the Commission to the Umpire was dismissed. The Commission’s application for judicial review of that decision is before us. THE DECISION BY THE BOARD OF REFEREES [10] Four aspects of this decision should be noted, as they demonstrate the Board’s tortuous reasoning and the resulting ambiguity. [11] First, the Board cited Canada (Attorney General) v. Tremblay, [1994] F.C.J. No. 896 and Astronomo v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1025, which deal with the issue of leaving employment without just cause under section 30 of the Act. That was the issue raised by the Commission before the Board. The Board found that the respondent had just cause to leave her employment. [12] Next, the Board referred to a person’s right to refuse employment that is not suitable, a right provided a contrario in section 27 of the Act. The Board decided that the respondent’s employment was not suitable because the employer did not offer her enough hours to enable her to support herself. In the Board’s opinion, leaving was the only reasonable alternative in the circumstances. The Board thus returned to the criteria in sections 29 and 30 of the Act. [13] Third, the Board concluded by citing the following statement written by Umpire Muldoon almost 20 years ago regarding the right to refuse employment that is not suitable: A claimant seeking suitable employment is, after a short time (not defined) of trying out the offered job, just as entitled to raise just cause for voluntary leaving if it be not suitable employment, as the claimant who refuses the job because it is not suitable employment is entitled to raise good cause for refusal. [14] I conclude from the Board’s decision that it considered suitability of employment just cause for leaving employment under section 30 of the Act. [15] Finally, section 27 of the Act is the yardstick for measuring whether an employment is suitable. Subsection 27(2) defines employment that is not suitable. Section 28 limits the duration of the disqualification under section 27. In this case, there is no evidence on which the Board of Referees could determine the suitability of the employment based on the criteria and the definition in section 27. As mentioned earlier, the decision by the Commission that was appealed to the Board referred to a disqualification under section 30, not section 27, of the Act. THE DECISION BY THE UMPIRE [16] The Umpire agreed with the Commission “that there is a consistent line of authority that a claimant who leaves employment because it does not offer an adequate salary has not established just cause for doing so within the meaning of the Employment Insurance Act.” However, he relied on the precedent created by Umpire Muldoon and cited by the Board on the issue of suitable employment. He added that the Board was responsible for assessing the evidence and testimony submitted to it, that the Umpire could not substitute his opinion for that of the Board, and that his role was limited to deciding whether the view of facts taken by the Board was reasonably open to it on the record. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION BY THE UMPIRE CONFIRMING THE DECISION BY THE BOARD OF REFEREES [17] At the outset, it should be noted that the issue before the Umpire was not a question of fact, but a question of law, i.e. what constitutes just cause under section 30 of the Act. In Tanguay v. Canada (Unemployment Insurance Commission), [1985] F.C.J. No. 910, at page 2, Mr. Justice Pratte wrote for the Court: It is true that it is sometimes said that the question of whether an employee was justified in leaving his employment is one of fact. However, it is clear that where the question is as to the definition that must be given to the words “just cause” in s. 41(1), this is purely a question of law. It follows that if a decision is made which cannot be reconciled with this definition, the decision is vitiated by an error of law. Subsection 41(1) is now subsection 30(1). [18] Under paragraph 29(c) of the Act, a claimant is justified in leaving an employment if, having regard to all the circumstances, he or she had no reasonable alternative. Paragraph 29(c) is neither restrictive nor exhaustive, but subparagraphs (i) to (xiv) delineate the type of circumstances that must be considered. As Mr. Justice Décary stated in Canada (Attorney General) v. Côté, 2006 FCA 219, at paragraph 11, “all types of ‘just cause’ set out by Parliament in paragraph 29(c) of the Act, except for those specified in subparagraphs (vi) (‘reasonable assurance of another employment in the immediate future’) and (xiv) (‘any other reasonable circumstances that are prescribed’) assume third‑party intervention.” Like him, I am reticent to add by jurisprudential means a “just cause” which would depend on the claimant in each case evaluating whether an employment is suitable for him or her. In Côté, the “just cause” referred to by Décary J.A.. depended on whether the claimant wanted to return to his or her studies or continue them. [19] Moreover, “just cause” within the meaning of section 30 is not necessarily synonymous with “reason” or “motive”: see Côté and Tanguay, above. Accordingly, good cause for failing to accept a suitable employment under section 27 is not necessarily just cause for leaving one under section 30. [20] In this case, section 27 did not apply because, according to the situations set out in that section, the respondent did not refuse suitable employment, or fail to take an opportunity to obtain such employment. The applicable provisions are in sections 29 and 30, which deal with voluntarily leaving an employment where the circumstances are such that leaving is the only reasonable alternative. The respondent here could have kept her job, received benefits adjusted to her income and looked for a new job. This was the reasonable alternative for her and for the Employment Insurance system, which would then have been called upon to play the supportive role mandated by Parliament, rather than being compelled to assume all the costs incurred without just cause as a result of the respondent’s act. [21] The respondent works and was working the first time she came into contact with the Employment Insurance system. A good part of the difficulties she now faces stem from her lack of knowledge of the Act and the system. She was sincere and wanted to work in a region where employment prospects were more limited. In fact, she took some training (while unemployed and receiving benefits) and found a new job. The job she left did not give her an adequate income. But sincerity and inadequate income do not constitute just cause under section 30 of the Act, allowing her to leave her employment and making the Employment Insurance system bear the cost of supporting her: see Canada (Attorney General) v. Tremblay, above. [22] In short, given the error in law by the Board of Referees regarding the meaning of just cause under section 30 of the Act, the total absence of evidence as to suitable employment under the criteria in section 27 and the fact that section 27 did not apply in this case, the Umpire should have intervened to allow the Commission’s appeal. [23] There is no doubt that the result is deplorable for the respondent whose lack of knowledge of the system and her inexperience in this area caused her misadventure. I deplore it, but I must apply the Act and I am bound the precedents of our Court. [24] For these reasons, the application for judicial review will be allowed without costs, the Umpire’s decision will be set aside, and the matter will be referred to the Chief Umpire or his or her designate for redetermination on the basis that the appeal by the Commission should be allowed, and the respondent should be disqualified from receiving benefits because she voluntarily left an employment without just cause within the meaning of section 30 of the Act. “Gilles Létourneau” J.A. “I concur. Alice Desjardins J.A.” “I concur. J.D. Denis Pelletier J.A.” Certified true translation Mary Jo Egan, LLB FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-57-06 STYLE OF CAUSE: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA v. JOHANNE CAMPEAU PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec DATE OF HEARING: November 9, 2006 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LÉTOURNEAU J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: DESJARDINS J.A. PELLETIER J.A. DATED: November 17, 2006 APPEARANCES Carole Bureau FOR THE APPLICANT Johanne Campeau FOR THE RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD: John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE APPLICANT