Topple (Re)
A defaulted Division II consumer proposal does not constitute prior bankruptcy under the BIA definition in s.2(1) because defaulting a proposal does not effect a deemed assignment into bankruptcy; therefore a person who has only defaulted a proposal remains eligible for automatic discharge under s.168.1 if otherwise qualified; s.173(1)(j) does not negate automatic discharge because it governs court hearings, which do not arise where discharge is automatic.
- Citation
- 2001 NSSC 219
- Parties
- Trustee: Goodman Associates Inc.; Bankrupt: John Edward Topple
- Court
- Supreme Court of Nova Scotia
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 5 February 2001
- Procedural Posture
- Bankruptcy Discharge Application / Application for Discharge (objection by Trustee)
- Outcome
- Discharge granted subject to a short period of suspension; held that a prior defaulted Division II consumer proposal does not preclude automatic discharge under s.168.1
- Legal Topics
- Automatic Discharge, Consumer Proposal Default, Definition of "bankrupt", Interpretation of BIA S.168.1 and S.173
- Source Language
- English
Case Brief
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Parties
Goodman Associates Inc.
Trustee
John Edward Topple
Bankrupt
Procedural Posture
Bankruptcy Discharge Application / Application for Discharge (objection by Trustee)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a prior defaulted Division II consumer proposal disqualifies a first-time bankrupt from automatic discharge under s.168.1 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
- 2 Whether a person who made a consumer proposal but defaulted is a "bankrupt" under s.2(1) for purposes of s.168.1
Ratio Decidendi
A defaulted Division II consumer proposal does not constitute prior bankruptcy under the BIA definition in s.2(1) because defaulting a proposal does not effect a deemed assignment into bankruptcy; therefore a person who has only defaulted a proposal remains eligible for automatic discharge under s.168.1 if otherwise qualified; s.173(1)(j) does not negate automatic discharge because it governs court hearings, which do not arise where discharge is automatic.
Court Disposition
Discharge granted subject to a short period of suspension; held that a prior defaulted Division II consumer proposal does not preclude automatic discharge under s.168.1
Orders
- Discharge granted subject to a short period of suspension
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